Creating Cayman as an Offshore Financial Center: Structure & Strategy since 1960 by Freyer, Tony & Morriss, Andrew P.
Texas A&M University School of Law 
Texas A&M Law Scholarship 
Faculty Scholarship 
1-2013 
Creating Cayman as an Offshore Financial Center: Structure & 
Strategy since 1960 
Tony Freyer 
Andrew P. Morriss 
Texas A&M University School of Law, amorriss@law.tamu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tony Freyer & Andrew P. Morriss, Creating Cayman as an Offshore Financial Center: Structure & Strategy 
since 1960, 45 Ariz. St. L.J. 1297 (2013). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/23 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more 
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 
CREATING CAYMAN AS AN OFFSHORE
FINANCIAL CENTER: Structure & Strategy
since 1960
Tony Freyer* & Andrew P. Morriss**
ABSTRACT
The Cayman Islands are one of the world's leading offshore financial
centers (OFCs). Their development from almost a barter economy in 1960
to a leading OFC for the location of hedge funds, captive insurance
companies, yacht registrations, special purpose vehicles, and international
banking today was the result of a collaborative policy-making process that
involved local leaders, expatriate professionals, and British officials. Over
several decades, Cayman created a political system that enabled it to
successfully compete in world financial markets for transactions, participate
in major international efforts to control financial crimes, and avoid the
political, economic, racial, and social problems that plague many of its
Caribbean neighbors. Using archival sources, participant interviews, and a
wide range of other materials, this Article describes how the collaborative
policy making process developed over time and discusses the implications
of Cayman's success for financial reform efforts today.
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INTRODUCTION
Offshore financial centers ("OFCs") generally and the Cayman Islands in
particular have inconsistent reputations. While critics of offshore
jurisdictions frequently assert that OFCs are under-regulated-as with
Ronen Palen's complaint that OFC transactions "are not only free from the
regulation of the country in which the bank resides, but are subject to no
mandatory regulations whatsoever"'-others have seen them as an
important part of the world financial system. For example, Professor
William Vlcek termed them "nodal points in the web of banks and financial
institutions that interlace the world via electronic connections."2 And the
Economist Intelligence Unit ("EIU") published a series of reports on
offshore jurisdictions between 1972 and 2002 that showed how Cayman
exemplified efforts by OFCs to compete regionally and globally for
economic growth through promotion of high value financial products.3
1. Ronen Palan, Offshore and the Structural Enablement of Sovereignty, in OFFSHORE
FINANCE CENTERS AND TAX HAVENS: THE RISE OF GLOBAL CAPITAL 18, 21 (Mark P. Hampton
& Jason Abbott eds., 1999); Nicholas Shaxson identified Cayman among stereotypical "treasure
islands" engaged in money laundering, drug trafficking, and broader tax evasion. Nevertheless,
he insisted, these were "all shades of gray." Rob Hopkins, An Interview with Nick Shaxson,
author of 'Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men Who Stole the World', TRANSITION
CULTURE (May 14, 2012), http://transitionculture.org/2012/05/14/an-interview-with-nick-
shaxson-author-of-treasure-islands-tax-havens-and-the-men-who-stole-the-world/. Switzerland
presented "a classic example" whereby for "decades [it] set out to provide banking secrecy and
to attract dirty money, criminal money and other sorts of money from around the world. But
every country, in a sense, is a tax haven in its own right because there [was not] an international
network of transparency, of sharing information between countries that makes any country in
the world completely transparent." Id. Major malefactors nonetheless included large nations
such as the United States and Great Britain that through "democratically created tax systems"
enabled wealthy individuals and multinational corporations to exploit "a [global] system that
remains unregulated and uncontrolled." Id. Indeed, Cayman was only part of "a British . . .
financial empire. It grew up from the 1950s onwards with the City of London, the growth of the
oil markets. That was when the formal British empire was ended but the UK" maintained
"influence over the flows of money around the world," and it "now has this new kind of
financial empire." Id.; see also NICHOLAS SHAXSON, TREASURE ISLANDS: UNCOVERING THE
DAMAGE OF OFFSHORE BANKING AND TAX HAVENS 1 (2012) (expanding on criticisms); Andrew
P. Morriss & Clifford C. Henson, Regulatory Effectiveness in Onshore & Offshore Financial
Centers, 53 VA. J. INT'L L. 417, 419-21 (2013) (summarizing criticisms).
2. WILLIAM VLCEK, OFFSHORE FINANCE AND SMALL STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, SIZE AND
MONEY 6 (2008).
3. See TONY DOGGART & CAROLINE VOJTE (DOGGART), ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE
UNIT, QER SPECIAL REPORT No. 8: TAX HAVENS AND OFFSHORE FUNDS (1971); CAROLINE
DOGGART, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, QER SPECIAL REPORT No. 21: TAX HAVENS AND
THEIR USES (1975); CAROLINE DOGGART, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, SPECIAL REPORT
CREATING CA YMAN
Although the EIU reports conceded that these growth strategies-as with
some strategies used by onshore jurisdictions-sometimes involved illegal
practices or political corruption, they noted that Cayman and other OFCs
pursued development and competitive advantages through effective
regulation that was often consistent with global best practices.' If there are
OFCs playing constructive roles within the international financial
framework, different legal and policy responses to the regulatory
competition they provide will be more appropriate than if they are merely
shady locales 'subject to no mandatory regulation whatsoever.'" Putting the
development of OFCs like Cayman into the proper context is thus essential
at a time when there are efforts underway to alter the international financial
system and when OFCs are regularly at the center of U.S. and EU political
controversies.'
This Article employs sources including participant interviews and
archival evidence to argue that the Caymanian financial center emerged
No. 61: TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USES (1979) (hereinafter "DOGGART, 1979 Report"); CAROLINE
DOGGART, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, SPECIAL REPORT No. 105: TAX HAVENS AND THEIR
USES (1983); CAROLINE DOGGART, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, SPECIAL REPORT No. 1191:
TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USES (1985); CAROLINE DOGGART, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT,
SPECIAL REPORT No. 186: TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USES (1985); CAROLINE DOGGART,
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, SPECIAL REPORT No. 1191: TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USES
(1990); CAROLINE DOGGART, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, SPECIAL REPORT No. P261: TAX
HAVENS AND THEIR USES (1993); CAROLINE DOGGART, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT,
RESEARCH REPORT: TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USES (1997) (hereinafter "DOGGART, 1997
Report"); CAROLINE DOGGART, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, RESEARCH REPORT: TAX
HAVENS AND THEIR USES (2002); see also Morriss & Henson, supra note 1, at 466 tbl.4.
4. See, e.g., DOGGART, 1997 Report, supra note 3, at 154 (describing Caymans as "an
attractive base for banking and trust business because of their social and political stability, the
accumulated expertise and operating infrastructure, and a sound regulatory environment" and
the Financial Services Supervisory Department as having "watchful eyes" on the sector and
closing a bank in 1995 involved in "trading irregularities"); see also TOM RUSSELL, I HAVE THE
HONOUR TO BE 193 (2003) (former governor noting that process of meeting concerns of
metropolitan powers "has continued through the years, with United Nations, the European
Community, the O.E.C.D. and the Financial Action Task Force, all scrutinizing Caymanian
laws and practices to ensure that these conform to international norms"); Morriss & Henson,
supra note 1, at 455-56 (arguing that many OFCs offer equal or better regulatory measures than
onshore jurisdictions).
5. Morriss & Henson, supra note 1, at 422.
6. 2012 Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney and Obama Treasury Secretary
nominee Jack Lew both had Caymanian investments, which became issues. See Matthew Mosk,
et al., Romney Parks Millions in Cayman Islands, ABC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/romney-parks-millions-offshore-tax-haven/story?id=15378566;
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from, and evolved with, a constitutional structure that legitimated
collaborative policymaking among the key stakeholders. Resting on
Cayman's social stability, this constitutional legitimacy promoted a
regulatory and tax competitive advantage that avoided capture and resisted
both corruption and abuse better than many other jurisdictions.! It shows
how Cayman developed an effective and cost-effective regulatory
framework that enabled it to grow from essentially a barter economy in
1960 with no banks to a sophisticated, developed economy with hundreds
of banks playing a major role in the world economy by the 1980s.'
Cayman's development must be examined within the context of broader
constitutional trends within Britain's dissolving post-war Empire. In the
Caribbean, Cayman and other jurisdictions that maintained ties to the
colonial powers-as well as those colonies that opted for independence, like
Jamaica and the Bahamas-diversified from commodity economies into
financial and tourist centers. Cayman was unusual, however, because its
government constructed a financial regulatory system that enabled the
territory to achieve more economic development and diversification than its
peers, bringing it the highest per capita wealth in the Caribbean and putting
Cayman on par with the prosperity of Britain.' This success is all the more
remarkable because the Island began from a base of a barter economy built
on subsistence agriculture and the export of labor. Thus, between 1960 and
1980, the Cayman Islands went from being one of the least developed, both
legally and economically, jurisdictions in a poorly developed region to
surpassing its former colonial power in GDP per capita terms, and
developing a sophisticated body of financial law.
7. See TURKS & CAICOS IS., COMM'N OF INQUIRY 2008-2009, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR ROBIN AULD 11 (2009), available at
http://www.tcinewsnow.com/documents/inquiry-report.pdf (noting a "high probability of
systemic corruption in the government and the legislature and among public officers in the
Turks & Caicos Islands in recent years" and "serious deterioration-from an already low
level-in the Territory's systems of governance and public financial management control");
Stephen Clarke, Antigua and Barbuda: History of Corruption and the Stanford Case, LIBRARY
OF CONG. (Jan. 2011), http://loc.gov/law/help/antigua-corruption-stanford.php ("Despite an
absence of reported prosecutions, Antigua and Barbuda has gained a reputation for having had
governments in which officials accepted bribes in return for legal favors."); Steve Eder, 'Robin
Hood' of Antigua Left a Mess, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2012, 12:56 PM), available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052702303717304577275590457688730
("Prosecutors argued at [Allen Stanford's] trial that he concealed his [$7.1 billion Ponzi]
schemes by bribing an Antiguan regulator and an outside auditor.").
8. Key dates in the story are listed in the Appendix, infra.
9. B.W. HIGMAN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CARIBBEAN 267-326 (2011).
The evolution of the British constitutional structure for the dependent
territories-including checks and balances and the rule of law-steadily
expanded Cayman's autonomy after 1959. Indeed, although prior to World
War II, "at the root of the relationship between the colonial powers and their
possessions . .. was the apparent power of the former to control directly the
economic development of the latter,"o the new constitutional orders that
arose after the war created policy space within which even those
jurisdictions that did not choose to become independent gained greater
control over their development. This constitutional autonomy enabled
collaboration among Caymanian and UK officials and Caymanian and
resident expatriate lawyers and financial professionals to implement a series
of financial-diversification strategies that incorporated, and eventually
helped develop, global best practices in the finance sector. This became a
quasi-institutionalized effort in which the government and business sectors
worked together to develop an effective regulatory structure that both
safeguarded the jurisdiction's reputation and facilitated profitable financial
activity that provided law firms, accountants, insurance companies,
company agents, and others with profits and the government with resources
from fees. We argue that this produced regulatory efforts focused on
developing and preserving the jurisdiction's reputational capital, enabling it
to compete for international business by offering a low cost regulatory
environment that credibly committed to controlling criminal activity and
fraud.
In Alfred Chandler's classic thesis, strategy leads business structure. In
Cayman, the constitutional structure enabled the competitive strategy that
yielded the OFC, and enabled further evolution of the constitutional
structure in pursuit of the strategy. Cayman's success is due both to the
entrepreneurial activity of its business sector and the cost-effective
regulatory structures which enabled Cayman to avoid killing the goose that
laid the golden eggs: either by stifling it through over-regulation or letting it
be destroyed by corruption, crime, or fraud through under-regulation. In
addition, Cayman successfully fostered an entrepreneurial climate that
brought it new businesses while not provoking onshore jurisdictions into
closing off access to their economies to Caymanian entities. Cayman's
10. JOHN DARWIN, BRITAIN AND DECOLONISATION: THE RETREAT FROM EMPIRE IN THE
POST-WAR WORLD 9 (1988).
11. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 1 (1962). The idea that constitutional structure
promotes collaborative policymaking that avoids cartelization and capture is suggested in JOHN
BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000).
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success in navigating twice between Scylla and Charybdis provides
valuable lessons for financial regulators elsewhere.
British overseas jurisdictions were generally well-positioned to meet the
growing post-war demand for jurisdictions providing opportunities to
structure businesses and personal affairs to reduce tax.12 Not only was there
a long history of such activity in the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Channel
Islands and Isle of Man, but the City of London had the cluster of
accounting, legal, and banking services necessary to design and implement
strategies that went beyond simple relocation of assets." Further, British
economic and tax policy developments during the 1950s and 1960s gave
overseas territories an incentive to meet that demand, both through the
capital controls that restricted asset flows out of the post-war "Sterling
Area" and through a combination of increasing tax and surtax rates,
discussion of wealth taxes, and other measures that motivated wealthy
individuals to seek alternatives. At the same time, the post-war push for
decolonization created the political space needed by the overseas territories
to exploit this demand by reducing British control and empowering interests
within the British government which focused on the territories' economic
sustainability rather than on the impact "tax havenry" might have on the
British Treasury. Thus, just as Britain was increasing overseas territories'
autonomy with the goal of reducing their demands on British taxpayers, it
was also creating conditions that provided a market for OFC services which
City firms were happy to help drive.'4 Combined with the development of
the telex and long distance telephone systems-which by the 1950s made it
"almost as easy to transact business with a bank in a foreign centre as with
one just across the road""--there was now an opening for new jurisdictions
to enter the market. By contrast, France's constitutional relationship to the
12. Christophe Farquet notes that there was substantial European demand for tax reduction
strategies between World War I and World War II based on relocation of assets met primarily
by Switzerland. Christophe Farquet, The Rise of the Swiss Tax Haven in the Interwar Period:
An International Comparison 2 (Eur. Historical Econ. Soc'y Working Paper No. 27, 2012),
available at http://www.ehes.org/EHESNo27.pdf; see also NICHOLAS FAITH, SAFETY IN
NUMBERS: THE MYSTERIOUS WORLD OF Swiss BANKING 7-11 (1982) (tracing Swiss efforts at
asset protection to the 17th Century).
13. See infra notes 72, 93-95 and accompanying text.
14. In the 1970s, A UK executive, Lord Duncan-Sandys, "was revealed to be receiving an
extra $100,000 a year tax-free through the Cayman Islands, and the then British Prime Minister,
Ted Heath, referred to it as the 'unpleasant and unacceptable face of capitalism.' 'We had some
good jokes about it,' said one lawyer. 'It may have been unacceptable to Mr. Heath, but it
certainly wasn't illegal."' ANTHONY SAMPSON, THE MONEY LENDERS: THE PEOPLE AND
PoLITICS OF THE WORLD BANKING CRISIs 283 (1981).
15. PAUL EINZIG, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 239 (2d ed. 1970).
overseas territories it retained after decolonization made those areas integral
parts of the French state, leaving no policy space for those jurisdictions to
follow such a strategy.16
Part I explains how an economy based on seamen remittances and
subsistence agriculture produced the 1960 Companies Law, the start of all
subsequent tax, banking, and commercial-instruments legislation
constituting the Cayman financial center using participants' accounts. We
also explain the law's origin within the growth of a more open Cayman
government and the creation of the 1959 Constitution that formally ended
Jamaica's administrative control. Part II examines the constitutional
structure and strategies promoting the first phase of financial diversification
up to 1968. At that point, the racial unrest and turmoil surrounding the
Bahamas' independence brought new financial business to Cayman;" it also
consolidated collaboration among Caymanian elected officials, UK and
Cayman civil servants, and expatriate lawyers and financial professionals in
shaping financial policymaking.
The Bahamas' problems also demonstrated how the more stable
Caymanian interracial politics combined with British constitutionalism and
colonial status to provide a competitive advantage within the Caribbean and
relative to other British OFCs. Part III turns to the role of the 1972 Cayman
Constitution that increased self-government, linking elected officials in the
Legislative Assembly and the Executive Council. The link strengthened the
collaborative policymaking model. This allowed collaboration among
resident expatriate and Caymanian legal professionals as well as Caymanian
(both elected and unelected) and UK officials.
By 1980 the constitutional structure enabled not only proliferating new,
globally-competitive, diversified financial products, it also successfully
contributed to social stability-including the encouragement of Caymanian
employment-through interracial "Team" coalitions rather than
ideologically-polarized or rent-seeking party politics. Part IV examines how
during the mid-1980s the constitutional structure enabled Cayman to join
the United States and UK in signing international agreements that policed
16. See ROBERT ALDRICH & JOHN CONNELL, FRANCE'S OVERSEAS FRONTIER 76 (1992)
(describing the close legal integration of overseas territories into metropolitan France after
World War II). J.A. Roy Bodden argues that this was a viable model for British Overseas
Territories as well. See J.A. BODDEN, THE CAYMAN ISLANDS IN TRANSITION: THE POLITICS,
HISTORY, AND SOCIOLOGY OF A CHANGING SOCIETY 123 (2007).
17. BODDEN, supra note 16, at 141 (noting role of expatriate migrants from the Bahamas
in promoting Cayman as a jurisdiction); BELL WALKER WITH M. SHANE AQUART, FROM
GEORGETOWN TO GEORGE TOWN 127 (2010) ("But for the grossly misguided actions of the
Pindling government, we [Cayman] might still be struggling in the mix.").
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money laundering and drug trafficking. In 1993 constitutional amendments
conferred further internal self-government and in 1996 the Caymanian
government created an innovative financial regulatory body, the Cayman
Island Monetary Authority (CIiMA), which further enhanced Cayman's
competitive position. Part V evaluates claims made from 1997 to the 2009
UK grant of full constitutional self-government that Cayman poorly policed
abuse of its financial products. The discourse also suggested that the
appearance of party politics, charges of corruption, and budget deficits
prompting UK intervention challenged the social order underpinning the
Cayman financial center.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, STRATEGY & THE 1960 COMPANIES
LAW
The enactment of the 1960 Company Law, the first legislation directly
promoting a Cayman financial center, followed a significant change in
Cayman colonial government. In the 1950s the Caymanian economy relied
on seamen's remittances and agriculture, supplemented by turtle and other
fishing, shipbuilding, and hand crafts.'" Limited airline service sustained an
embryonic tourist business built around small. guest houses and hotels.19 A
1950s tourism pamphlet promoted the Islands by cautioning, "You must
console yourself with the thought that life anywhere is impossible without a
little healthy frustration."2 0 There were no banks on any of the three
islands.21 Within the British Empire, Grand Cayman and the smaller islands
of Cayman Brac and Little Cayman were a dependency of the colony of
Jamaica, which also separately administered the Turks and Caicos island
group.2 The London-appointed Crown Governor (the Crown's
representative) responsible for all three jurisdictions exercised colonial
18. In 1952 an academic study of the Cayman Islands concluded that "as a measure of the
relative importance of the economic activities . . . [s]eafaring activities stand at the head of the
list . . . as they do in all other statements about the islands. Second, however, is subsistence
agriculture, heretofore almost completely neglected as being of significance. Of a decidedly
lower order of importance . . . are storekeeping, scale and commercial fishing, thatch rope
manufacture, shipbuilding, and the tourist trade." Edwin Beale Doran, Jr., A Physical and
Cultural Geography of the Cayman Islands, at 437-38, 443 (1953) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with the author).
19. Id. at 437-38.
20. WALKER, supra note 17, at 130.
21. MICHAEL CRATON, FOUNDED UPON THE SEAS: A HISTORY OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS
AND THEIR PEOPLE 352-53 (2003) (hereinafter "CRATON, FOUNDED").
22. VASSEL JOHNSON, As I SEE IT: How CAYMAN BECAME A LEADING FINANCIAL CENTRE
103-04 (2001); HIGMAN, supra note 9, at 269.
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authority from Jamaica; subordinate commissioners represented the Crown
in the two outlying dependencies.23
Within this structure, Cayman's resident Commissioner exercised
executive power and proposed laws in conjunction with traditional officers
known as Vestrymen and Justices of the Peace. 24 These were generally
drawn from the Islands' small mercantile group, which dominated the
Legislative Assembly.25 As pressures for independence across the
Caribbean grew in the late 1950s, however, the larger political shifts in
Jamaica and other major British Caribbean colonies facilitated creation of a
new Cayman colonial constitution that altered existing politics and
displaced the ruling elite. 26 The 1960 Companies Law emerged from the
transforming constitutional struggle, setting the stage for later
developments.
A. Setting the Stage
Although Cayman was on the periphery of the British Empire, it was not
an isolated colonial backwater. Despite infrastructure limitations and a
largely barter-based domestic economy, a large proportion of Caymanian
men spent many of their adult years as seamen and officers aboard merchant
marine ships or on turtle-fishing boats that ranged widely throughout the
Caribbean.27 Caymanians were thus aware of changes in the world economy
and able to contrast their home with the rest of the Caribbean and the
broader world.28 The Caymanian population grew increasingly sophisticated
through this exposure. Moreover, the seafaring tradition fostered a strong
23. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 306-07.
24. Id. at 306.
25. J. A. RoY BODDEN, PATRONAGE, PERSONALITIES AND PARTIES: CAYMANIAN POLITICS
FROM 1950-2000 2-4, 17-46 (2010).
26. Id. at 47-69, 99-128.
27. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 220-23, 281, 301-02; JOHNSON, supra note 22,
at 65, 68-71 (describing turtling, describing post-World War 1I involvement of Caymanians as
crew members on commercial shipping vessels, and noting that "[s]eamen's earnings were
certainly the bulk of Cayman's economy for a decade and a half to 1965"). Caymanians began
serving on merchant marine ships after World War II, in part because of the decline of turtle
fishing. BODDEN, supra note 16, at 19-20. At its peak, 1,000 Caymanians out of a total
population of 10,000 islanders were at sea. Id. at 21.
28. BODDEN, supra note 16, at 82 ("It was these opportunities that allowed Caymanian
seamen to travel the world, exposing them to different cultures and to a variety of consumer
goods."); ROGER C. SMITH, THE MARITIME HERITAGE OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS 80 (2000)
("Caymanian seafaring men broadened their once-insular perspectives by voyaging
worldwide.").
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tradition of independence among both the men and the women, who had to
manage family and business affairs on their own while the men were
away.29 However, the majority of Caymanian seamen were effectively
disenfranchised by their long absences from the islands." Combined with
the limitation of the franchise to men, these absences also restricted the
ability of those serving as sailors to exert influence through their families at
home. Neither Caymanian individuals nor companies operating there paid
income, property or other direct taxes, leaving the colonial government
dependent on limited revenue from import duties, the sale of postage stamps
to collectors, and indirect taxes.3 ' Caymanians had "a history of largely
handling their own affairs. Moreover, they were accustomed to living
within their means. They had never had outside help to balance their modest
budget."3 2 Combined with Britain's relative parsimony towards its
Caribbean possessions, this left the Islands with few public resources for
economic development." For example, a serious mosquito infestation
hampered the development of tourism and budget limitations prevented
steps to control the mosquitoes.3 4 Cayman thus entered the post-war era
with an antiquated political structure without access to much funding and
few resources beyond a population with a strong tradition of independence.
The 1950s brought new economic challenges to Cayman. In the late
1950s and early 1960s, the global shipping industry was adopting large-bulk
29. ELIZABETH W. DAVIES, THE LEGAL STATUS OF DEPENDENT BRITISH TERRITORIES: THE
WEST INDIES AND NORTH ATLANTIC REGION 33, 94 (1995) (remarking on individualism and
describing seafaring life as "an anti-authoritarian existence"); see also BODDEN, supra note 16,
at 2 (arguing that "benign neglect" of Cayman by Britain left Caymanians viewing "themselves
as being apart and distinct from the rest of the Caribbean").
30. BODDEN, supra note 25, at 68.
31. Doran, supra note 18, at 438-39.
32. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 167.
33. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 332-35, 339-40, 347-48, 352; DAVIES, supra
note 29, at 57-59 (explaining that British aid to the Caribbean was less than was provided by
some of the other European colonial powers, including the Dutch); Cayman Archives Oral
History Interview with Benson 0. Ebanks, Discs 1-4 (Sep. 30, 1997) (transcript on file with the
Cayman Islands National Archives).
34. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 331, 343-46; Cayman Archives Oral Histories
Interview with Jack Rose, Disc 3, p. 17 (May 18, 1999) (transcript on file with the Cayman
Islands National Archives). On the mosquito problem, see JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 71, 114-
24 (noting that mosquitoes "plagued everyone" in mid-1960s; detailing nine years of control
efforts and noting that "it was unwise to take a walk after sunset if you were not doused with
insect repellent or did not have a 'smoke pot' for company" before the 1970s and noting that
more than 80% of Grand Cayman was swampy and "ideal for mosquito breeding").
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cargo ships, which meant fewer jobs for Caymanian seamen.3 5 In addition,
Nicaragua reduced Caymanians' access to Nicaraguan turtle fisheries in the
1960s."6 Like most in Caribbean jurisdictions in the 1950s, Caymanians
began to look for economic development strategies. The combination of
geographical isolation, the restrictive local political structure, and the
jurisdictional connection to Jamaica influenced the choice of development
projects available to the Caymanian government. The limited outside capital
invested in Cayman came primarily from Britain, the Bahamas, and
Jamaica; the few corporations doing business in the Cayman Islands
registered under the Jamaican Companies Act," reflecting both Cayman's
legal dependence on its larger neighbor and the significant limits on
Caymanian sovereignty under the pre-1960 colonial constitution. This
dependence extended to the legal profession, with few law agents (legally
trained lay individuals) and no lawyers on the islands.38
Three noteworthy developments occurred during this formative period.
First, after periodic interruptions to air service in the 1940s, the Cayman
government began to subsidize Owen Roberts' airline service (registered as
an English company), allowing the airline to operate regularly by 1950.39
Second, influential Caymanian businessman and public official E. D.
Merren and two Bahamian-English entrepreneurs secured passage of the
1950 Hotels Aid Law, which facilitated opening several modem hotels
between 1951 and 1958 to accommodate the small numbers of tourists
arriving by air.40 Some Caymanian property-holders opposed the Hotels Aid
Law because some land consolidations were necessary to construct the
hotels.4 ' The archaic system of proving land title aided their resistance and
continued to limit tourism-related development into the 1960s, just as the
broader Caribbean began to focus on North American tourism as a
development strategy.4 2 Third, Barclays opened the islands' first bank, using
35. JoHNsON, supra note 22, at 71 ("[C]ontainer cargo [ships] appeared on the scene . . .
and joined ranks with new supertankers for the reduction of crew requirements."); SMITH, supra
note 28, at 146.
36. BODDEN, supra note 16, at 47; DAVIES, supra note 29, at 35; SMITH, supra note 28, at
79-80.
37. Cayman Archives Oral History Interview, Arthur Hunter, Disc 3, p. 8 (June 22, 2000)
(transcript on file with Cayman Islands National Archives).
38. Caymanians depended primarily on "law agents" rather than solicitors and barristers to
accomplish legal tasks into the early 1960s. See id. at Discs 3-4.
39. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 334-35; Doran, supra note 18, at 317-19.
40. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 347-48. See also BODDEN, supra note 16, at 18-
19 (describing early efforts to develop tourism).
41. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 339-40.
42. Id. at 340-41.
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a Jamaican-registered subsidiary.43 Barclays' initial business was handling
seamen's remittances; prior to the bank's establishment, local mercantile
firms like Merren's handled these." Barclays thus created an initial
connection, albeit a limited one, between Caymanians and the world's
banking system.45
While these small steps expanded Cayman's connections to the outside
world, the limitations of the existing constitutional order constrained efforts
to build on those new connections. Forced to seek alternatives by the
prospect of constitutional change stemming from the impending large
change in Britain's relationship with its Caribbean territories on the horizon,
by 1958 colonial officials and a transformed Legislative Assembly began to
consider foreign investment as a new source of revenue and employment.46
B. Decolonization, Federation, and Jamaica
Cayman's constitutional evolution occurred in the context of, and under
the influence of, contemporary, larger scale constitutional developments in
the British Caribbean. In particular, British colonial and local officials
throughout the Caribbean debated the creation of a West Indian Federation
as a path to self-government beginning in 1955." From Britain's point of
view, the West Indies "were a monument to colonial failure: poverty-
43. Id at 352-53.
44. Id. at 309-10, 473 n.4; BODDEN, supra note 25, at 68; SMITH, supra note 28, at 80.
45. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 332-35, 339-40, 347-48, 352-53; Interview
with Benson 0. Ebanks, supra note 33, at 14.
46. Doran, supra note 18, at 437-38, 443.
47. British interest in consolidating her Caribbean possessions was long-standing.
Elizabeth Wallace noted that:
For almost three centuries some form of closer association has been propounded as a
solution to British Caribbean problems. Such proposals originally emanated, not from West
Indians, but from Englishmen impressed by the probable economies of unified
administration. The usual attitude of the islanders was early Illustrated, towards the end of
the seventeenth century, when Barbadian planters rejected a Jamaican plan for a joint
expedition against the pirates then infesting the Leewards, on the ground that they would not
expend one shilling to save their little northern neighbors.
ELIZABETH WALLACE, THE BRITISH CARIBBEAN: FROM THE DECLINE OF COLONIALISM TO THE
END OF FEDERATION 85-86 (1977). Like the British, the Dutch also wrestled with issues of
consolidation and fragmentation among their Caribbean possessions. Also like the British, the
issue for the colonial government was related to concerns over costs while the Caribbean
populations on smaller islands feared consolidation with larger islands. See Craig M. Boise &
Andrew P. Morriss, Change, Dependency & Regime Plasticity in Offshore Financial
Intermediation: The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles, 45 TEX. INT'L L.J. 377, 396-401 (2009)
(describing struggles over structure for the Netherlands Antilles).
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stricken, politically backward, economically as well as politically
fragmented. . . ." Her overseas territories "were more of an embarrassment
than a source of strength, trade or influence." 48 Britain's goal became, as a
draft official memorandum noted, "to avoid any situation which results in
our being left with any of the present federated territories on our hands for
which we can see no obvious future except as colonies."4 9 Britain saw the
Federation as the key to reducing the costs of its smaller Caribbean
colonies, as the Federation would allow consolidating the smaller islands
with the larger colonies of Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and
the Bahamas." At the same time, the economic problems of the Caribbean
territories received comparatively little attention from a Britain preoccupied
with more pressing imperial issues elsewhere." The combination of a
distracted metropolitan power and its focus on narrow fiscal issues helped
create an opening for developing an OFC.
Outside Cayman, Caribbean politicians initially saw the Federation
proposals as a path to sovereignty and so were receptive to the idea,
although their enthusiasm cooled as it became clear that Federation would
require them to yield some of the powers they were just acquiring from
Britain to a Federation government.52 Moreover, as Elizabeth Davies notes,
the Federation "was intended as a vehicle to independence for those
colonies that were viewed at the time as too small to proceed to
independence alone. The larger colonies, however, did not need such a
vehicle in order to become independent, so why should they choose to
continue to bear the expense?"" As leading Jamaican and Trinidadian
politicians in particular chose to focus on their own islands, the British plan
to consolidate the smaller islands with them unraveled.54
48. DARWIN, supra note 10, at 222.
49. THE WEST INDIES lxxi (Ser. B, vol. 6 of British Documents on the End of Empire S.R.
Ashton & David Killingray, eds. 1999) (quoting Colonial Cabinet Policy Committee draft
memorandum, 1961).
50. Id.
51. DARWIN, supra note 10, at 216. Again, there are parallels with the Dutch experience,
in which Dutch preoccupation with Indonesia affected the relationship between the Netherlands
and the Caribbean territories. See Boise & Morriss, supra note 47, at 397 ("The constitutional
structure ultimately proposed by the Dutch as a basis for association with its former colonies
was developed with the objective of keeping Indonesia within the Kingdom, not with the well-
being of the Caribbean territories in mind.").
52. DARWIN, supra note 10, at 215, 219 (initial local enthusiasm); DAVIES, supra note 29,
at 104-05 (attributing failure of federation to the "disproportionate, onerous, financial
obligation" it placed on Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago); THE WEST INDIES, supra note 49, at
lxxi, xli.
53. DAVIES, supra note 29, at 105-06.
54. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 306-11, 314-15.
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Amidst Britain's efforts to consolidate its Caribbean territories into the
Federation, successive resident Commissioners responsible for the Cayman
Islands reported to colonial authorities on the existing local political
structure. In 1956, the Commissioner wrote the colonial Governor in
Jamaica that the "population of the Dependency is now estimated to be
8300. The franchise being restricted to adult males, there is a maximum
political electorate which I estimate as being not more than 750. The
Dependency is in fact one rotten borough" dominated by the Justices of the
Peace and Vestrymen, who controlled the Legislative Assembly.5 An
essential reform was the "extension of the franchise to women, who are at
present disenfranchised, and who constitute over eighty percent of the adult
population."5 6 In 1958, the Commissioner explained to the Governor that a
drive for greater self-government would need to address resistance from
Caymanian "merchants" and individuals "open to bribery" because of their
need "for credit" and "employment."" Although Caymanian seamen were
the "large group of independent men, whose money keeps the islands
going," they were "virtually disenfranchised by being at sea. Once the
women are given the vote [in 1958] a very audible voice will be heard from
this independent group, and the one who pays the piper will start calling the
tune. Vested interest is worried.", 8 This forecast how the enfranchisement of
women would significantly broaden the interests represented in the
legislative assembly."
Britain pressed Cayman to consider association with the Federation, at
one point proposing that Cayman take a status with the Federation similar to
that of the Channel Islands with Britain, even offering to take Cayman back
as a colony if such status proved unsatisfactory after five years. 0 Britain
feared that if it did not persuade Cayman to agree to join the Federation,
Cayman would "remain a permanent U.K. dependency."6 1 One British
analysis listed Cayman as a possession for which there was "no probability"
ofindependence.62
Although Britain saw Cayman's future as being a tiny part of the
Federation, Caymanians were less certain. Some urged severing the
Jamaican connection altogether in favor of greater self-government as a
55. BODDEN, supra note 23, at 66.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 68.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 66-68; MICHAEL CRATON, A HISTORY OF THE BAHAMAS 306-14 (1986).
60. THE WEST INDIES, supra note 49, at 417.
61. Id. at 418.
62. Id. at 518.
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separate British territory.6 3 Other Caymanians, led by Ormond Panton,
argued that greater self-government was compatible with a looser Jamaican
connection, preserving traditional uses of Jamaican laws and legal
services.' Even as this discussion proceeded, small steps gradually
separated Cayman's legal identity from Jamaica's. For example, during
1958-59 the Governor in Jamaica appointed a stipendiary magistrate for the
Cayman Islands, who would cooperate with the Commissioner." In 1958,
colonial officials discussed-and the Commissioner left for his successor's
consideration-proposals for more open immigration into the Caymans, a
general Companies Law no longer drawn from Jamaican laws, and funding
of mosquito eradication.66
Caymanians began to consider a model based on Bermuda and the
Bahamas' nascent tax and exchange control avoidance businesses,"
Curagao's "ring-fenced" tax regime benefitting from the extension of the
U.S.-Netherlands tax treaty to the Netherlands Antilles, and the tax
structuring business in the Channel Islands and Europe generally.69 Tax
avoidance was becoming an important political issue in Britain in the
1950s, with the Labour Party's Working Party on Tax Avoidance and
Evasion's 1959 report, Tax Dodging, stressing the need to focus taxation on
"those who live by speculation or who already have wealth".7 0
63. BODDEN, supra note 25, at 95-96. See also, BODDEN, supra note 16, at 24 (describing
goal of gaining "the maximum autonomy" in Caymanian affairs).
64. BODDEN, supra note 25, at 96-97.
65. Cayman Archives Oral History Interview with Sir James Astwood, Disc 3, pp. 3-4,
40-41 (June 12, 2005) (transcript on file with Cayman Islands National Archives).
66. Interview with Jack Rose, supra note 34, at Disc 3, p. 12, 17, 18, 20, 21.
67. Brian Archer, The Impact of International Companies on the Economies of Small
Islands: A Case Study of Bermuda, in BANKING AND FINANCE IN ISLANDS AND SMALL STATES
192, 194 (Michael Bowe et al. eds., 1998) (first offshore company established in Bermuda in
1935); SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 281 ("By the mid-sixties a few businessmen on [Grand
Cayman] were looking with envy at the Bahamas to the north, also a British colony, which was
attracting many big companies and banks by providing exemption from tax."); Mark P.
Sullivan, The Bahamas, in ISLANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN: A REGIONAL STUDY
521, 535 (Sandra W. Meditz & Dennis M. Hanratty eds., 1987) ("A large number of trust and
finance companies and investment firms were established [in the Bahamas] in the 1950s,
following the imposition of restrictive finance laws in many industrialized countries.").
68. Boise & Morriss, supra note 47, at 409 (discussing extension of treaty).
69. CRATON, supra note 59, at 269-70 (describing the importance in the 1950s and 1960s
of 'offshore' or 'suitcase' companies"); Farquet, supra note 12, at 16 (describing use of
holding companies as strategy); DAVID W. MOORE, THE OTHER BRITISH ISLES 245-46 (2005);
see also WALKER, supra note 17, at 127 ( "[T]he offshore financial business was not new.").
70. RICHARD WHITING, THE LABOUR PARTY AND TAXATION: PARTY IDENTITY AND
POLITICAL PURPOSE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN 147 (2000).
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Serious discussions of the introduction of wealth taxes in Britain also
created a growing demand for offshore products within the sterling area (as
the exchange control area managed by the British and incorporating both
colonies and some former colonies was known), as did the weakening of
capital controls brought about by the British return to current account
convertibility in 1959. The British side of such transactions was already
well developed: British banks and financial firms had more than a century
of international operations, with experience to develop techniques "only
acquired by the inherited aptitudes and many years of experience".72 The
City had also developed considerable expertise navigating regulatory
thickets in adapting to the 1947 Exchange Control Act's impact on British
multinationals that went well beyond simple avoidance techniques like the
"hand payments" (illegal hand carried deliveries of U.S. dollars in London)
used in the late 1940s and early 1950s." For Cayman to enter this business
would require new legal infrastructure, however, and as Caymanians
explicitly feared, legislation at the Federation level could prevent it should
Cayman join the Federation.7 4
C. Autonomy
In 1959, Cayman's colonial administrative connection to the Jamaican
legislature ceased; the Governor for the Caymans and Jamaica remained a
71. BARRY EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM 94, 121-22 (4th prtg. 1998).
72. A BANKER'S WORLD: THE REVIVAL OF THE CITY 1957-1970, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS
OF SIR GEORGE BOLTON 113 (Richard Frye ed., 1970); see also Farquet, supra note 12, at 18
(describing City involvement in international tax issues in interwar period).
73. A BANKER'S WORLD, supra note 72, at 15-16, 31-32, 113 (experience with controls;
City discovers role separate from sterling; techniques experience); Susan Hine & John Olienyk,
The Evolution of US. Multinational Banking, in THE GLOBAL STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL
MARKETS: AN OVERVIEW 319, 320 (Dilip K. Gosh et al. eds., 1997) (noting British had
"organizationally sound banks run by superior managers" even before World War II).
74. BODDEN, supra note 25, at 66; A.K. CAIRNCROSS AND B. EICHENGREEN, STERLING IN
DECLINE: THE DEVALUATIONS OF 1931, 1949, AND 1967, at 115-16, 142-43 (1983) (hand
payments and describing complexity of controls and terming them "the principle instrument by
which the government sought to regulate economic activity"); HEATHER D. GIBSON, THE
EUROCURRENCY MARKETS, DOMESTIC FINANCIAL POLICY, AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
INSTABILITY 4, 10 (1989); JOHN STOPFORD & Louis TURNER, BRITAIN AND THE
MULTINATIONALS 198-99 (1985); Sullivan, supra note 67, at 522; THE WEST INDIES, supra note
49, at 415 (fear of federation legislation); HENRY MYHILL, INTRODUCING THE CHANNEL ISLANDS
238-42 (London: Faber and Faber, 1964) (on well known avoidance activity in Channel Islands
& Bahamas & involvement of London firms in it); WHITING, supra note 70, at 147, 189-90
(labour report and wealth tax).
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single position." The old Cayman legislature of Justices of the Peace and
Vestrymen ended and a new Legislative Assembly took its place." The new
Assembly included two or three "official" members appointed by the
Cayman Administrator (who replaced the Commissioner), two to three
other "nominated" members also selected by the Administrator, twelve
members elected from districts (some multimember), and an Executive
Council, which included a member appointed by the Administrator from
among the Legislative Assembly's "nominated" members and two chosen
by the Assembly's elected members from among themselves."
The Executive Council was formally merely advisory to the
Administrator, who presided at its meetings.7 ' The Administrator also held
reserve powers and executive prerogatives such as the granting of pardons,
though these powers were in effect shared with the governor in Jamaica."
The new Administrator's role thus preserved considerable British colonial
authority. At the same time the displacement of the Justices and Vestrymen
in the Legislative Assembly subjected legislation-including the 1960
Companies Law-to a more open electoral process than had previously
existed in Cayman. Although the formal changes in Cayman's relationship
with Britain were in some ways less dramatic than, and even in the opposite
direction from, those occurring in the larger Caribbean jurisdictions firmly
on the path to independence, on balance the shift from Jamaican
dependency to Crown Colony both increased Cayman's effective autonomy
and broadened the political basis for the Islands' government."
Under the old constitutional order, developers lobbied for and won
passage of special laws like the Hotel Act that favored well-connected
75. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 309-11; SIR HAROLD PATON MITCHELL,
CARIBBEAN PATTERNS: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE CONTEMPORARY
CARIBBEAN 213 (2d ed. 1972) (terming the dual nature of the governor's position "an illogical
but convenient solution"). Cayman's early constitutional history is explored in the context of the
relationship of the Anglican church in Cayman to the British church in NICHOLAS J.G. SYKES,
THE DEPENDENCY QUESTION: A STUDY OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE CAYMAN ISLANDS 15-50
(1996), available at http://www.churchofenglandcayman.com/Dep%20Ques%20-
%20Contents.html. Sykes argues that Cayman was always treated as a separate dependency by
the British government, but some personnel (e.g., the governor of Jamaica) had additional roles
with respect to the Cayman Islands. Thus, Sykes concludes, "To have the Governor of Jamaica
as the Governor of the Cayman Islands does not by itself necessitate or imply a state of
dependency of the Cayman Islands upon Jamaica." Id. at 17.




80. BODDEN, supra note 25, at 66, 70, 74-75; Interview with Jack Rose, supra note 34, at
Disc 3, pp. 12, 17, 18, 20, 21.
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promoters like the Caymanian Merren and foreign entrepreneurs. The old
order had not enabled steps to broadly develop the economy, such as
funding mosquito eradication." At first, Caymanian politics took steps
toward the same type of party-based political culture emerging elsewhere in
the British Caribbean, but significant differences soon emerged.82
Importantly, issues of race and class played a less central role in Cayman
than in Jamaica and elsewhere. For example, in 1958 the Cayman Vanguard
Progressive Party ("CVPP") attempted to mobilize the newly enfranchised
women, and also expressly appealed for support across social-class and
racial lines. The CVPP "president was a black businessman in George
Town [the largest town], and other leading members were also black or
colored."" By contrast, the Bahamas' politics was dominated by Bay Street
faction through the white-led United Bahamian Party at this time.84 In
addition, in Cayman "school teachers among [the CVPP leadership] ensured
that the improvement of educational facilities figured prominently in the
party platform, and such items as mosquito eradication and the
encouragement of foreign investments figure[d] prominently in the
platform," which an observer noted "stood for other views than those which
had thus far prevailed in the Assembly."" While the CVPP dissolved after
the 1958 elections, the new government pursued the link between mosquito
eradication and foreign investment by passing the 1960 Companies Law. 6
Although the new, more open Legislative Assembly that debated and
enacted the 1960 Companies Law arose out of the new constitutional
structure and the Law itself resonated with the CVPP platform, it remained
Administrator Rose's proposal." Thus, both a British official and
Caymanians collaborated on this initial step in establishing the OFC.
D. The 1960 Companies Law
Like the more open 1959 constitution under which it was created, the
1960 Companies Law was a departure from prior practice. The statute
81. CRATON, FOUNDED,supra note 21, at 343-47.
82. BODDEN, supra note 25, at 107-45.
83. Id. at 67.
84. MICHAEL CRATON, PINDLING: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE FIRST PRIME MINISTER OF
THE BAHAMAS 85 (2002) ("Even more damaging and divisive was the exacerbation of the racial
issue. This was perhaps inevitable in a system in which the minority in power were whites (or
regarded themselves as such), and the powerless majority was overwhelmingly non-white.").
85. BODDEN, supra note 25, at 67.
86. Id. at 66-69; Interview with Jack Rose, supra note 34, at Disc 3, pp. 12, 17, 18, 20, 21.
87. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 313.
created a Caymanian Registrar of Companies, eliminating formal
dependence upon Jamaican law" (existing Cayman companies with
Jamaican registration re-registered under the new law"9). As Arthur Hunter,
the new Registrar, recalled: "the Companies Law . .. was making it possible
for Cayman to register the companies on their own, without any reference to
Jamaica or anywhere else."90 Along with the preexisting customs duties and
collectable stamps, the registration fees provided revenues that gave
Cayman greater effective autonomy from the UK by enabling it to fund its
own activities.9'
The 1960 law did more than encourage registrations to shift from
Jamaica to Cayman, however. As Registrar Hunter described, the
"Companies Law that we ended up with was basically the same as the
[relevant sections of] the English Company Law [the Companies Act] of
1948 . . . dealing with public companies, prospectuses and that type of
thing, but what really started the ball a-rolling were the bits of legislation
offering tax concessions," and the "idea that we could have a company
separate from the individual, that he could shield behind the [company
name]." 92 Thus, the selective use of the English Companies Act together
with the absence of direct taxes enabled Cayman to begin competing with
established financial centers like Bermuda, the Bahamas, and the Channel
Islands. Jack Rose, the Administrator who introduced the Law into the
Assembly, pursued two goals suggested by his immediate predecessor: first,
the company registration fees would provide funds for the mosquito
eradication program, and second, a growing financial sector cquld create
employment for the seamen whose jobs were threatened by the restructuring
of the shipping industry.93 It is important to note that the use of company
registries as part of a tax avoidance strategy was not a new one, and so
Cayman was entering an existing international business. For example, the
Bahamas, Bermuda, and the Channel Islands had been in the registry
business for tax purposes since the 1930s,94 and Switzerland, Liechtenstein,
and Luxembourg had been since the 1920s.9 ' Thus, not only were City firms
88. Interview with Arthur Hunter, supra note 37, at Disc 3, pp. 8-9.
89. Id. at 9.
90. Id.
91. Interview with Jack Rose, supra note 34, at Disc 3, pp. 12, 17, 18, 20, 21.
92. Interview with Arthur Hunter, supra note 37, at Disc 3, p. 9.
93. Interview with Jack Rose, supra note 34, at Disc 3, pp. 12, 17, 18, 20, 21; see also
WALKER, supra note 17, at 117 (noting that Rose had "germinated the seeds" of the financial
center from a note left by his predecessor).
94. See supra notes 67-69.
95. Farquet, supra note 12, at 16-17.
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familiar with the concept but the use of the English Company Law as a
model made it easy for UK lawyers to create strategies using Caymanian
entities.
The 1960 Companies Law promoted foreign investment, replacing
Jamaican incorporation with the Cayman registration of firms. The Law
ensured both individual and corporate freedom from direct taxation, an
improvement on the possibilities for tax avoidance offered by the Bahamas
and other Caribbean competitors.97 Administrator Rose's linking of the
seamen reemployment and mosquito eradication with revenues from the
Companies Law fees aligned the new Legislative Assembly with newly
enfranchised women and the program the interclass, interracial CVPP had
advocated in 1958. Also important for the future was the 1960 visit of
James MacDonald, a Canadian lawyer. He attended the Assembly when the
Companies Law was enacted, soon became a Cayman resident, and began
to aggressively promote Cayman's distinctive tax status. 98 Nevertheless,
divided local politics persisted concerning whether the Caymans should
preserve some connection with Jamaica;99 and the colonial Administrator's
dominance of the Executive Council recalled rule by Justices and
Vestrymen. Consummation of the Companies Law's possibilities required
resolving vital constitutional and diversification-financial issues during the
1960s.' 00
II. CONSTITUTIONAL STABILITY AND FINANCIAL DIVERSIFICATION
THROUGH 1968
Passage of the 1960 Companies Law coincided with demands from
Ormond Panton and others for stronger self-government, demands that were
entangled with the consequences of the demise of the Federation and
Jamaica's imminent independence."o' Cayman's challenge was to secure
sufficient legal and fiscal autonomy from Britain while creating a climate of
96. See generally ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009)
(describing factors involved in competition among jurisdictions).
97. Interview with Arthur Hunter, supra note 37, at Disc 3, p. 10-11.
98. Interview with Benson 0. Ebanks, supra note 33, at Disc 3, p. 10-12; Cayman
Archives Oral History Interview with Aileen MacDonald, Disc 3, pp. 25, 26 (Mar. 30, 2001)
(transcript on file with Cayman Islands National Archives); Cayman Archives Oral History
Interview with William Walker, Disc 3, pp. 5-6 (May 31, 2000) (transcript on file with Cayman
Islands National Archives).
99. BODDEN, supra note 25, at 94-98.
100. Id. at 76-106.
101. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 305-14.
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fiscal stability that could attract business and fund the infrastructure
necessary for both business and development.
A. Creating Autonomy
The progress of decolonization elsewhere in the Caribbean made
Panton's insistence that self-government could be consistent with a loose
Jamaican connection harder to sustain. As a result, Caymanians confronted
an increasingly stark choice: independence or preserving colonial status,
albeit with greater self-government.'0 2 Thus, during 1961-62 when the
Companies Law went into operation and MacDonald began promoting
Cayman's tax advantages, the future depended, as it had in 1958-59, on the
resolution of constitutional structure issues.o3 As leading Caymanian
elected public official Benson Ebanks described the dynamic process: "the
new Companies Law was in 1960 . . . the beginning . . . of a conscious
effort to go after the off-shore business." The remarkable growth that
followed "all had to do with planning, not just the physical planning, but the
fiscal planning as well."'
Ebanks' focus upon offshore business required the transformed
constitutional structure that reached a turning point in 1962. Although the
1959 colonial constitution had formally terminated the Jamaican
administrative connection, practical political implementation awaited
resolution of disputes over the Federation and Jamaica's place within it.o5
After Jamaicans opted for independence in a referendum in September
1961, Jamaica, soon followed by Trinidad and Tobago, withdrew from the
Federation in spring 1962. The Federation then dissolved and Jamaican
independence from Britain began on August 6, 1962.106 Given its concerns
over being left with an expensive legacy of financially dependent territories,
Britain's interest in the region focused on finding a means for fiscal self-
sufficiency in the Caribbean. The Colonial Office was intent that Britain not
be "left with a residue of financially dependent territories such as the
102. Id. at 315-17.
103. Id. at 315-19; BODDEN, supra note 25, at 107-145; Interview with Benson 0. Ebanks,
supra note 33, at 19-21; Interview with Aileen MacDonald, supra note 98, at Disc 3, p. 11;
Interview with William Walker, supra note 98, at 6-9.
104. Interview with Benson 0. Ebanks, supra note 33, at Disc 3, 19; Disc 4, p. 20.
105. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 314-15; Interview with Jack Rose, supra note
34, at Disc 2, p. 4.
106. CRAToN, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 315.
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Caymans, Turks and Caicos, and the British Virgin Islands."' 7 Thus, the
Companies Law went into operation at the time Caymanians were wrestling
with the practical consequences of the Federation's demise and Jamaican
independence and Britain was focused on reducing its fiscal exposure to her
remaining Caribbean territories.
Amidst these events, Caymanian views on how to structure self-
government remained in dispute.0 o In the 1962 election, self-described
conservatives, such as D.E. Merren, formed the Christian Democratic Party
("CDP") and insisted that self-government must above all include a direct
link to Britain.' 9 Fears of domination by Jamaica led the conservatives to
oppose continuing legal links to an independent Jamaica." 0 In contrast,
Ormond Panton and Warren Conolly's National Democratic Party ("NDP")
favored self-government with a loose administrative connection with
Jamaica, together with continued ties to Britain."' Complicating the issue,
political affiliations mixed substantive positions with friendships and
animosities among those individuals who had the interclass and interracial
connections within the various kinship, friendship, and patronage networks
among the three Islands' communities that were necessary to mobilize
political support.1 2 Thus, the NDP had to walk a fine line on the issue of
ties to Jamaica to retain support from people like the widely respected Dr.
Roy McTaggart, who favored continued colonial status and no Jamaican
connection but who had personal disagreements with the CDP leadership."'
Reflecting Britain's policy preferences, both Rose and the out-going
Governor, Sir Kenneth Blackburne, promoted the benefits of ties with an
independent Jamaica, while simultaneously professing respect for leaving
the ultimate decision to Caymanians.114
Although a majority of Caymanian voters supported the NDP, public
opinion also favored continued colonial status."' Caymanians saw Jamaican
independence as the break and sought stability in their relationship with
107. THE WEST INDIES, supra note 49, at lxxi. During 1959-61 Cayman representatives
participated in London conferences that crystallized these views. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note
21, at 309, 314; Interview with Jack Rose, supra note 34, at 4.
108. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 315-17; Interview with Jack Rose, supra note
34, at Disc 2, p. 17.
109. CRATON, FOUNDED,supra note 21, at 316.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 315-16.
112. BODDEN, supra note 25, at 36-46, 116-28.
113. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 315-16.




Britain. As a Caymanian official put it, "it wasn't that we moved away from
the Caribbean, the Caribbean moved away from us."116 Although at first
British officials resisted increased self-government, perhaps hoping to
encourage departure, Governor Blackburne soon retreated from
Administrator Rose's earlier indication that Britain would not grant
immediate self-government, suggesting instead that Britain might grant
increased self-government on a reasonable timetable.' As members of the
Legislative Assembly debated these issues, a formal petition from voters in
Cayman Brac and Little Cayman not only endorsed remaining a British
colony but also declared support for secession from Grand Cayman if the
larger island pursued a Jamaican connection."' Blackburne claimed that the
volume of applause following the debate supported maintaining Cayman's
colonial status.'19 The following day there was a more objective result: The
Legislature voted unanimously-including both Panton and Merren-for a
resolution stating: "It is the wish of the Cayman Islands: 1. To continue
their present association with Her Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom; 2. To negotiate with Her Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom for internal self-government, taking into account the wishes of the
people of the Cayman Islands as to timing."1 20 Some ties remained to
Jamaica as Cayman continued the official use of Jamaican currency1 2 1
(although U.S. dollars also circulated unofficially on the island through the
payment of seamen's wages in dollars)12 2 and Jamaican appellate judges.123
Caymanians' broad public support for a direct link to Britain under
increased self-government facilitated collaborative promotion of the
offshore financial center.124 Following the November 1962 elections, a
substantial NDP majority controlled the Legislative Assembly, providing
democratic legitimacy for its platform, which had included "Education,
public facilities, road improvements, and mosquito control," as well as
116. SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 280.
117. BODDEN, supra note 25, at 117-45; CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 315-19.
118. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 317.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 318.
122. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 176-78.
123. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 318.
124. WALKER, supra note 17, at 111 ("For years, I had been following the Caribbean's
whole independence movement and then the federation issues . . . and I was galvanized by
Cayman's decision to remain with Britain. It was a positive and intelligent choice, and it is one
of the reasons Cayman has been able to progress to the level it has. The image of being British
has given it a great impression of stability.").
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"encouragement of local industries."l2 5 The NDP platform also opposed
"introduction of income tax" and "invited foreign investment," 26 issues on
which the NDP and the earlier CVPP had similar views. Not surprisingly,
Rose linked mosquito eradication to Caymans' no-direct tax status and the
development strategy reflected in the 1960 Companies Law.127
Despite the NDP's electoral strength, however, the use of the so-called
"membership system," under which the Administrator invited two or three
Legislative Assembly members to take responsibility for specific
government policies, undercut the development of the type of political party
system arising elsewhere in the Caribbean at this time. 128 Although Rose
first used the "invitation power" as a means of blocking NDP leader
Panton's influence, the "membership system" ultimately facilitated policy
collaboration among the Administrator, the Executive Council, and the
Legislative Assembly, and so strengthened collective promotion of offshore
finance.' It may also have played a role in the transformation of
Caymanian politics into a system in which for several decades after the
early 1960s candidates stood primarily as independents rather than on party
platforms.13 0 The 1962 governmental changes facilitated development of the
collaborative process involving the nascent Civil Service and the Treasurer,
Vassel Johnson. Though not yet a member of the Executive Council as he
would be later, Johnson repeatedly contributed policy initiatives that the
Executive Council and Legislative Assembly employed.13 ' Attorney Bill
Walker, then living in Canada but searching for a Caribbean jurisdiction to
which to move, visited in the early 1960s and noted that "the potential of
the place stuck out a mile" and that it was "just like the Bahamas, but new
and better." 3 2 Meanwhile, the collaborative process funded Dr. Marco
Giglioli's mosquito eradication campaign that was critical to the
development of large scale-tourism;133 it also installed Cable & Wireless, a
leading British telecommunications company, which led to improved
125. BODDEN, supra note 25, at 118.
126. Id. at 116-45.
127. BODDEN, supra note 25, at 67; Interview with Jack Rose, supra note 34, at Disc 2, p.
17.
128. BODDEN, supra note 25, at 99-153.
129. BODDEN, supra note 16, at 27-28 (arguing that Administrator Rose's refusal to
appoint NDP members to the Executive Council and the subsequent dissolution of the NDP
made the other party "politically irrelevant" as well and ended party politics); CRATON,
FOUNDED,supra note 21, at 317-18.
130. DAVIES, supra note 29, at 33.
131. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 125-33.
132. WALKER, supra note 17, at 97.
133. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 402; JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 114-24.
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communications infrastructure. 13 4 As Walker later noted, "things happened
in just the right order."13 5
B. Exchange Controls, Eurodollars, and Banks
Johnson played an influential role in developing the 1966 Exchange
Control Law, which proved an important step in the creation of Cayman as
an OFC.136 In general, the sterling area served as "a formal collective
arrangement for discriminating against the scarce [U.S.] dollar."1 37
Exchange control both complicated offshore strategies and created demand
for them as a means of avoiding the controls.138 Jurisdictions within the
sterling area had the problem that the regulations required entities dealing in
dollars and U.S. securities to be non-resident for exchange control purposes
134. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 355; JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 91-95;
WALKER, supra note 17, at 115. As Walker described it, improving telecommunications was
important because of the problems of being dependent on a single radio operator. "There were
no telephones to speak of. Overseas information was transmitted by short-wave Morse code,
from the telegraph office. There was a little local telephone network but it never really worked.
Our short-wave operator was a bit of a drinker and so you had to make sure that any
transmissions were made by 10:00 am or you could never be sure what the message was going
to say." Id. at 111. Cayman continued to invest in communications infrastructure. As Walker
later noted, "[w]e have successively been known as the country with the most faxes per capita
and the most cell phones per capita of any nation in the world and, although these figures may
be urban myth, they do aptly illustrate that we are an economy driven by communications
technology and that we're always at the forefront of communications technology despite the
relative smallness of our island." Id. at 165.
135. WALKER,supra note 17, at 115.
136. Cayman Hansard, Mar. 19, 1985, at 5-6, available at
http://www.legislativeassembly.ky/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/LGLHOME/BUSINESS/PUBLICATI
ONS/ARCHIVE/1985.PDF (describing role of Cayman Exchange Control law in financial
centre development); JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 125-29.
137. CAIRNCROSS & EICHENGREEN, supra note 74, at 23; BENJAMIN J. COHEN, THE FUTURE
OF STERLING AS AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY 81 (1971).
138. CAIRNCROSS & EICHENGREEN, supra note 74, at 229 ("Once financial markets joined
the list of those undergoing decontrol, new channels were opened through which capital might
flow, and the feasibility of controlling international capital movements diminished
accordingly."); Douglas W. Hawes, What is an Investment Partnership?, in INVESTMENT
PARTNERSHIPS AND "OFFSHORE" INVESTMENT FUNDS, at 244-45 (PLI Corporate Law &
Practice, Transcript Series No. 2 B 0223, 1969) (noting that a shareholder resident in the UK
would pay the 40% investment dollar premium to invest in a U.S. security and pay 25% tax of
premium he received on sale of the investment dollars. "By investing in an offshore fund, the
foreign investor can limit the foreign exchange risks and costs solely to the time of the purchase
and sale of the fund shares.").
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but barred such entities from selling shares into the sterling area.13 9 Within
Britain, a hefty tax was applied to sales proceeds of foreign currency
securities, and no official exchange was available for portfolio investment
outside the sterling area.140 Sterling area residents' desire to invest outside
the exchange control region meant there was a market for strategies and
structures that enabled them to side step the controls. Adding to the
incentive, U.S. estate taxes did not apply to U.S. investments foreigners
held through corporate vehicles.141
British efforts at exchange controls were only partially successful, as
outward direct investment increased from £102 million to £157 million
between 1964 and 1966.142 Not surprisingly, British exchange controls
tightened after 1965, limiting investment even into Australia, New Zealand,
Ireland, and South Africa, where the majority of British investment within
the sterling area had been placed.'4 3 Fears Britain would devalue sterling-
despite a "kind of conspiracy of silence in relation to devaluation" in
Britain, as people feared open discussion would make it more likely-
motivated sterling area investors to attempt to shift their assets out of the
British currency.1" However, the City's business in international finance
grew despite the controls and doubts about sterling. "By the close of the
sixties the overseas funds deposited in London were equal to half the British
national income, and the net overseas earnings of the various services
centred in the City-banking, insurance, merchanting, brokerage and
shipping-were estimated at around E350 million a year. . . ."145 This
growth in financial services was based, at least in part, on "a firm
139. Albert Francke III & William S. Robertson III, Offshore Investment Funds, in
INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIPS AND "OFFSHORE" INVESTMENT FUNDS 256 (PLI Corporate Law &
Practice, Transcript Series No. 2 B 0223, 1969).
140. Id. After 1957, British purchases of non-sterling securities from overseas sterling area
residents was prohibited. COHEN, supra note 137, at 180.
141. Hawes, supra note 138, at 243.
142. CAIRNCROSS & EICHENGREEN, supra note 74, at 174-75. In 1960, the sterling area had
60% of British foreign investment; by 1970 it had only 38%. DARWIN, supra note 10, at 305.
143. CAIRNCROSS & EICHENGREEN, supra note 74, at 22-23; COHEN, supra note 137, at
179-80. Other European countries, including France and Italy, also tightened controls in the
second half of the 1960s. EINZIG, supra note 15, at 334-35.
144. CAIRNCROSS & EICHENGREEN, supra note 74, at 159-60. Labour Prime Minister
Harold Wilson's concern that devaluation on his watch would cause Labour to be viewed as
"the party of devaluation" made him "too willing to run risks with sterling" and so delayed
devaluation, despite the series of crises which "battered" his ministers almost from the moment
they took office in 1964. Id. at 167-68; ROBERT Z. ALIBER, THE INTERNATIONAL MONEY GAME
7, 65 (5th ed. 1987) (Labour feared becoming "the Devaluation Party" in 1960s); DARWIN,
supra note 10, at 291.
145. A BANKER'S WORLD, supra note 72, at 12.
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conviction [among senior Treasury and Bank of England officials] that the
financial and commercial service trades had something unique to contribute
to the rebuilding of Britain's economic position in the world." 46 Moreover,
it built on the British legal tradition.147
At the same time, a pool of U.S. dollars had been accumulating outside
the United States since 1957, when the U.S. trade surplus had shifted to a
trade deficit; by mid-1958 a European market for deposits and loans in
dollars had appeared.'48 Since the post-war international financial
framework permitted variation in banking regulation, this created an
opportunity.'49 Eurodollar volume "roughly tripled" in 1959 and doubled
again in 1960.15o North American demand for offshore entities grew after
the United States imposed the Interest Equalization Tax ("IET") in 1963,
and both the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint program and the Foreign
Direct Investment Regulations in 1965, all of which were intended to
reduce the flow of capital out of the U.S. market.'"' (The IET remained in
effect until June 1974.)152 In addition, Federal Reserve Regulation Q's limits
on interest paid on deposits in the United States also pushed dollars into the
Eurocurrency markets, where higher rates were available.15 3 Both U.S.
firms' foreign subsidiaries (which were expanding their borrowing in
Europe because U.S. interest rates in the 1950s and 1960s were often higher
146. Id. at 16.
147. VLCEK, supra note 2, at 21 (arguing that "[i]n a broad sense, the legal space in which
the offshore business sector has been built exists within a fundamental difference between the
English and Continental legal systems. The difference lies within the foundations of each legal
system-for the continental legal tradition explicitly identifies what is permitted, whereas the
English legal tradition explicitly identifies what is not permitted.").
148. GIBSON, supra note 74, at 10.
149. VLCEK, supra note 2, at 25.
150. SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 139.
151. A BANKER'S WORLD, supra note 72, at 30-31; FREDERICK G. FISHER III, THE
EURODOLLAR BOND MARKET 21 (1979); GIBSON, supra note 74, at 11-12; Hine & Olienyk,
supra note 73, at 322; R.A. JOHNS & C.M. LE MARCHANT, FINANCE CENTRES: BRITISH ISLE
OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1979, at 13 (1993); SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 139. The tax
had to be paid each time a foreign security was acquired by a U.S. person, "an effective
disincentive to investment in such securities" despite the modest level of the tax. FISHER, supra,
at 21. It reduced effective yields on foreign securities by about 1%. EICHENGREEN, supra note
71, at 129.
152. Exec. Order No. 11,766, 39 Fed. Reg. 3,807 (Jan. 30, 1974) (setting rate to zero); Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (repealing tax).
153. EICHENGREEN, supra note 71, at 121-22. See also R. Alton Gilbert, Requiem for
Regulation Q: What It Did and Why It Passed Away, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. Louis
(1986) (describing history of regulation), available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/86/02/RequiemFebl986.pdf.
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than in Western Europe)' 4 and non-American firms thus entered the rapidly
growing Eurodollar market in pursuit of cheaper financing."' That market
was centered in the City in London, because City firms had the "traditional
skills and stability in looking after other people's money" and, as Citibank's
European head Walter Wriston noted, "people believe that the British
government is not about to close it down."' 5 6 Further, for Eurodollar
depositors like the Soviet-owned Banque Commerciale de l'Europe du
Nord, which worried about too close contact with American institutions,
"what was wanted was a reliable non-American bank which would borrow
the dollars and undertake to repay them in dollars.""' The growth of the
Eurodollar market was important for Cayman because although it was
primarily headquartered in London, Eurodollar transactions were "behind
much of the financial activity based on Grand Cayman.""
The American policies also led U.S. banks to establish foreign branches
and subsidiaries: in 1960, eight U.S. banks had 130 foreign branches; in
1964, eleven U.S. banks had a total of 181 overseas branches with assets of
$6.9 billion; in 1970, seventy-nine U.S banks had a total of 536 overseas
branches with assets of $52.6 billion."' By 1980, 126 U.S. banks had nearly
a thousand foreign branches.'6 0 Offshore banks "borrow[ed] money from
nonresidents and [lent] to other nonresidents," serving as "crucial
intermediary conduits, global transnational structures, for ongoing activities
based on the inward and outward routing and re-routing of business profits
154. ALIBER, supra note 144, at 289-90.
155. GIBSON, supra note 74, at 11-12. See also Tax Evasion through the Netherlands
Antilles and Other Tax Haven Countries: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on
Gov't Operations, 98th Cong. 1 (1983) (Statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., Commissioner,
Internal Revenue Service) (stating that the U.S. encouraged use of Netherlands Antilles
financing subsidiaries in 1960s).
156. SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 142. Britain's "welcome" to foreign banks was also
important. STOPFORD & TURNER, supra note 74, at 227.
157. A BANKER'S WORLD, supra note 72, at 31-33.
158. SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 284.
159. GIBSON, supra note 74, at 12; FISHER, supra note 151, at 43 (describing how "U.S.
investment houses were able to transfer their operations to Europe to continue their
underwriting and placement of foreign bonds outside the territorial boundaries of the United
States" after the IET); ALIBER, supra note 144, at 175-76 ("In the absence of the ability to sell
dollar deposits in London, most of these [U.S.] banks would not have established London
branches."); Id. at 179-80 (noting lower regulatory costs in London drew U.S. banks there to
access Eurodollar market and enabled paying higher interest rates there). Note that during this
same period, foreign banks opened U.S. branches. More than 50 opened U.S. branches between
1960 and 1980, with the goal of "retaining the U.S. business of their domestic customers-and
attracting some U.S. customers." Id. at 263.
160. ALIBER, supra note 144, at 263.
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and incomes."'"' The appearance of the Euromarkets in currencies
weakened domestic efforts at financial regulation throughout the world, 16 2
creating space for offshore business strategies that had not existed under the
tighter national control of banking possible when the Euromarket alternative
was not available. Banks having branches in multiple countries further
internationalized financial markets, as branches kept in touch with their
home offices even outside local trading hours, gradually creating more
continuous trading opportunities."' Thus, just at the moment when Cayman
was entering the market, regulatory efforts in Britain and the United States
were creating demand for offshore jurisdictions' services and spurring the
financial and legal industries in both countries to exploit their respective
competitive advantages in developing that demand. Cayman was lucky to
have the opportunity, but their success was due to more than luck-
Caymanians seized the opportunities with which they were presented as
well as seeking to create more such opportunities. In particular, the demand
for structures to avoid British exchange control regulations and the growing
Eurocurrency market in London gave sterling area jurisdictions an
advantage and a "home" market in the sterling area that developed
institutional capacity and promoted innovation, while also allowing growth
into the larger North American market."
C. Responding to Demand
Demand for offshore jurisdictions was growing and Cayman had an
initial product with the 1960 Companies Law, and the policy space
necessary to respond to it by 1962. It was not the only OFC, however. To
161. JOHNS & LE MARCHANT, supra note 151, at 21.
162. GIBSON, supra note 74, at 45; Hine & Olienyk, supra note 73, at 323.
163. EINZIG, supra note 15, at 21, 238-48 (describing how the U.S. bank branches'
presence in London eventually led to after hours trading by U.K. banks attempting to compete
with the U.S. branches).
164. MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 71-73 (1990)
(describing importance of a "home base" in developing "a complex of specialized assets and
skills" and providing "better ongoing information and insight into product and process needs").
Farquet's observation that the greater British emphasis on taxation of income at the source made
the British tax system more effective at collecting taxes without taxpayer cooperation in the
interwar period than nominally more progressive continental tax systems suggests another
'home market' advantage for City firms and sterling area OFCs over continental tax advisors
and OFCs. Farquet, supra note 12, at 11-12. It took more creativity and effort to avoid UK
taxes, forcing City firms and sterling area OFCs (including the UK itself) to go beyond simple
asset relocation schemes earlier. They thus had an advantage for the post-World War II
competition.
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compete with Bermuda, the Bahamas, the Channel Islands, Curagao, and
the Isle of Man, all of which had head starts, as well as other jurisdictions
entering the market, Cayman would need to develop additional products and
expand its capabilities. An important source of policy innovation for
Cayman was the slowly growing group of expatriate professionals who
followed MacDonald to Cayman in the mid-1960s and established
Caymanian residency."' British-trained lawyer William Walker, born in
British Guiana and educated in Barbados before studying law at Cambridge
University and in London, arrived in Cayman from Canadian law practice
in 1964. Like MacDonald, Walker started Cayman law practice alone. 166
Walker later described Cayman on his arrival as having "cows wandering
through Georgetown, only one bank, only one paved road, and no
telephones."' 6' There were just three other lawyers on the islands and
"almost no Caymanian law, a dearth of legislation," and no attorney general
("instead a magistrate on contract").168 Within two years he applied his
transatlantic legal experience, collaborating in the governmental process to
bring in two pivotal pieces of legislation: the Banks and Trust Companies
Regulation Law (copied from the Bahamas) and the Trusts Law (drafted
with an English barrister, Milton Grundy).'6 9
Each law extended the philosophy behind the 1960 Companies Law to
new fields, implementing a policy of diversification and expansion that
continues into the present and which contrasts with other 1960s-era
OFCs.170 Walker's contributions to the legislation brought to bear practical
expertise in the service of the government's collaborative policy making. '"
The involvement of resident expat professionals in the collaborative process
grounded policy making in the combination of Cayman's constitutional
autonomy backed by British sovereignty.172 Financial Secretary Vassel
Johnson "spearheaded" the development of the OFC, insisting it "must be
under government control," a crucial step for building regulatory
165. Interview with Benson 0. Ebanks, supra note 33, at Discs 13-14, 20; Interview with
Aileen MacDonald, supra note 98, at Discs 24-27; RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 168 (giving credit
to lawyers Arthur Hunter, Bill Walker, Warren Connolly, and Charles Adams, and accountant
Michael Austin).
166. WALKER, supra note 17, at 102-19.
167. SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 281.
168. WALKER, supra note 17, at 109, 111.
169. Letter from Timothy Ridley to authors (Oct. 14, 2012) (on file with authors); WALKER,
supra note 17, at 118.
170. Boise & Morriss, supra note 47, at 431-34.
171. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 353; JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 126, 132-33;
WALKER, supra note 17, at 116-19.
172. Interview with William Walker, supra note 98, at 5-27.
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infrastructure."' By contrast, Rose had employed a Kingston, Jamaica law
firm to draft the 1960 Companies Law, which the Colonial Office approved
as written, amidst the uncertain colonial constitutional disputes of 1959-
1962.174 The process included a small but growing Caymanian elite, "a
tightly knit group". 175 Cayman's incorporation of its small but growing
expatriate community into the policy-making process contrasts sharply with
the more contentious relationship between expats, local white elites, and the
black majority taking shape at the same time in the Bahamas and
Bermuda.'76
Diversification of laws designed to attract the offshore investor
confirmed the collaborative process in which the "[g]overnment liked to
work with committees and get lots of input."'7 7 Walker described the 1966
Trusts Law, drafted by London trust expert Milton Grundy, as an
"exempted trust using principles from the 'Anstalt trust' from
Liechtenstein," plus the "British law . . . adjusted . . . to fit to the needs of
Cayman."' 7 1 Caymanian lawyers, government officials, and businessmen
sought Grundy's assistance, in part because he was well known in the
Bahamas and in part because of his expertise in British tax law.179 Treasurer
Vassel Johnson helped push for the law, as part of creating "the right
atmosphere" for a development strategy based on finance.'s The trusts
business was "designed not really to evade taxes but, more often than not, to
preserve property from generation to generation and keep children from
spending inherited money.""' As the Labour Party in Britain was
increasingly focusing on efforts to tax passive income, British wealth was
173. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 168.
174. Interview with Jack Rose, supra note 34, at Disc 3, p. 21.
175. SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 283 (noting that three-of-seven members of the Cabinet in
mid-1960s were named Bodden and of the remaining eight members of legislature, one was a
Bodden and three were Ebanks.).
176. DAVIES, supra note 29, at 11-12 (describing "racial tension and rioting" before the
1968 elections in Bermuda that led to the declaration of a state of emergency, imposition of a
curfew, and arrival of British troops and noting that the subsequent Report of the Commission
of Inquiry had found that the PLP had a "positively racial character;" 1969 regional Black
Power conference in Hamilton; riots in October 1970; murder of police commissioner in 1972
and assassination of governor and his aide six months later); TERRY TUCKER, BERMUDA TODAY
& YESTERDAY: 1503-1978, at 162-63 (1979) (describing rise of racial politics in late 1950s);
see also supra note 67.
177. WALKER, supra note 17, at 118.
178. Id. at 116.
179. SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 281.
180. Id.
181. WALKER, supra note 17, at 116.
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passing "outside the more exposed forms of individual title and instead
through the more elusive and labyrinthine network of trusts."l8 2
The Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Law created two license and
regulatory categories for banks and trust companies, which, like the
Bahamas law on which it was based,' took the same approach as the ring-
fenced model established in Curagao in the 1950s.' In Category A were
banks and trust companies operating within the Caymans; they were more
closely regulated than Category B entities doing business solely as offshore
entities.' Caymans' more numerous Category B entities, unlike many
competing offshore jurisdictions, required some minimal local office
representation, and local supervision,18 thus helping to build infrastructure.
Firms paid annual fees that steadily increased.'8 7 The policy launched five
years earlier with the Companies Law thus was "making a valuable
contribution to the building of the financial industry."'"8
By 1968 the collaborative policy making enabled Cayman to seize a
competitive advantage. The Bahamas had had a "large number of trust and
finance companies" since the 1950s, exploiting its proximity to Miami and
its location in the same time zone as New York City. 8 9 Cayman saw a
chance to distinguish itself, focusing on being a "clean spot" in contrast to
the Bahamas, where unrest surrounding Bahamian independence and some
taint of the casinos in Nassau, "which were often suspected of money
laundering,"' 90 made foreigners suspicious. Walker recalled the "Banks and
Trust Companies [Regulation] Law being enacted as literally an emergency
piece of legislation," exploiting the establishment of Bahamian majority
rule in 1968, when tensions between Lyndon Pindling's black majority
182. WHITING, supra note 70, at 138.
183. On the evolution of Bahamian offshore bank regulation, see Carlene Y. Francis, The
Central Bank of the Bahamas: Central Banking in a Developing Country with an Offshore
Banking Centre, paper prepared for presentation at the 11th Annual Monetary Studies
Conference, Kingston, Jamaica, at 2-3 (Oct. 23-25, 1978),
http://ccmfuwi.org/files/publications/conference/59.pdf; Ralph Deans, History and Success-
Financial Services Evolution, BAHAMAS INVESTOR MAG., June 23, 2009, available at
http://www.thebahamasinvestor.com/2009/history-and-success-financial-services-evolution/.
184. Boise & Morriss, supra note 47, at 405 (stating that Antilles had first ring-fenced tax
regime in 1954).
185. STRATINFO, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE BANKING INDUSTRY IN THE CAYMAN
ISLANDS 9 (2006), http://www.cibankers.org/pdfs/CIBAEconomic Impact.pdf (tracing
distinction to 1966 statute).
186. Id. at 10; CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 353.
187. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 353.
188. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 127.
189. Sullivan, supra note 67, at 535.
190. SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 282.
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government, white business elites (known as the "Bay Street Boys") and the
expat financial community over Pindling's Bahamization program provoked
an exodus of financial industry firms from the Bahamas.191 Many of these
firms shifted operations to Cayman-as one observer put it, "the Cayman
government should build a statue to Sir Linden Pindling as one of the great
benefactors of the Cayman Islands!" 9 2 As the Bahamas began "the
revocation of expatriate work-permits and everybody fled. They packed up
their files and companies and money and left and we, under fortunate
circumstance, were ready." 93 Mosquito control funded by OFC-generated
revenues and increased air service allowed tourism to expand as well.'9 4
In Jamaica, British Guiana, the Bahamas, and elsewhere across the
Caribbean, independence movements aggravated racial divisions.' 95 These
certainly played a role in the Bahamas, where UK trust and tax lawyer
Milton Grundy attributed the financial industry's disputes with the Pindling
government more to race than Pindling's actions, saying, "It wasn't that
Pindling said or did anything to damage the banks, it was just that he was
black."' 96 In the Caymans, however, although racism sometimes privately
divided people, the long heritage of mixed-race "colored," blacks, and
191. Sullivan, supra note 67, at 546; WALKER, supra note 17, at 115; BODDEN, supra note
15, at 32; Letter from T. Russell to D.F.S. Le Breton, Commissioner in Anguilla, at 1-2 (May
21, 1975) (on file with the British National Archives File FCO 44/1181) (stating that after
threats to offshore sector, Bahamas "rapidly lost a great deal of off-shore business and the big
bank operations normally have branches in several tax havens so that at the least whiff of
trouble in the wind they can transfer business to another haven that seems more settled");
CRATON, supra note 84, at 161 ("Many companies transferred all or part of their operations to
what were seen as more favorable locations, bringing the first surge of prosperity to the Cayman
Islands and reinforcing the longer-established financial industry of Bermuda."). The conflict
began before Pindling took power. In 1965, Pindling was leader of the opposition and he seized
the speaker's mace and threw it out of the window during a session of the House of Assembly.
Sullivan, supra, at 546; see also CRATON, supra note 59, at 276-79 (describing growing
tensions in the Bahamas in late 1960s, including "purge" of "white, or near-white, candidates"
from Pindling's party).
192. WALKER, supra note 17, at 127-29 (citing Sir Etienne Dupuch); see also SAMPSON,
supra note 14, at 281. Pindling continued to be invoked as a negative example. See, e.g.,
Cayman Hansard, Nov. 21, 1991, at 1153 (MLA D. Ezzard Miller arguing "this country might
need a Moses but what it does not need is one from the mold of Milo Butler, Lyndon Pindling
and the Bay Street Boys. The people of this country know that the success of the Cayman
Islands was certainly helped along and spurred by the rising of that kind of a Moses in the
Bahamas.").
193. WALKER, supra note 17, at 115.
194. DAVIES, supra note 29, at 35; SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 281.
195. WALKER, supra note 17, at 115, 127-28, 136; Sullivan, supra note 67, at 548
(referring to an environment of "intense racial polarization" in the Bahamas during the election
campaign of 1968.).
196. SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 281.
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whites linked though kinship and personal networks meant that
representatives of each group occupied leadership positions in government,
politics, professions, religion, and private life.' The Caymans'
constitutional autonomy within a British colonial framework offered those
exiting the Bahamas not only professional opportunities but also the
expectation of more stable racial, social, and cultural relations. As speakers
on offshore investment funds at a continuing legal education seminar in the
United States concluded in 1969, "We also like political stability and a legal
tradition that people really believe in and feel they are supported by."'9 8
This meant that it was possible, as Walker described, for the Cayman
"private sector and the government [to] work[] together very closely to
produce both the business and the laws that facilitated it."' 99
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSOLIDATION, COLLABORATIVE
POLICYMAKING, AND DIVERSIFICATION: 1968-1980
From the late-1960s through the end of the 1970s, collaborative policy
making and Cayman's constitutional structure were consolidated, tested,
and further developed to promote the jurisdiction's competitive advantages.
The success of this process can be seen in the jurisdiction's growing
financial sector. The number of Caymanian-registered companies increased
steadily: The 1960 Companies Law promoter MacDonald's registered firms
grew from 20 to "hundreds" in a few years. 200 Following the Bahamas'
1967-68 disorders and political and racial destabilization in Jamaica and
Bermuda during the early 1970s, the number of Caymanian-registered
entities climbed in 1970 to "2000 companies," and in 1976 to "7,521
registered companies, 126 banks and trust[] [companies], and one captive
insurance company."2 0 ' Growth continued into the 1980s.2 02 The captive
197. BODDEN, supra note 25, at 36-46.
198. Francke & Robertson, supra note 139, at 242, 252.
199. WALKER, supra note 17, at 117.
200. Id. at 115.
201. Id. at 136; Interview with William Walker, supra note 98, Disc 3, p. 13; CRATON,
supra note 84, at 161 (after Pindling took power "the rate of increase [of banks] slowed
dramatically, and the number of trust companies substantially declined. Many companies
transferred all or part of their operations to what were seen as more favourable locations,
bringing the first surge of prosperity to the Cayman Islands and reinforcing the longer-
established financial industry of Bermuda. Besides almost missing out on the development of
the offshore 'captive' insurance business to those rival colonial jurisdictions, The Bahamas
began to gain a reputation as a refuge for offshore financial operations at the shadier and shakier
end of the spectrum . . . .").
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insurance company reflected an initial step into diversification beyond the
company registry, into not only local and international banking and trust
business, but also malpractice insurance, predictable land titles fostering a
hotel and government building boom, North American mass tourism,
immigration and employment policies, and infrastructure. As the Caymans'
local and global business diversified, the evolution of its constitutional
structure and the collaborative policy-making process incrementally
addressed local and foreign demands and pressure for improved policing of
criminal conduct, largely avoiding the corruption problems that plagued
some of its competitors.
A. Growing Demand
Cayman's evolution occurred in a shifting business environment for
Caribbean OFCs in the early 1970s. The collapse of the Bretton Woods
system in 1971 dramatically changed currency risks;203 the decline of
exchange controls altered the international financial landscape;2 0 the
infusion of petrodollars into the Eurodollar market vastly expanded the
202. Cayman Hansard, Feb. 11, 1981, at 2 (Governor noting in Throne Speech that bank
licenses and company registrations grew at 11% and 15% respectively during 1980); Id. at 3
(noting insurance fees projected to increase from 1980 to 1981 from CI$50,000 to CI$720,000);
id, Mar. 17, 1982, at 4 (Governor noting during Throne Speech that banks and trust company
registrations rose 21% in 1981, companies registered rose 18%, and insurance licenses rose to
264, with financial sector providing 20% of government revenue).
203. Paul Krugman, Exchange Rates, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS
(1993), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Encl/ExchangeRates.html ("Exchange rates
between currencies have been highly unstable since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system
of fixed exchange rates, which lasted from 1946 to 1973."); LAURENT L. JACQUE,
MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISK 1 (1997) ("Of all the winds of
change that have buffeted multinational corporations in recent years, none has had a more
pervasive impact upon their risk-return profile than the breakdown of the international monetary
system of fixed exchange rates that had prevailed until March 1973 under the Bretton Woods
agreement (1944-1971) and, later, under the short-lived Smithsonian accord (1971-1973).").
204. See EICHENGREEN, supra note 71, at 191 ("[A]s international transactions were
liberalized, it became impossible to keep domestic markets tightly regulated. Once financial
markets joined the list of those undergoing decontrol, new channels were opened through which
capital might flow, and the feasibility of controlling international capital movements diminished
accordingly."); see also Christopher J. Neely, An Introduction to Capital Controls, FED. RES.
BANK ST. LOUIs REV. 13 (Nov./Dec. 1999) (describing dismantling of capital controls); Pascal
Petit, Exchange Control, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 207 (1987)
(first half of 1980s "characterized by the liberalization of capital movements").
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scope of international finance;2 05 and entrepreneurs in finance spread new
products around the world.206 On the exchange control front, Britain
subdivided the sterling area into the "scheduled territories" (the United
Kingdom, Isle of Man, Channel Islands, and Irish Republic, plus, after
January 1, 1973, Gibraltar) and the "overseas sterling area," and applied
restrictions on capital outflows to the overseas sterling area 07 (all British
exchange controls were formally ended in 1979208). Cayman relaxed its
enforcement of exchange controls in 1972, choosing to administer them "in
a very liberal manner"209 and, ultimately, to seek to suspend them (with
London's agreement).210 Cayman responded too, in part, by shifting first
from the Jamaica dollar to a British pound-linked currency in 1972 and then
changing the currency link to the U.S. dollar in 1974.211 Moreover, once
Britain entered the EEC, it found its "residual responsibilities" to the
Caribbean "increasingly hard to reconcile with the reality of Britain's
perceived new future with Europe,"2 12 increasing British interest in its
Caribbean territories' fiscal self-sufficiency. Cayman was in the right place
to exploit "all these synergies working together, the collapse of traditional
offshore markets and the rise in Eurodollar and Eurobond markets that were
searching for a stable offshore jurisdiction." 2 13
Demand for international financial services grew as the global economy
became more interlinked. "[I]nvestments by United States sources in
205. See YOUSSEF CASSIS, CAPITALS OF CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL CENTRES 1780-2005, at 236 (2007) (stating that from 1974 to 1980 oil exporters
accumulated $383 billion in liquid assets, half of which was invested as short term deposits).
206. FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND RISK SHARING 3
(1994) ("The world has been transformed by the frantic pace of financial innovation in the
1970s and 1980s.").
207. JOZEF SWIDROWSKI, EXCHANGE AND TRADE CONTROLS: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES
OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIC TRANSACTIONS AND SETTLEMENTS 85 (1975). The sterling area
itself became an "irrelevance" and was formally wound up in 1976. MARGARET ACKRILL &
LESLIE HANNAH, BARCLAYS: THE BUSINESS OF BANKING 1690-1996, at 303 (2001).
208. SEAN GLYNN & ALAN BOOTH, MODERN BRITAIN: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY
232 (1995) (exchange controls removed in 1979 in part done as aid to the City of London "to
compete more effectively for international financial services"). Cayman responded by formally
repealing its own dormant exchange controls. Cayman Hansard, Feb. 17, 1981, at 7 (Financial
Secretary Vassel Johnson noting repeal in 1980 was in response to UK action).
209. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 10, 1977, at 24.
210. Id.
211. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 177-79, 185-88. The Cayman dollar was originally
intended to be tied 1:1 to the U.S. dollar, but when the U.S. devalued the dollar, the rate
changed to 1:1.25. Id. at 179.
212. Anthony Payne, Britain and the Caribbean, in EUROPE AND THE CARIBBEAN 13, 18
(Paul Sutton ed., 1991).
213. WALKER, supra note 17, at 137.
foreign countries increased from $62 billion in 1968 to $168 billion in 1978.
Earnings from these investments totaled $6.5 billion in 1968 and $25.7
billion in 1978."214 British banks were unshackled by the combination of the
1970 return of a Conservative government and the shift in policy marked by
the Bank of England's publication of its Competition and Credit Control
paper in 1971. "For the banks, the critical difference made by the Bank of
England's new policy was that they might cease to be the fall guys,
expected to pursue the public interest while supposedly being private
organizations motivated by profit."215 This shift "had a profound effect on
bankers' ways of doing business and they soon found very distinct
attractions in it." 2 16 As a result, British bankers became more aggressive
about expanding into new markets. And it was not just British banks that
took advantage of Britain's new policies. Between 1971 and 1984, the
number of employees of foreign banks and securities houses in London
doubled to 42,000.217 The growth of British-based financial services
enhanced Cayman's competitive advantage, as Oxbridge-trained British
lawyers John Maples and Douglas Calder moved to the jurisdiction in the
late 1960s, followed by Anton Duckworth, Timothy Ridley, and Anthony
Travers in the early 1970s. 218
The global financial market's demand for offshore services grew and
investment funds in offshore jurisdictions became increasingly important.
Bernard Cornfeld had created his Investors Overseas Services, Ltd. (IOS)
mutual fund organization in the mid-1950s, first in Paris and then in Geneva
in 1958, selling mutual fund shares to European and Latin American
investors and American expatriates. 21 9 By 1969, IOS was the largest
financial sales organization in the world, with offices in 50 countries, sales
forces in 100 countries, 30,000 employees, more than a third of a million
investors, and over $2.5 billion in assets.2 20 Although Cornfeld's empire
soon collapsed, he had identified both an important market need, liquid
214. IRS, Review of Service Programs Relating to International Transactions (Aug. 25,
1981), in Improper Use of Foreign Addresses to Evade U.S. Taxes: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 2d sess. 53 (June 10,
1982).
215. ACKRILL & HANNA, supra note 207, at 163-64.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 215.
218. See BODDEN, supra note 16, at 140 (asserting that Caymanian bar's "capable corporate
attorneys" were "absolutely essential" to Islands' success).
219. BERT CANTOR, THE BERNIE CORNFELD STORY 49-57 (1970) (describing origins of
10S).
220. ALIBER, supra note 144, at 272.
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investments that protected against inflation and devaluation,22 ' and the
product that met this need, offshore mutual funds.222 The overall funds
market-largely funds incorporated in "low-tax, minimal regulation
jurisdictions like the Bahamas, Panama, and the Cayman Islands"-reached
$6 billion in 1969.223 As new funds entered the market in the 1970s to meet
the growing demand for these products, the demand for OFC jurisdictions'
services continued to grow.
Demand for offshore financial activity also grew in the 1970s, in part
because of the massive amount of money that petro-states needed to recycle
after OPEC successfully raised oil prices.22 4 External liabilities with respect
to OPEC countries of banks in countries reporting to the Bank for
International Settlements soared from $16 billion to $43.5 billion between
December 1973 and December 1974, much of which went into Eurodollar
investments.22 5 In addition, the increased internationalization of business
activity meant there was a greater need for
cross-border, cross-currency loans and loans booked at foreign
booking offices. In the financial sector, operational requirements
became twofold. Firstly, the establishment of a networked
institutional infrastructure to promote global deposit-sourcing and
lender-servicing, covering all time-zones, via which to secure and
effect transnational ease of currency movement and translation to
promote international tax-planning and cash management.
Secondly, the identification and representation in trouble-free
jurisdictions for the strategic deposit of funds and the legal situs of
particular intra-firm activities.226
The growth in these transactions and greater volume of money moving
internationally meant there was growing demand for offshore banks that
could borrow money from and lend to nonresidents, acting "as crucial
221. Robert Aliber notes that Cornfeld's "genius" was to see the European market for
"liquid financial assets that would offer protection against domestic inflation" at a time when
"most European investors had few attractive financial investment opportunities in their own
currencies." Domestic bank deposit interest rates "were kept deliberately low, partly because
banks were inefficient and partly because banking systems were rigged to subsidize borrowers,
including government, at the expense of lenders," providing real rates that were sometimes
negative. Id. at 276.
222. Id. at 273 (market need and product); id. at 275 (collapse caused by tight money and
"extravagant" mismanagement).
223. Id. at 273; see also ROBERT A. HUTcINSON, VESCo 39-40 (1974) (describing growth
of offshore fund industry as in 1968, 165 "truly offshore funds" with assets of $3.6 billion).
224. JOHNs & LE MARCHANT, supra note 151, at 3.
225. GIBsoN, supra note 74, at 16.
226. JoHNs & LE MARCHANT, supra note 151, at 3.
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intermediary conduits, global transnational structures, for ongoing activities
based on the inward and outward routing and re-routing of business profits
and incomes." 2 27 Throughout this process, Caymanian officials remained
conscious of the need to build a regulatory structure sufficient to maintain
the growing offshore business. As Financial Secretary Vassel Johnson
stated in his December 1971 budget address,
Growth in the off-shore sector may reach the point where the
Cayman Islands rank among major tax-havens; however, this
position will not come about automatically; it will depend on the
exerted effort on the part of this Government to maintain control
conducive to orderly growth in areas of rapid development; it will
depend on stability, and last but by no means least it will depend
on how well Government can establish itself in the driver's seat of
this country.228
They also remained conscious of the need to be competitive. For example,
debates in the Legislative Assembly over fee increases for offshore
company registration regularly centered on the impact on Cayman's
position relative to other jurisdictions.22 9
By the end of the 1970s, a network of "as many as thirty-six
jurisdictions" had grown up to service the demand for international
financial transactions.23 0 Cayman played a major role in this network, with
30 billion Eurodollars in Cayman by 1980, about 3% of world supply and
another $30 billion in accounts of insurance companies and other
companies on island.23 1 Global banks expanded their networks to leverage
the opportunities provided by these jurisdictions. For example, Barclays
created Barclays Bank International in 1972 out of its Dominion, Colonial
and Overseas unit because, as bank chairman Sir James Thompson put it,
the bank "needed a network of branches in all the principal financial centres
of the world with the organization and expertise to offer a comprehensive
227. Id. at 21.
228. Cayman Hansard, Dec. 10, 1971, at 7.
229. See, e.g., id., Dec. 8, 1975, at 39-45; Feb. 29, 1991, at 53-54 (Opposition MLA
objecting to fee increases because "we are not now as competitive with some of our Caribbean
neighbors as we would like to be."); Feb. 27, 1991, at 176 (Government supporter arguing need
to "monitor carefully" BVI, Turks and Caicos, and the Bahamas as competitors); Nov. 25, 1991,
at 1194 (opposition MLA arguing against fee increases because will cause shift to BVI "because
of the difference in cost"); Oct. 19, 2009, at 225 (discussing whether fee increases would make
Cayman uncompetitive); see also note 321 infra.
230. JOHNs & LE MARCHANT, supra note 151, at 15.
231. SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 285.
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package of financial services to the multinational corporate market."232
Market segmentation within the offshore world began to occur: "At the end
of the 1970s, the offshore network consisted of four primary centres, eleven
secondary centres, four transitional secondary centres, and eleven peripheral
tax havens, each interconnected with one another and interposed between
onshore external centres"233 with Cayman a peripheral secondary center.234
Financial services professionals, particularly the lawyers, and Caymanians
were "very aware that they face constant competition in the tax-haven
business" 235 and they began to take steps to differentiate Cayman in the
marketplace (which we describe below).
B. Adapting to Changes through Increased Autonomy
As the global economic environment became more complex,
Caymanians achieved more self-government in a new Constitution. After
three unsuccessful attempts to do so during the late-1960s, the Legislative
Assembly agreed in 1970 to pursue stronger self-government powers, much
like those advocated in the early 1960s by the NDP,236 formally requesting
action on increased self-government from the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office ("FCO").237 In response, the FCO sent the Earl of Oxford and
Asquith, a British constitutional expert, on a fact-finding visit in early 1971.
Two-party politics had ended with the 1962 election, replaced by
independent candidates in local districts across Grand Cayman, Cayman
Brac, and Little Cayman organized as "Teams" electioneering for seats in
the Legislative Assembly.238
Lord Asquith found that Cayman politics were centered on individuals
and rooted in local-district kinship and community networks, which
diffused interracial and class-based politics: "There is at present," he
concluded, "no marked stratification of society by colour, age, wealth, class
or education." 239 This was in sharp contrast to the more turbulent racial
232. ACKRILL & HANNAH, supra note 207, at 306 (quoting Sir John Thompson, A World
Banking Group, Barclays Bank Briefing, Dec. 20, 1972, at 1).
233. JOHNs & LE MARCHANT, supra note 151, at 17-18.
234. Id.
235. SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 285.
236. BODDEN, supra note 25, at 129-60.
237. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 319.
238. Id. at 315-22.
239. Id. at 320. Caymanian historian Roy Bodden, who is often critical of the financial
sector's role in Caymanian society, similarly argues that Cayman had a "social fabric" that was
"held together by the realization that what exists is a synergistic and symbiotic relationship,
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climate in competitor jurisdictions such as the Bahamas and Bermuda
(where race riots would break out again in 1977).240 Substantively, Lord
Asquith found the Assembly united in favor of an increase in elected ExCo
Members, a measure that reduced, but did not eliminate, the Governor's
power. 241 However, sentiment remained strong to maintain the association
with Britain. As MLA Annie Bodden put it in her 1974 comments in
response to the Throne Speech, "I want to see that beautiful British [flag] on
the top of all our flag poles, on the ships. I don't want to see any red and
green and yellow, or whatever the colours Jamaica's is, or Honduras or
Cuba. I want to see the British flag, and I hope the day will never dawn that
we try to be foolish enough to talk that we can get our independence."242
Lord Asquith's findings shaped the changes embodied in the 1972
Constitution, which consolidated the collaborative policy-making approach.
The gradualist approach reinforced Cayman's reputation-and competitive
advantage-as a stable, law-abiding offshore financial center.24 3 The new
Constitution left the London-appointed Governor charged with foreign
affairs, national security, and traditional executive powers such as the
pardon. 2" London gave the governor considerable autonomy. Governor
Russell, who served from 1974 to 1982, described it as being "left, in large
measure, to run my own shop" as long as he kept London informed.2 45
While the Governor lost the power to appoint "nominated Members," he
retained the power to appoint the Chief Secretary, the Financial Secretary,
and the Attorney General, who were the ex officio members of the
which must be maintained if both groups are to continue to prosper." BODDEN, supra note 16, at
22.
240. DAVIES, supra note 29, at 12-13.
241. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 319. There were local differences. For example,
Lord Asquith ascertained that the two smaller islands urged preserving their share of the
Assembly versus Grand Cayman. Id. at 319-22.
242. Cayman Hansard, Mar. 13, 1974, at 6.
243. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 320. This was reflected in the Governor's
Throne Speech in August 1972. See Cayman Hansard, Aug. 7, 1972, at 3-4 (praising the
"careful and progressive development of participation by elected representatives of the people"
in the new Constitution and Caymanians for not accepting "the popular belief that anything
carrying the 'colonial' label is bad"' but instead being "prepared to work out slowly and
carefully and with wisdom, what is really best for the Caymanian people.").
244. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 321; RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 174.
245. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 180. Financial Secretary Vassel Johnson later noted that he
had gone to London in 1970 to "arrange a meeting with the officials of the Treasury, the Bank
of England and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to relate our particular situation in the
Cayman Islands, and to pleas with the British Government to leave our financial industry
alone." Cayman Hansard, Mar. 19, 1985, at 2.
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Executive Council.24 6 These executive officers joined the twelve elected
Members of the Legislative Assembly, where the Governor presided and
had the tie breaking vote.247 The majority could have created its own office
of speaker to take over this function, but did not do so for many years.24
The practice of debating the Governor's Throne Speech also began at this
time.24
The 1972 Constitution enabled the Legislative Assembly to elect four of
the seven Members to the Executive Council, where the Governor still
presided.25 0 The elected ExCo members held portfolios (allocated by the
Governor) responsible for social services; agriculture, lands, and natural
resources; communications and other infrastructure; and tourism, aviation,
and trade.2 5' Serving both in the Assembly and on ExCo, these elected
Members helped to consolidate the collaborative policy-making process.2 52
The ex officio ExCo members were primarily those committed to the
collaborative process, such as the Financial Secretary, Vassel Johnson,
appointed by the Governor in 1972.253 Capturing the results, Governor
Thomas Russell told an interviewer at the end of this period, "It's a
pleasantly compact government-all my [C]abinet are on the same floor.
People here are very critical of independence; they think it causes troubles
like Jamaica's. . . . My job here is really a kind of combination of
ombudsman and business consultant. I don't interfere very much and the
British government leaves us very much alone-largely no doubt because
we don't need any kind of grant." 254 As Russell's comment noted, the space
for the development of the Caymanian model existed because Cayman was
not a drag on British resources. The OFC revenue effectively bought
Cayman additional autonomy. Britain was delighted with the tradeoff-
246. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 321; RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 174.
247. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 321-22; RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 174.
248. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 321; BODDEN, supra note 25, at 268; RUSSELL,
supra note 4, at 174, 186. The formal effort to have a local Speaker began in 1987, with a
private member motion by MLA Ezzard Miller. Cayman Hansard, Feb. 12, 1987, at 14. That
motion failed 3-5, with 2 abstentions. Id. at 43. A second effort in 1989 by MLA McKeeva
Bush was defeated when the elected members split 6-6 (the official members abstained) and the
governor cast the deciding vote against the motion based on established parliamentary
procedure. Id., May 26, 1989, at 547-59; May 29, 1989, at 561-78.
249. Cayman Hansard, Aug. 8, 1972, at 21-22.
250. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 321.
251. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 321; RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 174.
252. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 320-22.
253. Interview with Benson 0. Ebanks, supra note 33, at Disc 3, pp. 9-10.
254. SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 288; see also RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 168 (noting that
while Cayman had a smaller population than his previous posting in the Solomon Islands, it had
a larger budget without "the administrative restraint of budgetary control from Whitehall.").
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ending development loans in 1976 despite Governor Russell's argument
that continuing the loans would give Britain a greater voice in policy
discussions.25 5 In addition, the network of British officials facilitated
collaboration. The Attorney General for much of Russell's tenure was a
former colleague and personal friend from Russell's time in the Pacific
territories, which he found "helped ... enormously".2 56
Cayman used its autonomy to enable Assembly and ExCo members to
work collaboratively with legal and other professionals representing
business interests. From 1969 to 1984 Benson Ebanks served as an elected
Assembly member on ExCo; like his colleagues, he actively supported
major legislation of the early 1970s such as the Currency Law that tied the
Cayman currency to the U.S. dollar in 1974, tighter immigration residency
requirements implemented in Caymanian Protection Laws, and the Land
Adjudication, Land Surveyors', and Registered Land Laws.2 57 Ebanks said
that "certainly in many instances [ExCo and the Assembly] sought advice
before we implemented anything" following "regular meetings" between
"Financial Secretary [Vassel Johnson] and the Attorney General" and
"representatives of the financial community," especially lawyers from one
of the three major law firms, Walkers, MacDonald and Maples [later
Maples and Calder], and Hunter and Hunter.258 Indeed, Walker later termed
the process, "a very collaborative government, working very closely with
the private sector in the midst of a time of great growth."25 9 Governor
Russell actively promoted the financial sector in speeches in the United
States.260 Walker used his Canadian and UK connections: "I had a lot of
investment contacts, in Toronto through the Investment Dealers
Association, and through the Cambridge old-boys' network, and I was
never backward about calling them and looking for business."26 1 Then
Deputy Financial Secretary John Lemuel Hurlston later summed up the
collaborative process: there was "a tremendous fusion of ideas from all of
the people working in harmony together to come up with what the country
255. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 178. Even critics of the financial industry agree that Britain
supported the industry in part to reduce the financial burden of maintaining the jurisdiction. See,
e.g., BODDEN, supra note 16, at xix.
256. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 177.
257. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 341; Interview with Benson 0. Ebanks, supra
note 33, at Disc 3, pp. 20-21, Disc 4, pp. 3, 6, 11-12, 19.
258. Interview with Benson 0. Ebanks, supra note 33, at Disc 4, p. 14.
259. WALKER, supra note 17, at 165.
260. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 190-91.
261. WALKER, supra note 17, at 129.
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was capable of affording."2 62 This rapidly brought in additional funds-
government revenue in 1974 was 48% ahead of the estimates.26 3
Collaborative policy making promoted further diversification beyond the
company registry and tax avoidance. Fearing that revising the land-title
regime would facilitate imposing property taxes, Caymanian property
holders had resisted adopting the cadastral land-title registration system
which colonial officials, ExCo, and Assembly leaders advocated as
necessary to promotion of tourism development. 2' Amidst discussion of the
Constitution in 1971, however, the collaborative process facilitated
enactment of the cadastral system.26 5 During 1971-72, collaborative
policymaking built on stabilized land titles and the effective mosquito
campaign-which earlier had resulted from the same policy process-to
enact new laws fostering hotel and condo construction, attracting wealthier
tourists.266 In the Assembly, former-NDP leader Warren Conolly promoted
the Tourist Board, which administered license-fee regulations to promote
hotel and condo occupancy through 1976.267 For eight years beginning in
1976, James Bodden, the ExCo member responsible for Tourism, Aviation,
and Trade, used a collaborative approach to encourage a shift from tourists
arriving by air to growing cruise-ship visits. 2 68 Collaborative policymaking
benefitted further from the 1978 establishment of the Central Planning
Authority, which oversaw Cayman's growing real estate development
industry.269 During the 1960s and 1970s, Cable and Wireless, a UK
government-owned company, also invested in improving the
communications infrastructure, a necessary precondition to a serious
financial industry,270 further evidence of collaboration between British and
262. Cayman Archives Oral History Interview with John Lemuel Hurlston, Disc 3, p. 15
(Dec. 6, 1996) (transcript on file with the Cayman Islands National Archives).
263. Cayman Hansard, Mar. 12, 1974, at 2.
264. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 239. The survey was initially controversial and led to what
was the largest demonstration in Cayman on April 20, 1970. BODDEN, supra note 16, at 29.
265. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 340-43. Caymanian property holders soon
embraced the new system. Id.; see also RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 175 (describing survey);
WALKER, supra note 17, at 108 (describing pre-survey land conveyancing as "often necessary to
go out and meet local elders and get affidavits that would often say things like 'Yes, that piece
of land ran from those two seagrape trees to this small rock wall.' You'd have to get a couple of
these testimonials to finish a conveyance.").
266. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 348-49.
267. Id
268. Id at 349.
269. Id at 349-52.
270. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 91-93. The importance of such infrastructure can be seen
in a 1969 comment at a continuing legal education seminar on offshore strategies, where one
participant noted that "[t]he Cayman Islands became popular several years ago. In the flush of
Caymanian interests. Governor Russell helped regularize administration,
leading efforts to publish an official gazette for new laws, among other
things.27 1 Moreover, even as the political team in control of the Legislative
Assembly changed dramatically in 1976,272 the overall commitment to the
financial sector did not waver.
Things did not always go well. Cayman experienced its first banking
scandal when Interbank collapsed in 1974. The bank's founder, Canadian
Jean Doucet, arrived in Cayman in 1966 from the Bahamas, where he had
worked in the offshore industry.2 73 Doucet soon had a network of offices in
Miami, Montreal, London and Geneva as well as a Cayman headquarters.
Unlike many in the offshore industry, Doucet expanded into local banking
almost immediately, creating a subsidiary providing large local mortgages
at attractive rates in 1974.274 When rumors began to circulate that Doucet
was involved with the Mafia, his bank suffered a "crippling liquidity
crisis." 275 Although the Mafia rumors proved unfounded, problems with the
bank's handling of gold were discovered in the investigation. Doucet
chartered a jet and fled Cayman for Monaco, from which he was eventually
extradited, and prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned for nine months.2 76
excitement over this new jurisdiction, I tried to call someone there by telephone. After a long
wait during which I was trying to find the Cayman Islands in an atlas on my lap, I was informed
by the overseas operator that there was a ham radio operator in the Bronx who made a weekly
transmission to Grand Cayman, and if I wished he would let me talk at the end of it." Francke &
Robertson, supra note 139, at 242, 253-54.
271. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 174. Russell described the prior practice as "pinning a copy
of the laws with a drawing-pin to a notice board outside Post Offices." Id.
272. BODDEN, supra note 16, at 30-31. Just four of the elected members returned after the
November 1976 election, including none of the members of the Executive Council. The post-
November Executive Council included several members who had been persistent critics of the
pre-election Council. See Cayman Hansard, Sept. 8, 1976, Nov. 17, 1976 (listing members).
273. WILLIAM BRITTArN-CATLIN, OFFSHORE: THE DARK SIDE OF THE GLOBAL EcoNOMY
154-55 (2005).
274. Id. at 157 (Doucet's Cayman Mortgage Bank dealt "only with personal mortgages for
local Caymanians, offering them large advances at preferable rates. The venture would show,
once and for all, that Doucet was committed to Cayman, not just using the island for his own
convenience.").
275. Id.
276. Cayman Archives Oral History Interview with Ian Boxall, Disc 3, p. 32 (Aug. 28,
2002) (transcript on file with the Cayman Island National Archives); JOHNSON, supra note 22, at
158-60, 162-64; BRITTAIN-CATLIN, supra note 273, at 158-59. Not all in Cayman saw
Interbank as a complete disaster: Deputy Financial Secretary Hurlston noted that
notwithstanding Doucet's illegal conduct, many "Caymanians own their homes today as a result
of some of the early mortgages that were made available through that [Interbank] group of
companies." Interview with John Hurlston, supra note 262, at Disc 3, p. 19.
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Although offshore critics like William Brittain-Caitlin portray the
Doucet prosecution as "an institutional cover-up" that threw "a strictly
imposed veil of secrecy over" activities on the islands,2 77 it is also possible
to see the affair as an example of how collaborative policymaking enabled
learning from the problem.27 8 Deputy Financial Secretary Hurlston
concluded: the "way the government responded and managed that particular
crisis led others [locally and internationally] to realize that they were
dealing with an administration that was capable of . . . steering itself away
from those kinds of mistakes in the future." Indeed, "that collapse produced
the decision to establish the Banking Inspectorate, which had not existed
before."279 Moreover, Cayman's institution of the Inspectorate paralleled the
adoption of a similar regulatory approach in other nations developing multi-
purpose banking "involved in land development, land reclamation, [and]
shipping."280 Cayman's regulatory response to the Interbank crisis coincided
with the "emerging of inspectorates worldwide, who collaborate more
closely with one another" to address "any problem that stretches across
boundaries. You've got to have that collaborative capability... . If you have
a problem that stretched across borders, share your intelligence with your
neighbors. They, in turn, do the same in return."2 81 As a result, Cayman was
able to build a regulatory structure sufficient "so that Cayman cannot be
considered a loophole in the international supervisory system."2 8 2
C. Diversification into Insurance
Caymans' collaborative policymaking also played a role in the
jurisdiction's diversification into captive insurance. Seeing both an
opportunity and reputational risk in the development of an offshore market
for insurance in 1978, the Cayman government sought assistance from the
277. BRITTAIN-CATLIN, supra note 273, at 158-59.
278. A comparison of the Interbank/Doucet problems with Antigua's difficulties with Allen
Stanford and his Stanford International Bank in the 2000s shows the advantages of the
collaborative policy making model. Much like Doucet, Stanford attempted to buy his way into
Antiguan society. Stanford's ability to penetrate the government, influencing banking
regulators, facilitated the fraudulent activity that ultimately brought down his empire. See Tom
Leonard, How Sir Allen Stanford Bowled Antigua Over, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Feb. 20, 2009),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/sir-allen-stanford/4736739/How-Sir-Allen-
Stanford-bowled-Antigua-over.html.
279. Interview with John Hurlston, supra note 262, at Disc 3, p. 18; RUsSELL, supra note 4,
at 193.
280. Interview with John Hurlston, supra note 262, at Disc 3, p. 18.
281. Id. at 18, 19-20.
282. Cayman Hansard, Feb. 17, 1989, at 12 (Financial Secretary in Budget Address).
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British Executive Overseas Service to aid in drafting an insurance law,
procuring the help of a recently retired insurance executive.2 83 In addition,
captive insurers told the Cayman government "that they are not prepared to
establish in the Cayman Islands if a regulatory system is not established
under an acceptable form or legislation." 28 4 Cayman engaged in a lengthy
consultation process with "many specialists in the fields of insurance,
accountancy and Law as well as persons actively engaged in the industry
itself."285 The advisor hired by the government "had very lengthy
discussions with a wide range of prominent members of the insurance
industries both locally and abroad" and met with companies operating in the
"United States, London, Bahamas and Bermuda." 286 Passed in September,
the law was amended in November in response to industry suggestions on
refining definitions and treatment of existing companies.2 87
Although Bermuda led the way overall in registering captive insurance
companies-those which "underwrite solely for their parent companies"-
social tensions there and Bermuda's reluctance to expand into medical
malpractice captives offered opportunities for Cayman policymakers.2 88
When U.S. medical malpractice market 'hardened' in the early 1980s,
Cayman was able to take advantage of the opening.2 89 Cayman's use of
English gave it an advantage over the Netherlands Antilles where official
filings had to be in Dutch, as did Cayman's willingness to adapt regulations
for the medical malpractice captive market.29 0 Financial Secretary Johnson's
published account described the collaborative "committee" work of British,
foreign, and Cayman authorities in shaping the Caymans' 1979 Insurance
Law. That statute established regulatory categories for fee licensing of
283. Cayman Hansard, Apr. 4, 1979, at 8; id., Sept. 5, 1979, at 8 (explaining need for
insurance law in part due to offshore industry developing, and concern for Cayman's reputation
if "unreliable" companies opened in Cayman); id. at 9 (describing role of advisor). The bill
ultimately prepared covered both domestic and offshore insurance companies, which had
previously been operating under the Companies Law. Id. at 8.
284. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 5,1979, at 9.
285. Id. at 14.
286. Id. at 9.
287. Id., Nov. 9, 1979, at 14-16.
288. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 216-18; RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 193 ("In 1980 we
enacted insurance legislation to broaden the base of financial services. There was immediate
growth in this sector . . . ."); WALKER, supra note 17, at 138 ("[W]ith unrest in Bermuda in the
middle '70s, insurance companies started to look for another jurisdiction.").
289. Alan Markoff, Cayman Captives: Past, Present, and Future, CAYMAN FIN. REv. (Oct.
12, 2012), http://www.compasscayman.com/cfr/2012/10/12/Cayman-captives--Past,-present-
and-future/.
290. Boise & Morriss, supra note 47, at 441.
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insurance companies, including captives. 291 The committee endorsed having
a regulatory role for "an insurance inspector . .. in the same manner that the
Inspector of Banks performed his duties under banking legislation." 292
Another example was when a group of Boston hospitals led by Harvard
Health Systems "pioneered the idea of self insuring hospital/physician
liability risk. Basically they believed they do it better than the commercial
market."2 93 When the Bermuda authorities refused to allow the offshore
medical malpractice market to develop there, considering it too risky,
Caymans' collaborative policy process enabled the quick grasping of the
opportunity by ensuring that the Insurance Law did not restrict the
development of this business.294
Adapting the banking laws' inspectorate to captive insurance suggested
further competitive advantage that collaborative policymaking achieved.
After the Insurance Law's regulations were fully operational in 1980,
Financial Secretary Vassel Johnson noted that the Caymans "attracted a
complement of genuine insurers" and became second only to Bermuda in
the global captive insurance market.295 Moreover, "about 200 companies
who may not have been 'real' companies 'packed their bags and left."'
29 6
By 1982, Johnson's successor as Financial Secretary was reporting that 137
people were working in insurance, 71% Caymanians, and the insurance
industry was generating CI$1 million in government revenue.2 97 Worried
about the U.S. and U.K. recessions' impact on insurance, the government
moved to "strengthen the Superintendent's Office by the appointment of a
Deputy who is a qualified insurance accountant" 298 and to hold a seminar to
promote the industry299 rather than by cutting prices. Later in the 1980s, the
291. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 216-18.
292. Id. at 216.
293. Andrew P. Morriss, Industry Insider ... Tom Jones and LJFallon, CAYMAN FIN. REV.
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.compasscayrnan.com/cfr/2011/10/05/Industry-Insider----Tom-Jones-
and-LJ-Fallon/ (quoting Tom Jones).
294. Id. (quoting Tom Jones that Bermuda "turned Harvard down based on the belief that
the risk of physician professional medical liability was too volatile to self insure").
295. JoHNsoN, supra note 22, at 217.
296. Id.
297. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 19, 1982, at 18. A few years later Jefferson reported that in
1984, there were 271 Class B licensed companies, employing 162 personnel, of whom 80%
were Caymanian, as well as generating approximately 5,000 visitors to the islands each year.
Id., Mar. 1, 1985, at 13 (Financial Secretary giving Budget Address).
298. Id, Nov. 19, 1982, at 18.
299. Id., Nov. 29, 1985, at 9.
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government took note of the rising competition from U.S. states creating
their own captive insurance laws.30 0
The ability of Cayman's professionals, civil service, and political system
to continually innovate in attracting new structures and transactions to the
jurisdiction was critical to maintaining the growth in the financial services
sector necessary to fit within, and benefit from, evolving regulations
elsewhere which sought to limit revenue losses by onshore jurisdictions to
the growing offshore sector and distinguished Cayman from rivals like the
Netherlands Antilles.30 1 Moreover, the nature of financial services
competition required continual efforts to develop new products. As one
analysis noted:
The point about most financial services is that there is no 'magic
mousetrap' to be sought, which, if discovered, will have the world
beating at the door of the company concerned. There is nothing
any bank in the world can devise which can have the impact that,
say, the discovery of the float glass technique did for Pilkington,
or the development of the world's most successful video recorder
did for JVC. As a bank like Citicorp shows, competitive success in
financial services stems from sustained attention to being more
efficient and innovative than competitors over several decades,
without getting overenthusiastic by jumping into some sector
(such as loans to Latin America in the late 1970s) which is
fundamentally unsound.302
Through facilitating innovation, collaborative policymaking was able to
maintain the Cayman Assembly's stable budgets based on indirect fees-
including those the financial industry paid-without the need to levy direct
taxes, a situation that had prevailed (with rare exception) since the early
twentieth century.303 Through 1976, when Britain ended development aid to
300. Id., Feb. 17, 1989, at 12 (Financial Secretary noting in Budget Address that "It is of
particular interest to note that at least eight states in the United States have introduced special
legislation to attract Captive and Risk Retention Groups onshore. . . . Nothwithstanding, the
above mentioned undesirable conditions twenty-nine new Class "B" Insurer's or Captive
Licenses were granted by Government during the year giving a net total of 362 licensed Captive
Insurance Companies. These new companies are of high quality and is seen as a vote of
confidence in the standard and range of services offered by the offshore market.").
301. Boise & Morriss, supra note 47, at 414 ("Perhaps lulled into a false sense of security
by its monopoly position in the lucrative international finance subsidiary business and distracted
by inter-island squabbling and the ongoing struggles over Dutch involvement in insular
governance, the Antilles' government did not innovate.").
302. STOPFORD & TURNER, supra note 74, at 124.
303. See JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 103-226; Doran, supra note 18, at 437-39. See also
Cayman Hansard, Mar. 2, 1977, at 9 (Financial Secretary noting that the financial industry
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Cayman, Cayman's budget stability gave it a significant competitive
advantage over other OFCs in securing British development aid.3 04 Thus,
Cayman was able to secure British development loans for infrastructure
projects improving harbor and airport facilities and instituting world-class
telecommunications networks that further enhanced its competitive
position,305 while avoiding British involvement in the legislative process
that might have restricted innovations that interfered with British interests.
British officials recognized the development potential of the finance
industry and those in the FCO applauded the budgetary implications for the
UK and resisted the Treasury's pressure to reign in Cayman and other
offshore centers under British jurisdiction.306
The collaborative policymaking process also helped soften the conflicts
over immigration that had been such a problem in the Bahamas. In 1972,
Cayman enacted the Caymanian Protection Law, administered by an
administrative board ("the CPL board"), which required foreign companies
to comply with local licensing regulations and imposed tighter residency
requirements on immigrants seeking work permits.3 07 The CPL board
regulated entry and so reduced the threat of business nationalization and
employment discrimination that characterized some other tax havens, while
allowing entry for expatriate professionals and other workers much needed
for the finance and tourism industries.30 8 Cayman policymakers established
a "system," historian B.W. Higrnan said, that "made Caymanians some of
provided "approximately 25 percent of the Government's recurrent revenue, and makes a
substantial indirect contribution to the economy."). In the 1977 Budget Address, the Financial
Secretary estimated the spending on salaries, work permits, and overheads by banks and trust
companies with offices in the Cayman Islands at CI$7.4 million. Id., Nov. 10, 1977, at 3. A
popular myth is that Cayman's lack of direct taxation stems from the heroic rescue efforts by
Caymanians of the crew and passengers in the 1794 "Wreck of the Ten Sail," including a
member of the royal family. There was a wreck, and Caymanians did brave a storm to save the
crew and passengers, but there was no prince aboard nor was freedom from direct taxation
granted by a grateful monarch. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 57-60.
304. Cayman Archives Oral History Interview with A. Peter Lloyd, Disc 3, p. 7 (Apr. 29,
1997); see JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 103-226.
305. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 125-46.
306. See, e.g., Tax Havens and Tax Concessions, Note of a meeting held in the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office on March 25, 1969 (British National Archives, File FCO 59/533)
(discussing concerns of various British government offices over the rise of tax havens in
dependent territories). See also RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 178 (UK refused to continue aid as a
means of influencing policy).
307. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 241-42.
308. Id. at 240-42, 256-57.
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the best-off people in the Caribbean."3 09 Or, as one Caymanian put it, "[t]he
advantage of being an island is that you get to choose your own neighbors.
We've chosen Miami instead of Jamaica.""o This did not mean that tensions
did not emerge from the collaborative policymaking process. Young
Caymanian educator (and later historian) Roy Bodden insisted that what he
termed Caymanians' "total colonialism" replaced the merchant-dominated
economy based on seamen and subsistence agriculture with a new
dependency on foreign investment and North American tourism. Neither the
old nor new dependency completely avoided claims of corruption."'
The combination of the evolution of the constitutional structure and
collaborative policymaking also helped Cayman cope with external
pressures. Soon after a Miami federal judge ordered a Cayman-based bank
manager to divulge confidential client information U.S. authorities
demanded, the collaborative process produced the 1976 Confidential
Relationships (Preservation) Law,3 12 codifying and strengthening the British
common law of financial privacy based on the 1924 decision in Tournier v.
National Provincial and Union Bank of England.' Despite considerable
differences on other issues during the same session, the Legislative
Assembly passed the statute with little controversy. 314 The 1976 law and its
1979 amendments regulated foreign tax and law enforcers' access to
confidential financial information.3 15 "Thus the stage was set," wrote Vassel
Johnson, "to defend and safeguard confidentiality of customers' financial
information in these islands as far as this is possible under the law."316
Although this solved the immediate problem, by the 1980s the U.S.
government, the OECD, and others were using it to argue that Cayman
exhibited regulatory laxity fostering criminal conduct like the Interbank
309. HIGMAN, supra note 9, at 296. In 2001, MLA Alden McLaughlin, Jr. noted that this
law's purpose was to ensure that "Caymanians continued to maintain a prominent place and role
in the Island's progress and economy." Cayman Hansard, Mar. 22, 2001, at 164. This seems to
us to be a fundamental problem for small open economies, like Cayman.
310. SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 290.
311. Colonialism's Curbs; Party Politics' Failure, and Future Problems, Part I, THE
NOR'WESTER, Sept. 1978, at 36-42, 37; Some Unanswered Questions About Our Future,
Concluding Part, THE NOR'WESTER, Oct. 1978, at 35-42; VLCEK, supra note 2, at 71-72.
312. US Grand Jury Indict Castle Bank Manager, THE NOR'WESTER, Apr. 1977, at 39;
JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 154-56; WALKER, supra note 17, at 138; BODDEN, supra note 16, at
160-61; Cayman Hansard, Sept. 5, 1979 (Financial Secretary noting that the 1976 statute was
"introduced at the request of the local financial community" in response to Castle Bank case in
the United States).
313. Toumier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England, [1924] 1 KB 461 (Eng.).
314. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 7, 1976, at 20-37; id., Sept. 8, 1976, at 1-5, 12-13.
315. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 154-58.
316. Id. at 155.
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collapse or sham insurance companies.3' Cayman's strengthened
confidentiality regulations thus was used to support international claims that
Cayman not only protected illegitimate "bank secrecy" but lacked effective
financial regulation and enforcement. This returned again and again in
onshore jurisdictions' efforts to reduce OFC competition.
D. Challenges
Cayman faced several challenges during this period. First, both Britain
and the United States began to take notice of the growth of tax planning and
regulatory arbitrage strategies and of OFCs and to worry about the loss of
tax revenues. A 1973 Labour Party paper, Plugging a tax loophole, argued
that "the wealthy have made fools of our tax man for too long." 3 1 Its 1970-
74 working party on taxation proposed "a veritable battery of capital taxes .
. . 'with the objective of breaking up great concentrations of wealth, "31" and
anti-tax haven legislation sponsored by an all party group of MPs was
reported to "have considerable appeal" in Labour circles in 1978.320 All
three suggested a dramatic change in attitude from that displayed by a
Labour MP's 1965 plea that "I do not want a state of affairs in which people
live in perpetual fear of having to see an inspector of taxes." 32 1 Caymanians
were aware of this threat. As MLA James Bodden noted in opposing a bill
to raise bank license fees in 1974, the financial sector was "very fragile"
and could be damaged by "one derogatory editorial in Time magazine".322 A
supporter of the increase agreed that the banks could leave "easily" but
assured the other members that the banks did not object to the increase
while another supporter agreed that Cayman "should not try to kill the
goose that laid the golden egg."32 3 Discussions of fee increases often
referred to the fees charged by competing jurisdictions.3 24
317. DOGGART, 1997 report, supra note 3, at 66-70; Interview with Ian Boxall, supra note
276, at Disc 3, p. 12; Interview with John Hurlston, supra note 262, at Disc 3, p. 12; Interview
with William Walker, supra note 98, at Disc 3, pp. 21-22; Interview with Benson 0. Ebanks,
supra note 33, at Disc 3, p. 16; JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 154-66, 217; Andrew P. Morriss &
Lotta Moberg, Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD's Campaign against "Harmful Tax
Competition," 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 33-56 (2012) (describing evolution of anti-tax
competition campaign).
318. WHITING, supra note 70, at 221.
319. Id.
320. D.G. KERMODE, DEVOLUTION AT WORK: A CASE STUDY OF THE ISLE OF MAN 9 (1979).
321. WHITING, supra note 70, at 165.
322. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 21, 1974, at 5.
323. Id. at 6, 8. A similar discussion occurred in 1981 when a fee increase for the company
registry was debated. See id., Oct. 18, 1981, at 24 (MLA Annie Huldah Bodden opposing a fee
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Another challenge was increased competition from onshore jurisdictions
themselves. As William Vlcek notes, the U.S. exemption of interest paid
foreign depositors makes the United States "the largest offshore tax haven
in the world."3 25  The United States created "International Banking
Facilities" in New York at the end of the 1970s as a competitive response to
OFCs.3 26 Britain began relaxing exchange controls under Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher, culminating in the 1979 UK Banking Act, which
"removed all distinction between offshore and onshore markets."32 7 The
United States also took steps to cut borrowing costs in the United States,
easing up on monetary policy in 1969 and early 1970, raising the
Regulation Q interest rate ceilings in January 1970, and eliminating capital
controls in January 1974.328 Although these steps reduced the U.S. demand
for Eurodollars, they also played a role in enhancing the market since U.S.
banks were now more free to arbitrage between the domestic and Eurodollar
markets and to pursue international business with their non-U.S.
subsidiaries.
However, Cayman and other OFCs were fortunate that the U.S.
government significantly lessened its pressure on offshore tax avoidance
increase arguing "Now let us be very realistic about it, there are other places in the world that
would be glad to get some of the business that we have in this island" and explicitly referencing
the "Goose that laid the golden egg"); id. at 26 (similar point by MLA Capt. Charles
Kirkconnell); id. at 31 (Financial Secretary supporting increase argued "Every care and caution
is exercised to ensure we do not upset the status quo. A lot of research is put into any measure
which is proposed to ensure that those who will be affected will not be upset by their
introduction."); id., Nov. 22, 1983, at 2 (Financial Secretary noting in proposing fee increase on
banks that "much caution was taken to ensure that the competitive edge which the Cayman
Islands have in this area should not be diminished in any way"); id., Dec. 10, 1985, at 8
(invoking metaphor); Dec. 4, 1991, at 1334 (invoking metaphor).
324. See, e.g., Cayman Hansard, Dec. 17, 1985, at 5 (comparing Cayman bank license fees
to "our competitor to the north"); id. at 25 (arguing raised insurance fees left Cayman "very
competitive").
325. VLCEK, supra note 2, at 81.
326. Ronen Palan, Offshore and the Structural Enablement of Sovereignty, in OFFSHORE
FINANCIAL CENTERS AND TAX HAVENS: THE RISE OF GLOBAL CAPITAL 18, 33 (Mark P.
Hampton & Jason P. Abbott, eds. 1999). Cayman took these seriously as a threat. See Cayman
Hansard, Feb. 17, 1981, at 5 (Financial Secretary Vassel Johnson stating that "this threat [IiBFs]
must not be treated casually for we are now at the stage where we must be prepared to offer
competition in offshore banking or suffer losses to New York."); id., Nov. 19, 1982, at 15
(Financial Secretary T.C. Jefferson commenting on IBF competition and arguing that "The
Cayman Islands must ensure that it is competitive, not only in price but in the standard of
services offered, and that the Country's image abroad is not tarnished. If the Cayman Islands
fail to be competitive, or, if its facilities are used to harbour unclean money, the considerable
benefits now received from hosting banks' operations will undoubtedly disappear.").
327. Palan, supra note 326, at 33.
328. GIBSON, supra note 74, at 14-15.
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strategies in the mid-1970s. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the IRS had
launched a number of investigations into overseas-based tax evasion,
including the use of mail intercepts, undercover agents, and other
measures. 32 9 Cayman was relatively little affected by this. One estimate
during the IRS's "Operation Tradewinds" was that Cayman accounted for
only a small amount of illicit funds, with the Islands' bank supervision
described as "competent", the government as "honest" and "now interested
in eliminating such criminal operations as may be active in the islands,
including laundering." 3 30 When the IRS' efforts became entangled in the
Nixon Administration's use of the agency for political purposes, the
resulting Tax Reform Act of 1976 "minimized, if not eliminated, [the IRS']
role in nontax law enforcement" and focused the IRS "almost exclusively"
on "the voluntary tax collection system." 33 ' This reduced IRS attention
undoubtedly benefited the entire offshore sector.
The 1970s also saw growth in offshore centers where there was little
regulation. For example, 1978 banking legislation in Monteserrat provided
that the Chief Minister would meet privately with license applicants, set out
no requirements for the license, and established no schedule of fees. 332 "The
inference could be drawn that government officials had provided
themselves an opportunity for private negotiations with applicants." 333
Similar proposals were reported in other jurisdictions.334 Cayman thus faced
329. Blum Report in Illegal Narcotics Profits: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th Congress, 1st session (1979)
[hereinafter "Blum Report"], at 475 (noting Operation Tradewinds in 1966-75 which led to 108
tax deficiencies of about $500,000 per case and which was terminated after Tax Reform Act
with 488 pending cases); id. at 480 (describing Project Haven); Statement of William Anderson,
in Tax Evasion, supra note 155, at 31-33 (describing Operations Tradewinds, Swiss Mail
Watch, Pirate, and Haven); see also Statement of William Anderson, in Tax Evasion, supra note
155, at 3 ("The use of tax havens has been of particular concern to the IRS since the mid-
1950's.").
330. Blum Report, supra note 329, at 482.
331. Nathan Statement, in Blum Report, supra note 329, at 23. IRS witnesses testified that
the Act reduced their ability to cooperate with prosecutors. Id. at 233. Sen. William Cohen
noted that he believed "everybody on this committee, most of the Senate and surely most of the
House of Representatives" voted for the Tax Reform Act without being aware of its impact on
law enforcement. Id. at 84. See also Remarks of Donald Alexander to Tax Section of the ABA,
Aug. 14, 1974, reprinted in Blum Report, supra, at 499 (noting termination in 1973 of Special
Service Staff at IRS); Blum Report, supra, at 476-77 (describing inter-agency rivalries between
IRS and DOJ over IRS tax haven activities). There were other reasons for the pullback,
including negotiations over military bases (Bahamas). Blum Report, supra, at 480.
332. Blum Report, supra note 329, at 481.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 481-82.
competition both from onshore jurisdictions and other offshore centers,
many using quite different strategies.
Cayman firmly rejected independence during this period. After a 1977
visit to the Islands by the U.N. Committee on Decolonization, two
Caymanian representatives went to New York to give evidence. One of
them, Truman Bodden, described the message they took as:
We told them we didn't want to be decolonized. It was the first
case like that they'd had for a long time. But we take the approach,
sir, that if there's something good, you mustn't change it. We
notice that other Caribbean countries may have political
independence but don't have economic independence. If they do
what we do, they could have success too. So long as Britain is
responsible for our foreign policy and defense, we can rest quite
well. We must be thankful to the Lord, sir, for leading us in the
right direction. If we keep people in government who have a lot to
lose, we should be all right.335
Caymanians thus identified maintaining the link to Britain as a critical part
of their competitive strategy.
Between 1968 and 1980, Cayman made an important transition, which
some of its rival OFCs did not. It was able to move from a business model
based on first generation offshore transactions to a model based on regular
innovation. As Walker put it, a constant need for "small reinventions of the
wheel keeping on our toes to stay ahead of the other jurisdictions."3 36
Increasingly sophisticated transactions, not just relocation to a jurisdiction
without a particular regulatory barrier, and collaboration with financial
professionals in major financial centers like New York and London made
Cayman capable of playing a new role in international finance. The
collaborative policymaking model gave Cayman the ability to develop
products and services and the supporting regulatory structures which would
enable Cayman to flourish in a more heavily regulated international
environment after 1980. That it was able to continue this despite significant
changes in the domestic political environment is further evidence of the
strength of the collaborative model.
335. SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 289; see also RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 184-85.
336. WALKER, supra note 17, at 143; see also Cayman Hansard, Apr. 12, 1979, at 20-21
(Financial Secretary comparing Cayman to competitor jurisdictions including Switzerland,
Panama, New Hebrides, Netherlands Antilles, Isle of Man, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Hong
Kong, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, and the Bahamas and arguing for need to support
industry).
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IV. COLLABORATIVE POLICYMAKING AND POLICING, 1980-1996
In 1980 the weekly paper The Nor'wester commented that the balanced
regulations instituted the previous year in the Insurance Law were
indicative of the "Cayman Islands ... decision to set up a financial centre as
a means of establishing an economic base for its development back in 1966
and, unlike a number of other places already in business or considering it,
enacted legislation to give its government powers to control and regulate the
development of business.""' Unlike "a tax haven . .. synonymous in some
minds with the influx of fly-by-night operators", Cayman "[w]ork[ed] to
perfect its image as reputable financial centre" that "over the years reviewed
and upgraded its legislation regularly to cope with growing demands. Such
careful plotting of its course has brought it, within a relatively short period,
to the position of the third largest financial centre in the world today with an
enviable reputation for stable operation.""' As Queen Elizabeth II noted in
her Throne Speech on her visit to the Islands in 1983, "efforts will continue
to maintain the high level of cooperation and confidence between
Government and the private sector so that economic development may
continue at a steady pace."33 Caymanians continued to see opportunities in
other jurisdictions' missteps340 and to warn against complacency.3 41
337. Mary Lawrence, New Law's Controls Firm But Gentle, THE NOR'WESTER, July 1980,
at 39.
338. Id. Similarly, in his budget speech, Financial Secretary T.C. Jefferson noted that "We
are all aware that Cayman has many detractors and that the hard work of many years in
promoting the good name of these Islands can quite easily be undone by one imprudent or
careless act." Cayman Hansard, Nov. 18, 1983, at 7.
339. Cayman Hansard, Feb. 17, 1983, at 2. One example of this collaborative effort is the
passage of the 1983 Partnership Bill, which replaced the common law of partnerships with a
statutory approach and to incorporate the previous limited partnership statute within the new
general statute. Despite the MLAs' willingness to debate at considerable length relatively small
provisions in other statutes, this one passed with virtually no debate and only amendments
correcting typographical errors in the draft bill. See Cayman Hansard, Sept. 12, 1983, at 13-14;
Sept. 13, 1983, at 24-28. The Financial Secretary introduced the bill by saying that the bill had
been circulated to "the Law Society, FINOCO the financial community committee and others
deemed desirable" and the suggestions received were incorporated into it. Cayman Hansard,
Sept. 12, 1983, at 14. The law was designed to come in to force only after a proclamation from
the Governor, allowing time for review. This allowed modifications before it came in to force.
Cayman Hansard, Feb. 24, 1984, at 35. Similarly, when Britain passed the British Nationality
Act, 1981, the Caymanian Legislative Assembly created a select committee to address the
impact on the Caymanian Protection Law, rather than drafting a government bill, allowing for
consultation to see "what, if any, changes are necessary and desirable to such legislation in
order more effectively to assist the financial and corporate infrastructure." Cayman Hansard,
Feb. 28, 1984, at 8-9. When the legislative assembly decided to draft a bill regulating the
company management industry, it formed a select committee, which held nine meetings, and
circulated the draft bill prepared by the Attorney General to the legal and business community.
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By 1980, Cayman was roughly equal to Hong Kong and Bahrain in
Eurodollar volume.3 4 2 Over the next decade-and-a-half, Caroline Doggart,
perhaps the leading world authority on OFCs in the 1980s and 1990s as a
result of her regular surveys of the jurisdictions for the Economist,
examined how, despite criticism in popular media, Cayman became known
among experts-including US and UK tax advisers and regulators-for
both customer satisfaction and compliance with international standards.3 43
Consistent with its history since 1960, proactive policing emerged from
collaborative policymaking rooted in the constitutional structure.
There was extensive involvement from the private sector, with one of the nine meetings entirely
devoted to "meeting with the representatives of the Law Society who had considered and made
detailed recommendations and submissions concerning the draft legislation." Cayman Hansard,
May 8, 1984, at 2; see also id. at 44 (sponsor describing process of creating legislation).
Notably, just prior to the consideration of the companies management legislation, the legislative
assembly had had a heated debate over instituting pensions for legislators, yet there was no
dissension or commentary from the opposition on this legislation. Similarly on final passage,
there was only discussion of correction of typographical errors and clarifications. Cayman
Hansard, May 9, 1984, at 22-26. In 1989, a thorough revision of the Bank and Trust Companies
Law was passed with little dissension, after the Financial Secretary noted in his introduction that
the bill was the result of extensive consultation with a committee of "private sector
practitioners" chaired by the Banking Inspector to recommend changes. Cayman Hansard, Mar.
14, 1989, at 397-411. (The only issue on which there was dissension was an effort by three
MLAs to amend the law to allow B license banks to lend money to Caymanians; the opposition
to the effort focused on the lack of appropriate regulation for local business for the offshore
banks. Id.). Similarly, the Companies Law was updated after a review by a similar committee
without dissension, just after a contentious fight over the composition of the Finance
Committee. Cayman Hansard, July 9, 1990, at 817-19; July 18, 1990, at 961 (final passage).
340. See, e.g., Cayman Hansard, Feb. 16, 1988, at 11 (MLA Capt. Charles Kirkconnell
noting that "The recent increase in bank and trust company fees in the Bahamas and the hostile
attitude towards bankers will undoubtedly force them to consider moving their operation. It is
my hope that the Cayman Islands will be the obvious alternative. We have everything necessary
to attract them: a stable Government, excellent communication, laws that protect bank's
confidentiality, no exchange controls, no excessive bank license fees, and a well-developed
financial service sector.").
341. See, e.g., Cayman Hansard, Feb. 23, 1988, at 6 (MLA Vassel Johnson warning that
"we can lose much of what we have for our yesterdays can return. It can return if we become
complacent and reckless in what we say, how, when or where. If we cause the environment to
become hostile against Investors, if our attitudes create fear. If we think only of personal
aggrandizement, for trying out one image on the platform, and another in office."); Feb. 17,
1989, at 11 (Financial Secretary warning in budget address that changes in regulations
elsewhere may reduce Cayman's attractiveness).
342. SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 285.
343. See, e.g., Doggart & Vofite, supra note 3, at 45-48.
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A. Planning for Success
During the early 1980s Cayman commentators recognized competitive
advantages gained from a deliberate, thoughtful policymaking process. In
1983 The Nor'wester reported that Central Planning Authority chairman,
Linford Pierson stated that the "country's most pressing need is planning...
. Careful, comprehensive planning now . . . will permit the Caymans to
avoid the mistakes made elsewhere in the Caribbean." 3" Pierson
emphasized how in the past "government worked together with a committee
comprised of leading men from the financial community." 34 5 Indeed, as
noted earlier, the 1979 Insurance Law resulted from a "committee . . . set up
in late 1978 to work with the legal draftsman," and an "experienced London
Insurance man" the British Executive Service Organization recruited.3 46
Financial Secretary Vassel Johnson's 1981 annual report to new Governor
Peter Lloyd highlighted the role of collaborative policymaking: the
"progress and economic stability of Cayman Islands were," he said,
"created by design" and "did not happen by sheer coincidence." Thus, the
collaborative process tapped the "Government's complete freedom from
direct taxation," the "long history of political stability," and the "charm of
the people."34 7 Governor Lloyd noted that colonial status provided a "check
and balance" when "in the course of preparing and drafting a law or" even
just "discussing" it, the "elected members" of ExCo and the Assembly
knew the Governor and the colonial secretary not only reviewed the
outcome, but also could ask to have the law disallowed in London.3 48 As
one Member recognized during a 1985 debate in the Legislative Assembly,
the financial industry "requires plenty of service from the Government" and
civil service regulators in banking, insurance, and company registration
were all needed.34 9 Since these civil servants remained answerable to the
344. Linford Pierson, Planning is Essential, THE NOR'WESTER, Feb. 1983, at 33.
345. Linford Pierson, Our road ahead... the key issue is planning, THE NOR'WESTER, June
1983, at 56. See also Cayman Hansard, Feb. 6, 987, at 4 (Governor noting in Throne Speech the
ongoing consultation with private sector "[t]o ensure our Laws remain attractive and in line with
modern Banking, Insurance, Trust, Partnership and Company practices").
346. Mary Lawrence, "The Ever-Changing Insurance Scene," THE NOR'WESTER, July 1980,
at 41; Pierson, supra note 345, at 56.
347. Financial Recordfor 1904-1981, THE NOR'WESTER, Apr. 1982, at 47.
348. Cayman Archives Oral History Interview with Peter Lloyd, Discs 3, pp. 11, 12 (Apr.
29, 1997) (transcript on file with the Cayman Islands National Archives).
349. Cayman Hansard, Mar. 20, 1985, at 4; see also id. at 11 (Financial Secretary arguing
that "[any day the Registrar of Companies does not respond to an attempt to register a company
within a short period of [time], because the international investor has to take the afternoon
flight, you hear a lot about it. You hear about it until you get tired of hearing it.").
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Governor, not the Legislative Assembly (and remain so today), this was a
significant check on political autonomy.
Cayman successfully navigated the politics of immigration and
residency, allowing businesses to recruit foreign workers for hotels and the
government regularly issued permits to expatriate professionals, most of
whom entered the financial sector, which enabled them to enter the
economy. Caymanian concerns often focused on ensuring that they
maintained control of the political apparatus, although they were cautious of
expanding local control too much and frightening investors.35 0 Caymanians
held various positions in the financial sector, such as McKeeva Bush (who
later became Leader of Government Business in 2001, Leader of the
Opposition in 2005, and Premier from 2009 to 2012), who in an early
electoral campaign listed employment history as a hotel "night auditor,"
then "construction, and later . . . banking, working at Canadian Imperial
Bank, from 1972 to 1977.""l By contrast, Vassel Johnson's final budget
stated in 1981 that the seamen who returned home amidst shipping industry
restructuring "were rarely suited to bank jobs-temperamentally nor in
terms of skills. Those men turned, instead, to construction and real estate, or
to developing businesses of their own." Yet the "many" seamen who "went
into construction" also had a stake in the "financial industry" since it
"demanded buildings. Government had to reorganize itself to cope with this
novel form of earning money; it too, had to become sophisticated and, so,
large, impressive buildings were needed." 35 2
Cayman's competitive advantages derived from no direct taxes, and
social, economic, and political stability were at a turning point in the 1980
election. Ormond Panton, chair of the Caymanian Protection Board urged a
return to the two-party politics he led in the pivotal 1962 election.5
Prominent MLA and Council Members, including Annie Bodden, Charles
Kirkconnell, Benson Ebanks, Craddock Ebanks, Norman Bodden, and
James Bodden all essentially agreed with John McClean's rebuttal: "This is
no time for political parties. Any system that has worked as good as the one
we have in Cayman should be left alone." Similarly, Norman Bodden said,
"much more can be accomplished through . . . a spirit of cooperation
amongst representatives. The establishment of a two party system," by
350. See Cayman Hansard, Feb. 25, 1987, at 9-11 (Benson Ebanks describing history of
Caymanian concern over losing political control, quoting extensively from Asquith report).
351. 31 standing for election, THE NOR'WESTER, October, 1980, at 7.
352. Charles Glidden, MLA 's: no to political parties, THE NOR'WESTER, Christmas 1982, at
37, 41.
353. Id. at 37.
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contrast, suggested "the forerunner of [the Islands'] independence."3 54 Out-
going Governor Thomas Russell reinforced the view that a better system
was candidates running as independents, noting that candidates were
divided principally by "grudges" that "seem to last for an awfully long time
in the Caymans." 5 ' The Nor 'wester reported, however, that in the 1980
election the "Unity and Dignity 'teams' clearly identified with separate
platforms," which persisted in the "election of the Executive Council," and
in repeated 7-5 votes on certain issues.356 Thus, while MLA and ExCo
Members rejected Panton's view, increasingly polarized politics
transcended simple personal animosities, influencing political stability, the
public consensus favoring colonial status, and collaborative
policymaking.5
Caymanians' preference for "teams" of independent candidates over
two-party politics reinforced the financial sector. Elsewhere in the
Caribbean, immigration and residency requirements could mobilize party
politics around ideological or racial appeals fostering instability." The
"teams" rejected such appeals in favor of a Caymanian consensus linking
economic development of tourism and the financial center to stable
voluntary ties to Britain that distributed benefits across the three Islands.
Independent candidates and elected officials thus disputed distributional
outcomes rather than ideological or racial claims. 359 For example, even after
parties appeared, the two member district of Cayman Brac and Little
Cayman continued to regularly elect one member each from the two parties
suggesting either clever strategic voting (giving the Sister Islands someone
in whichever camp prevailed across all three Islands) or something other
than ideology as a motivating force. Neither the lack of explicit parties or
their appearance meant Legislative Assembly sessions were placid, with
heated rhetoric particularly after the change of government following the
1984 election. 360 However, even during the periods of the greatest personal
354. Id.
355. Mohamed Hamaludin, Gov. Russell's farewell charge, THE NOR'WESTER, Feb. 1982,
at 10.
356. Glidden, supra note 352, at 37.
357. Id.; see, e.g., Cayman Hansard, Mar. 1, 1985, at 9 (Financial Secretary describing
1984 elections as "most heavily contested general elections ever held, resulting in a major
change in the membership of this Honorable House.").
358. Glidden, supra note 352, at 37; see also Cayman Hansard, Dec. 6, 1985, at 29 (MLA
McKeeva Bush arguing against introduction of racial arguments in politics).
359. Glidden, supra note 352, at 41.
360. See Cayman Hansard, Mar. 19, 1985, at 7-8 (dispute between McKeeva Bush and
James Bodden over Bodden reading a newspaper in the House); see also Cayman Hansard, Mar.
20, 1985, at 8 (Financial Secretary describing attacks on him during budget debate by an
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rancor in the mid-1980s, there were numerous examples of all members
voting in favor of measures sought by the financial industry even as they
hurled insults like "I call that a good communist vote" at each other.161
Executive Council member saying that "there were so many shots taken at me for some time
that I thought I was an Elected Member on the Opposition side, and I thought the Fourth Elected
Member of Council had confused me as such."); Dec. 6, 1985, 16-17 (MLA James Bodden
denouncing Legislative Assembly and majority for nepotism and treading on minority rights);
Dec, 17, 1985, at 19-20 (MLA James Bodden suspended for calling House "dictatorial"); Mar.
6, 1986, at 14-16 (MLA James Bodden suspended for remarks); Sept. 11, 1986, at 20-23
(walkout by 5 opposition members over procedural ruling by chair); Apr. 5, 1995, at 379
(Speaker complaining that she was finding "Members to be rather nit picking over small words
or reading more into words than what is actually said" in raising points of order); June 8, 1995,
at 468 (one MLA complaining of "Brutus-like traits" in a Minister's character and another
interjecting "Hear, hear! He is a Brutus!"); June 20, 1996, at 347-53; June 24, 1996 at 381-84
(member's coat had "cow itch" applied in chamber); Sept. 16, 1998, at 749 (suspension of
member for violation of rules); June 5, 2002, at 301 (two MLAs suspended for contempt of
chair); Feb. 27, 2008, at 576 (Opposition MLA shouts out "You're telling a dirty lie!" at
Minister); June 27, 2008, at 293-94 (contentious exchange); Nov. 24, 2010, at 545-46 (multiple
comments ordered expunged by Speaker).
361. See Cayman Hansard, Mar. 1, 1985, at 79 (communist vote comment by MLA James
Bodden); Mar. 7, 1985, at 36 (backing government motion to set Court of Appeal); Mar. 25,
1985, at 3-4 (agreement without debate on changing planning law to allow higher construction
to lure hotels); Sept. 4, 1985, at 44-48 (Court of Appeal amendments passed without comment
by opposition); Dec. 3, 1985 at 15-25 (unanimous vote and cordial debate over modernizing
amendments to Company Law); Nov. 17, 1986, at 18-19 (technical amendment to Trusts Law
passed unanimously, without debate); Apr. 28, 1987, at 14-16 (partnership law amended with
little controversy to gain business; two MLAs object to changing law for a particular investor);
28 Apr. 28, 1987, at 26-27 (unanimous trusts law amendment to enhance marketability of
Cayman trusts without controversy); Sept. 16, 1987, at 15-16 (opposition joins in support of
shipping law); Nov. 16, 1987, at 14-17 (uncontroversial second reading of insurance
amendments); Nov. 17, 1987, at 9-16 (cooperation in technical amendments to companies law);
id. at 16-17 (passage of insurance amendments without dissent); June 26, 1991, at 516-23
(cooperatively passing exempted limited partnership bill that emerged from consultation with
private sector soon after contentious disputes over death penalty and constitution); July 8, 1992,
at 595-99, July 13, 1992, at 675 (cooperative passage of amendments to Companies Law sought
by private sector); July 27, 1992, at 799-800, Sept. 2, 1992, at 832-34 (Legislative Assembly
agrees to suspend consideration of Merchant Shipping law amendments in response to request
for consultation by private sector and then adopts suggested changes); Mar. 25, 1993, at 252-53
(Companies Law amendment passed without controversy after heated 1992 election); June 28,
1993, at 449-57 (cooperative passage of Mutual Funds Law); Sept. 19, 1994, at 461-62, Sept.
23, 1994, at 536 (uncontroversial amendment of Partnership Law "with full support of the
financial community"); June 21, 1995, at 608-17 (amendments to Trusts (Foreign Element)
Law passed on shorter notice than law required in response to request from financial industry);
June 19, 1996, at 316-17, July 8, 1996, at 458-59 (amendments to Legal Practitioners Act "at
the request of local attorneys" passed without debate); Sept. 4, 1996, at 602-03, Sept. 5, 1996,
at 610-11 (Companies Law amendments passed without debate); Sept. 1, 1997, at 441-43, Sept.
3, 1997, at 457-58 (Special Trusts (Alternative Regime) Bill and amendments to Perpetuities
law passed to create "non-charitable purpose trusts" in response to demand from financial
services providers); Mar. 9, 1998 at 134 (amendments to trusts law and creation of segregated
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B. Diversification
Vassel Johnson's 1981 budget report described the benefits the
government gained from a diversified economy. Many other nations or
colonies in and around the Caribbean depended upon tourism and direct
business and personal taxes to generate revenue to fund budget deficits that
paid for the services underpinning social order. Johnson reported, however,
that "most definitely, there must be an alternative source of revenue for any
country [like the Caymans] that foregoes direct taxation."3 6 2 The Cayman
"Government's revenue comes largely from duty on imported goods which
produces 40 percent of total income."3 63 The second most important was
20% derived from postage and revenue stamps;3 6 companies incorporation
fees provided 15%, "Ban[k] and Trust[s] licence fee -7 percent and the
portfolio companies bills passed without debate on third readings); June 5, 1998 at 383-87, June
17, 1998, at 416-17 (congenial discussion of amendment to Banks and Trust Companies Act);
April 20, 2001, at 485-507 (various financial bills debated and passed with little dissent); Jan. 9,
2002, at 1537-48 (Merchant Shipping amendments); Jan. 14, 2002, at 1630 (SPC legislation
passed); Dec. 13, 2004, at 516-17, 519-20 (merchant shipping amendments passed without
debate or controversy); Sept. 29, 2006, at 342-44, 346-52 (financial bills moved without
controversy); May 16, 2007, at 218-19 (Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Law amendments
moved without controversy); Sept. 17, 2007, at 453-60 (Companies Law and Insurance Law
amended without controversy); June 26, 2008, at 276-84 (various financial bills moved without
controversy or debate); June 27, 2008, at 300-05 (uncontroversial passage); June 30, 2008, at
317-18 (third readings and passage uncontroversial); Dec. 5, 2008, at 583-90 (Freedom of
Information regulations affirmed unanimously); Dec. 17, 2008, at 738-40, Dec. 18, 2008, at
761-62 (Tax Information Authority Amendment passed without controversy); Mar. 20, 2009, at
1049-53, 1055-56 (companies act and exempted limited partnership acts amended as sought by
financial community with little controversy); Dec. 2, 2009, at 326-38 (fee increases approved
with two abstentions on one); Feb. 24, 2010, at 366-68 (act passed to allow international
cooperation in keeping with CFATF review); Sept. 15, 2010, at 446-52 (companies and
partnership laws amended to meet new Global Forum requirements without debate); Mar. 17,
2011, at 910-13 (creation of terror finance legislation to avoid UK action); Apr. 11, 2011, at
959 (amendment to Companies Law drafted "two rounds of consultations with various
associations across the industry"); Nov. 5, 2010, at 489 (agreeing to TIEA legislation); Sept. 28,
2011, at 491-94 (adopting audit oversight legislation to come into compliance with IOSCO
standards); Nov. 18, 2011, at 704 (various bills passed without debate or dissent); Aug. 31,
2012, at 236-38, 240-45 (amending financial laws to meet Global Forum recommendations);
Aug. 29, 2012, at 215-29 (financial bills amended to meet Global Forum recommendations);
Nov. 19, 2012, at 420-22 (Companies Law amendments adopted without debate or dissent);
Nov. 23, 2012, at 511-13 (Mutual Funds and Banks and Trusts Companies Laws amended
without debate or dissent); Jan. 10, 2013 at 608 (Partnership law amended to meet Global
Forum recommendation); Mar. 15, 2013, at 744-45 (amending CIMA's authority to allow
compliance with EU Alternative Investment Fund Manager's Directive).
362. Vassel G. Johnson, 'The fruits are now ripening'from Cayman's tax haven system,
THE NOR'WESTER, Christmas 1981 at 48.
363. Id.
364. Revenue stamps relate to the real estate business.
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balance of 18 percent comes from over 60 small items, such as insurance
license fees, royalty from the ship to ship oil transfer operation at the
smaller Islands, car licensing, medical fees and income from investment.""'
Even during the depressed conditions of the early 1980s these revenue
sources "produced a balanced budget" and "created reserves which can
produce an income."3 66 Benefits went beyond direct revenue. As Financial
Secretary T.C. Jefferson noted in his 1982 Budget Address, "In 1981, on
top of license fees [of CI$3.33 million in 1981] paid to the Government,
banks and trust companies spent some CI$26.2 million in the Cayman
Islands by way of capital investment and operating costs. Employment in
the banks and trust companies is increasing steadily. At the end of 1981,
709 persons were employed, 73% of whom were Caymanians."36 7
Moreover, he noted that
considerable employment is generated in accountancy and law
firms and in other companies providing financial services. The
benefit is felt in every sector of the economy, whether it be retail
trade, real estate, or hotels and restaurants. Indeed, the constant
flow of bankers and other visitors on financial business must
represent a substantial part of total tourism.368
Thus, the Caymans offered proof that, "A continuing pleasing performance
of the economy of any country will depend on stability, for no business can
strive where there is constant change of policies sometimes at the whims
and fancies of political leaders." 3 69
Cayman proved willing to adapt to meet the needs of new customers as
well. In 1984, the Legislative Assembly held a special session to pass a bill
to facilitate the Hong Kong company, General Oriental Investments, Ltd.,
reincorporating into Cayman by varying the terms of the general companies
365. Johnson, supra note 362, at 48. The oil transfer operation began in August 1977 and in
two months over 4 million barrels of oil were unloaded from super-tankers onto shuttle tankers.
Cayman Hansard, Nov. 10, 1977, at 5. By 1978, over 49 million barrels were being transferred.
Cayman Hansard, April 4, 1979, at 3.
366. Johnson, supra note 362, at 48.
367. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 19, 1982, at 15; see also id. at 18 (Financial Secretary
discussing large financial impact of law firms in offshore sector).
368. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 19, 1982, at 15; see also Cayman Hansard, Dec. 4, 1985, at 14
(MLA Vassel Johnson asserting that 40% of tourism is related to financial industry).
369. Johnson, supra note 362, at 48; see also Cayman Hansard, Nov. 29, 1985, at 5 (noting
in Budget Address by Financial Secretary that "we are only too aware of the potential fragility
of a sector which is dependent not only on continuing confidence in Cayman as a safe place to
do business, but also on the maintenance of favourable economic and monetary conditions
overseas, factors which are entirely outside our control or influence").
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law for this one firm.3 70 Despite some testy procedural exchanges over some
wording, there was no substantive disagreement over the need for the
measure. Likewise, Cayman moved to secure banks from outside the United
States, successfully diversifying the geographical pool on which it drew."'
And Cayman continued to shape institutions to reassure investors by
drawing on outside resources-the Court of Appeal created in the early
1980s had as its first four members the President of the Jamaica Court of
Appeal, the Chief Justice of the Bahamas, and a member and former
member of the Jamaican Court of Appeal.3 72
Diversification of financial-fee revenues drove new markets for legal
services. "Fees paid for the registration of companies in 1981, plus annual
fees amounted to CI$4.85m," The Nor'wester reported in 1982, "a
substantial contribution to the Cayman Islands budget and a 33.43 percent
jump over the 1980 figure of CI$3.6m." 313 As noted above, the amendments
to the original Companies Law expanding incorporation fees resulted from
legislation MLA and ExCo members discussed or negotiated with Cayman
law firms like Walkers, Maples and Calder, and Hunters.374 Government-
business collaboration also created new sources of fees. Thus, during the
early 1980s Cayman became home for "flag of convenience" shipping
registration, competing against long-established leaders in the business,
Panama and Liberia.375 From 1981 to 1982 Caymans' registrations increased
370. Cayman Hansard, July 30, 1984, at 2-3 1.
371. Cayman Hansard, March 1, 1985, at 10 (Financial Secretary noting in Budget Address
that Cayman's growing "credibility" and familiarity with the Islands was bringing in banks from
other areas, with 32% from Europe and 21% from the Middle and Near East and terming this
diversification "general recognition of the standing and strength of our financial industry");
Nov. 14, 1986, at 3 (licensed banks' foreign assets up 16.5% from 1984 to 1985, increasing
diversity in source countries for banks); see also Cayman Hansard, Nov. 13, 1987, at 3
(Financial Secretary reporting in Budget Address that bank assets and number of banks
increasing and now included 42 of top 50 banks in world).
372. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 7, 1984, at 16 (Governor announcing appointments); see also
Cayman Hansard, Mar. 7, 1985, at 36 (MLA James Bodden noting regret that "no Caymanian
has the qualifications probably at this time to sit on that Court [of Appeal].").
373. Companies now total 14,391, THE NOR'WESTER March 1982, at 41.
374. Interview with Benson 0. Ebanks, supra note 33, at Disc 4, p. 14. Interestingly, the
Legislative Assembly acted to close a tax avoidance loophole in 1985, eliminating the ability of
individuals to use companies to hold real estate and then avoid stamp duty by transferring the
shares rather than real estate. Cayman Hansard, May 22, 1985, at 26-46.
375. Companies now total, supra note 373, at 41. This required Britain's cooperation, since
the UK had to extend several international conventions to which it was a signatory to cover
Cayman. See Cayman Hansard, Feb. 23, 1987, at 5 (describing history of registry efforts). This
was not easy to procure. See id. at 19 (describing convincing UK as "a very difficult task"
because of UK view that needed to consider EU interests). As the registry developed, the
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"from 516 vessels to 582. Revenue from the Shipping Register also went
up, from CI$87,815.00 in 1980 to CI$100,660.00 in 1981.",316 Eventually,
Cayman law firms shifted the shipping-registration focus to registration of
private mega-yachts, developing a legal framework that facilitated secured
lending for construction of large yachts.377 Cayman also had a brief period
during which it handled sea-based transfers of oil from super tankers too
large to enter U.S. Gulf Coast ports into smaller tankers, taking advantage
of maritime jurisdictional rules and deep water off Cayman Brac.37 ' The
captive insurance industry continued to grow.179 Cayman was "becoming a
jurisdiction of choice for offshore corporate structures" and developed more
general special purpose vehicle business out of the aircraft finance business:
"The model of aircraft financing and ownership began being used for the
ownership of all sorts of assets: oil wells, pipelines, boats, even service
fleets. . . ."3so Thus, once collaborative policymaking established the
connection between the fee-structure and law firms, members of those firms
possessed expertise that drew clients seeking registration. Similarly
consistent with collaborative policy making, Dignity Team Member of the
Legislative Assembly, Vassel Johnson (upon retirement as Financial
Secretary, he had been elected a member of the Assembly and the ExCo)"'
and a committee enacted the National Trust Law preserving Cayman
heritage sites, which attracted tourists paying hotel fees.382 Expat lawyer Ian
Boxall assisted in drafting the National Trust legislation and advised on
legal matters for the National Trust.'
Caymanians' pursuit of business diversification reflected foreign
governments' multiple taxation goals. Caroline Doggart noted that most
nations' revenue officials applied a "carrot-and-stick" approach to tax laws
generally and towards OFCs in particular.384 Thus, in order to promote
government worked closely with the private sector. Id. at 6 (describing process in 1986 and
1987); Cayman Hansard, Sept. 16, 1987, at 13 (describing cooperation).
376. Companies now total, supra note 373, at 41; CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at
357.
377. Stephen Porter, Lecture on Cayman Islands (Mar. 13, 2012) (notes on file with the
author); see also RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 182, 191-92.
378. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 182. The business ended when deep sea transfer points were
built in U.S. waters. Id.
379. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 14, 1986, at 4 (Financial Secretary noting increases in Budget
Address).
380. WALKER, supra note 17, at 157-59.
381. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 290.
382. Id. at 356-65.
383. Interview with Ian Boxall, supra note 276, at Disc 12.
384. DOGGART, 1979 Report, supra note 3, at 38.
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corporate investment and employment under the U.S. "1978 International
Banking Act foreign banks' representative offices set up in Florida may
indulge in a variety of international financing operations." 385 Lloyds Bank
of London was one of eleven banks incorporated in Florida "regulated by
the federal government."38 6 More broadly, U.S. and other nations' revenue
laws granted "quid pro quo", such as "the Colonial American Maximum
Interest Trust (Camit). It invests primarily in US blue chip securities on
which it writes covered options traded on US exchanges. Its income will
consist mainly of premiums received from expired and exercised options, as
well as dividend interest income, and net gains from options."" Camit paid
registration fees and had contracts drawn by law firms in Cayman,
Bermuda, Channel Islands, or other "tax havens." Meanwhile, American
fund managers received the most income, which was subject to federal and
state taxation. In Cayman and other "tax havens' development planning
mills," by contrast, there was "a strong multiplier effect that runs through
the building industry, commercial and professional services, the
communications sector and even agriculture and fishing.""
C. Money Laundering, Black Lists & Regulation
International efforts to police money laundering identified with drug
trafficking and terrorism tested the tax policy trade-offs benefitting the
Caymans. John Grisham's 1991 best-selling novel The Firm,38 9 followed by
Hollywood's 1993 movie version, popularized an unflattering and
inaccurate stereotype of Cayman as center for money laundering, tax
evasion, and criminal activity."'o Since the early 1980s, however, Cayman
officials, legal and other professionals, and media perceived the detrimental
reputational effects of an absolute insistence on total client secrecy in all
385. Id. at 28.
3 8 6. Id.
387. Id. at 25.
388. Id. at 24-28.
389. John Grisham, THE FIRM (1992); see Boise & Morriss, supra note 47, at 429, n.329
(discussing the "Grisham effect"); Cayman Hansard, Mar. 7, 1985, at 40 (MLA James Bodden
(in opposition) describing initial narcotics agreement as identifying "Cayman as an area where
we are not trying to build an economy based on drug money.").
390. The Grisham Effect, THIS IS CAYMAN (Jan. 3, 2013), available at
http://www.thisiscayman.com/content/222/the-grisham-effect ("The impact of the movie based
on the novel by John Grisham is known until today in Cayman's financial circles as the
'Grisham effect."').
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areas."' In 1984, Cayman moved to enhance the reporting requirements of
Cayman-licensed banks, as a means of underlining "our commitment to
preserving the integrity of the international system rather than simply
looking to the banking sector as a revenue earning tool." 39 2 The United
States began the criminalization of money laundering in 1986, as part of the
larger effort against illegal drugs. 93 Claims of money laundering in Cayman
also created diplomatic tensions between the U.S. and Britain. Accordingly,
British, U.S., and Cayman officials engaged in a series of negotiations,
culminating first in the 1984 Cayman Narcotics Agreement with the United
States and then, after the further negotiations mandated in that agreement, in
the 1986 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty ("MLAT"). 394 The MLAT
committed Cayman to assist "US authorities in the investigation and
prosecution of a range of criminal offenses including drug trafficking,
inside trading, bribery of foreign officials, tax fraud and a catch all category
of racketeering crimes."3 9 Notably, the initial agreement was negotiated by
391. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 300-06; CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 359; Walker
Interview, supra note 98, at 4; Interview with Ian Boxall, supra note 276, at 14; Interview with
Benson 0. Ebanks, supra note 33, at 17; Interview with Peter Lloyd, supra note 348, Discs 12-
14.
392. Cayman Hansard, Mar. 1, 1985, at 11 (Financial Secretary in Budget Address).
393. VLCEK, supra note 2, at 49.
394. Cayman Hansard, Mar. 1, 1985, at 4 (Governor describing negotiations and Narcotics
Agreement in Throne Speech); Sept. 9, 1986, at 16 (Narcotics Agreement signed July 26, 1984
and committed Cayman to "enter into negotiations concerning a Law Enforcement Treaty
between the United States and Cayman, concerning criminal matters" and to reach an agreement
within 15 months); JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 300-06; see also United Kingdom-United States:
Treaty Concerning the Cayman Islands and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, 26
I.L.M. 536 (1987). Interestingly, despite the treaty being the result of U.S. pressure, the United
States did not ratify it until 1989. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1028SP,
CAYMAN ISLANDS: REVIEW OF CAYMAN ISLANDS AND U.S. LAWS APPLICABLE TO U.S. PERSONS'
FINANCIAL ACTIVITY IN THE CAYMAN ISLANDS 8 (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08l028sp.pdf. Cayman saw itself as pressured to sign the
agreement, as MLA McKeeva Bush noted in 1985, commenting that in early 1980s that it was
"almost impossible for a Bank Officer or a Lawyer to travel from this Island to the United
States, without risking a Subpoena to appear before a United States Grand Jury." Cayman
Hansard, Dec. 10, 1985, at 19.
395. DOGGART, 1979 Report, supra note 3, at 155, 156; RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 193
("Legislative changes were progressively introduced . .. to allay, as far as possible, the concerns
of the metropolitan powers."); WALKER, supra note 17, at 182 (discussing the MLAT and
noting he was "a big proponent of it"). At the signing ceremony in Grand Cayman, the Minister
for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office joined the Governor in signing the treaty, and the
Minister referred to the treaty as a "milestone." Cayman Hansard, July 3, 1986, at 1-3. (The
negotiations and treaty provisions are described by the Cayman Attorney General at Cayman
Hansard, Sept. 2, 1986, at 12-34.) The MLAT did not cover "pure tax matters;" that is, it did
not cover tax avoidance. See Cayman Hansard, Sept. 8, 1986, at 17.
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James Bodden's Unity Team government, while the MLAT was negotiated
by its successor after the bitterly contested 1984 election, showing
considerable unity concerning the survival of the financial industry, if not
with respect to the MLAT itself.3 96 The Government also cited support from
the financial community for the treaty in advocating for the implementing
legislation. 397 Fears that the MLAT would hurt business proved groundless
as companies registered grew by 18% from 1986 to 1987, which the 1988
Throne Speech termed "a vote of confidence in our policy of encouraging
clean business."3 98 As then MLA J.A. Roy Bodden argued in his response to
the Throne Speech,
I see nothing wrong with a little house cleaning, especially when
that house cleaning is necessary. I believe that it is better to heed a
warning given early, than for one to have to succumb oneself to
embarrassment. I believe that we did the right thing [in signing the
MLAT]. The journals that I read lead me to believe that the
Cayman Islands, if they had ever lost respectability in the banking
396. As MLAs, James Bodden and G. Haig Bodden, key figures in the earlier government,
opposed the MLAT, however. See Cayman Hansard, Sept. 2, 1986, at 25-33; Sept. 5, 1986, at
17-34; Sept. 8, 1986, at 6-16. The new Government argued for the MLAT explicitly on this
ground. See Cayman Hansard, Sept. 8, 1986, at 19 ("The present Treaty [the MLAT] has been
brought about because when the Narcotic Agreement was signed, a timetable was set for a Law
Enforcement Treaty on other types of crime to be concluded with the United States of
America."). The vote on the MLAT implementing legislation was 10-5. Cayman Hansard, Sept.
11, 1986, at 19. When the dissenters attempted to move to refer the matter to a select committee
to gather public input, the Governor (as chair) ruled that while the motion could be brought
there could be no debate on it under Parliamentary procedure, and the five walked out. Cayman
Hansard, Sept. 11, 1986, at 20-23.
397. See Cayman Hansard, Sept. 9, 1986, at 18 (elected ExCo Member Capt. Charles
Kirkconnell arguing that "[w]e have received many favorable comments from international
financiers. The principle associations which have responsibility for confidential matters and the
protection of clean investors have made favourable comments on this Treaty. One association
said that the Treaty would assist the Cayman Islands to shed its unclean image and attract more
international business and end criticism that we are a haven for drug and other criminal money.
We are already experiencing an increase in applications from prestigious international banks.
Some of these banks are coming from tax havens which are well known for protecting criminal
activity."). One government supporter noted that some of the criticism of the MLAT appeared
in a newspaper, the editor of which was the wife of the President of the Law Society, a Unity
Team supporter. See Cayman Hansard, Sept. 10, 1986, at 44. However, opponents of the Treaty
pointed to concerns raised by the Law Society that "persons with legitimate business in the
Cayman Islands may be reluctant to continue to do so on the basis that their private and
commercial affairs will be subject to greater disclosure than would be the case in other
jurisdictions and certainly greater disclosure than would be the case in the United States, where
the right to have judicial review of any investigative process of an enforcement agency
remains." Cayman Hansard, Sept. 10, 1986, at 36-37 (MLA quoting Law Society).
398. Cayman Hansard, Feb. 12, 1988, at 3.
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world, are regaining that respectability and once again we are
becoming the model that we should be - clean, clear cut and up
front.399
Contradicting the stereotype of the Islands as a place where there was
considerable money laundering, Caroline Doggart wrote, "The Financial
Action Task Force, set up in 1987 to give effect to the Vienna Convention
on illicit traffic in drugs and related money laundering, has been particularly
complementary about Cayman Islands' supervisory practices. The Caymans
were the first and so far the only, jurisdiction to have passed a Caribbean
Financial Action Task Force regulatory audit with flying colours."4 00
Cayman also took steps to build relationships in the UK, hiring the recently
retired governor in 1982 to represent it in London, which made Cayman one
of just four overseas territories to maintain a London office at the time.401
Further, Cayman strengthened its anti-money laundering laws several times,
keeping up with the Financial Action Task Force ("FATF") and Caribbean
Financial Action Task Force ("CFATF") recommendations.4 02 The
Caymanian Legislative Assembly monitored the UK's involvement with the
OECD's efforts to control "harmful" tax competition, forming a Select
Committee to gather public input into the UK's review of its relationship
with its overseas territories as the UK moved to pressure Cayman to change
its laws to meet OECD guidelines.4 03 As one member of the Legislative
Assembly noted, Cayman could "not afford to take a reactive posture" but
instead needed "a proactive position" to inform the OECD about "the good
things that we are doing rather than waiting for them to take action and then
reacting to their position.",4 The government and private sector
399. Id., Feb. 28, 1989, at 218.
400. DOGGART, 1979 Report, supra note 3, at 155, 156.
401. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 201; Cayman Hansard, Feb. 16, 1987, at 11 (MLA Capt.
Charles Kirkconnell praising Russell's appointment in London). The three other territories were
the Falklands, Gibraltar, and Hong Kong. Id. Russell served as the representative for 18 years,
bringing a "total commitment" to the effort. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at at 201-02. This enabled
Cayman to both be involved in policy decisions in London and to promote the jurisdiction. Id. at
203.
402. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 19, 1996, at 661-70 (support for Proceeds of Criminal
Conduct Law based on need for legitimacy, FATF/CFATF recommendations and done quickly
to allow Minister to discuss at upcoming Commonwealth Finance Ministers' meeting); Sept. 20,
1996, at 687-96 (strong support for same).
403. Cayman Hansard, June 22, 1998, at 444-59, June 24, 1998, at 474-82, June 25, 1998,
at 488-505; April 1, 1999, at 351-56 (describing response); Nov. 26, 1999, at 1271-72
(discussing OECD issues in Budget Speech); Mar. 2, 2000, at 108 (discussing response to
OECD).
404. Cayman Hansard, Mar. 22, 1999, at 283. Caymanians continued to argue that "[i]f
there is competition in tax, then I cannot see it being harmful," but they did not let this position
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collaborated on guidance notes to deal with the blacklist.40 5 And Cayman
took a seat as a member in the OECD's Global Forum, able to directly
represent its interests.406
In the late 1990s, observed one Cayman resident lawyer, the OECD and
"metropolitan" authorities attempted through "blacklists" to "proscribe most
of the financial centres."" The public and private sectors collaborated in
resisting these pressures. 40 8 As the transnational MLAT regulatory structure
took hold, however, metropolitan powers, as well as Caymanian
government officials and legal professionals alike recognized that "a
transparent, well-regulated, well-organized financial centre [was necessary],
so that business around the world can be done. Take for example a
'tremendous source' of Caymanian business, "aeroplane loans; every airbus
that is sold costs around $400,000,000." There were "20 banks who do a
syndicated loan . . . they all want to know they're going to be treated
equally on the terms . . . [of] security. . . documentation for that loan, they
don't want to pay VAT in one country, they don't want to pay goods and
services tax in another, and they don't want to pay stamp duty in yet
another, so they come to somewhere like Cayman." 409 The Cayman Islands
had "no local taxes [for international businesses] to worry about."4 10 The
banks
can do the documents under English law, which everybody
understands, and so the end result is that they will all go and pay
their taxes on the profits on their loans, in their country of origin,
but they won't get treated differently. If . .. the airline goes belly
up, they will all be on a level playing field. You can't do that
without a country like Cayman.411
prevent them from adapting by complying with FATF recommendations. Mar. 26, 2001, at 207.
Not everyone accepted the strategy of being at the forefront of compliance, but these were a
small minority. See, e.g., Cayman Hansard, Mar. 28, 2001, at 242-43 (MLA Rolston Anglin
arguing against being "overly aggressive and try[ing] to be a Christopher Columbus, going into
uncharted territory and lead[ing] the way").
405. Cayman Hansard, April 25, 2001, at 510-11.
406. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 9, 2005, at 489-90. In some instances, Cayman may have
moved too fast to adopt Global Forum recommendations. See Cayman Hansard, Jan. 10, 2013,
at 610 (Opposition alleging August 2012 amendments were done without consultation with
financial sector and so had problems, requiring further amendments).
407. Interview with Ian Boxall, supra note 276, at Tape 2, Side A, p. 15; see also Morriss
& Moberg, supra note 317, at 39-48.
408. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 206.
409. Interview with Ian Boxall, supra note 276, at Tape 2, Side A, p. 17.
4 10. Id.
411. Interview with Ian Boxall, supra note 276, at Tape 2, Side B, p. 17.
1366
Cayman lawyers competed for and won this "transparent" documents
business, with its substantial fees. 412 By the mid-1990s, intensified team
politics and further constitutional restructuring created a new forum for
collaborative policymaking. Since 1980, independent candidates in local
districts had aligned in interclass and interracial teams, which partially
diffused racial and ideological party politics although at a personal level,
racial tensions were sometimes divisive.4 13 The government managed
contentious immigration and residency issues; it also lowered the voting age
from 21 to 18, thereby increasing the participation and stake of the
Caymanians in elections for the legislature.414 In 1990 McKeeva Bush and
other National Team Assembly independents secured the creation of the
position of Speaker of the Legislative Assembly over the then-government's
objections, and a Caymanian, the "veteran civil servant" Mrs. Sybil
McLaughlin, was appointed the next year and served from 1991 to 1996.415
Caymanians' regard for what might be termed a voluntary colonial
relationship with the UK persisted during the early 1990s as National Team
MLA and ExCo members declined to accept British officials' suggestion of
a complete ministerial system, including a Premier.416 Instead, National
Team leaders opted to have the MLA elect an additional ExCo member,
establishing an elected majority on that body relative to the Governor and
ex officio officers. 4 17 Affiliation with the UK continued to be seen in largely
positive terms. As elected ExCo Member Benson Ebanks noted in 1990,
We have had two items of stock and trade up to now which
succeeding legislators have used to bring these islands to its
present stage of prosperity and those two terms are our people and
the stability which the Union Jack, fluttering in the wind and all
that it stands for, gives us. Our stability has rested and continues to
rest on our connection with the United Kingdom.418
412. Id.
413. See CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 305-06, 319; Glidden, supra note 352, at 37;
BODDEN, supra note 25, at 36, 44.
414. See CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 371-72; BODDEN, supra note 25, at 251-66.
415. BODDEN, supra note 25, at 263-71; CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 313, 321-
22; Cayman Hansard, Sept. 5, 1990, at 1210-20. The final vote was 7-5 with the official
members abstaining. Id. at 1219-20.
416. Truman M. Bodden, UK Dependent Territory Succeeds: An Analysis of Cayman's
Successful Development (2012), http://www.ucciconference.ky/papers/Bodden%20-
%20UK%20Dependent/o2OTerritory/o2OSucceeds%20-
%20An%20Analysis%2of/o2OCaymans%2OSuccessful%2ODevelopment.pdf at 1; BODDEN,
supra note 16, at 91.
417. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 321-22; BODDEN, supra note 25, at 272-88.
418. Cayman Hansard, June 12, 1990, at 414.
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Britain remained supportive of the financial industry: As Queen
Elizabeth II noted in her 1994 Throne Speech delivered in Grand Cayman
during a Royal Visit, "The Financial Sector remains the key to a successful
future for these islands. My Government is determined to maintain a
financial services industry of high quality and integrity, through strict
adherence to prudent policies, augmented by the introduction of the new
Mutual Funds Legislation."' 9 However, some tensions continued as well.
When Britain moved to abolish the death penalty in her overseas territories
through an order in council,42 0 this provoked a negative reaction in Cayman
4211both over the substance of the decision and over the lack of consultation.
The financial regulatory system continued to evolve as well. A Mutual
Funds Law brought a new line of business, with registrations growing
quickly and 615 funds registering in the first year of the new statute.422
Traditional businesses continued to grow as well, with both captive
insurance, banks, and company registrations growing in the early 1990s. 4 23
In 1995, the Financial Services Supervisory Department ("FSSD"), which
had replaced the more jurisdictionally limited Banking Inspectorate as the
financial industry expanded, shut down a "bank found to be involved in
419. Cayman Hansard, Feb. 26, 1994, at 2.
420. Britain had to operate differently with respect to different territories due to differences
in constitutional structure. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, OVERSEAS TERRITORIES, 2007-8,
H.C. 147-, at 83 (U.K.), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2007O8/cmselect/cmfaff/147/147ii.pdf;
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, PARTNERSHIP FOR
PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY: BRITAIN AND THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES, 1999, Cm. 4264, 14.7
(1999) available at http://www.ukotcf.org/pdf/charters/WhitePaper99full.pdf ("Bermuda's
degree of constitutional autonomy prevents us from imposing the abolition of the death penalty
there by Order in Council.").
421. Cayman Hansard, June 20, 1991, at 407-23; June 21, 1991, at 443-50 (debate over
Private Member's motion asking UK to reverse decision; motion defeated 6-8 with one
abstention). The debate turned on whether a dependent territory could make such a request.
MLA McKeeva Bush argued that "we cannot allow the United Kingdom to push on us every
whim and fancy which many conform with their obligations under the European convention."
Cayman Hansard, June 21, 1991, at 446. The Attorney General countered that "it is not
compatible with the Cayman Islands position as a Dependent Territory that it seeks to get the
U.K. Government's decision reversed in this way." Id. at 447.
422. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 9, 1994, at 602. Cayman also looked to gain a share of the
cruise ship marriage market with an amendment to the Marriage Law, reducing the waiting
period for a license. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 16, 1994, at 663. There was some controversy over
the morality of this step, although the amendment passed 12-3 with three absences. Id. at 663-
67.
423. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 9, 1994, at 602 (Thirty percent increase in company
registrations over prior year, thirty-one new banks, and forty new captives).
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trading irregularities."4 24 A formal consultative mechanism, the Private
Sector Consultative Committee ("PSCC") built on earlier informal
consultations to respond to the growing international pressure on OFCs.425
Concerns about maintaining Cayman's positive reputation undoubtedly
influenced incorporation of FSSD into the new Cayman Island Monetary
Authority ("CIMA"). Starting in 1997, CIMA combined the extensive
regulatory transparency of MLAT and mandatory consultation with
business and legal professionals.4 26 Extending collaborative policymaking to
policing, CIMA signaled a regulatory innovation that aimed to secure
Caymans' future competitive advantage.42 7 In 1996, the Cayman Islands
Stock Exchange was organized as "an enhancement to the array of services"
already available, to "combine the appropriate degree of regulatory control
with significant private sector participation" by creating a company in
which the government was the sole shareholder.42 8
When the FATF listed Cayman in 2000 as noncompliant, the
Government moved quickly to address the FATF's concerns.42 9 Steps
included meeting with the private sector to formulate a strategy, and
seeking advice from U.S. counsel on how to respond. 430 Just two days after
the initial listing, four pieces of new legislation were passed to provide
CIMA with expanded authority to cooperate internationally and otherwise
become in compliance with the FATF requirements.4 3 1 In 2002, Cayman
faced additional stress from the European Savings Directive, whose
424. DOGGART, 1979 Report, supra note 3, at 154.
425. BODDEN, supra note 15, at 150-54 (describing PSSC evolution and involvement of
"representatives from the major banks, the larger legal firms specialising [sic] in corporate law,
trust and estate planners, company management, and the Department of Finance, as well as one
or two government ministers and, on occasion, one or two members of the Legislative
Assembly."); Cayman Hansard, June 21, 1995 at 612 (describing committee as consisting of
"the President of the Cayman Bar Association, the President -of the Cayman Islands Law
Society, the President of the Cayman Islands Insurance Managers Association, the President of
the Cayman Islands Bankers Association, the President of the Cayman Islands Society of
Professional Accountants, the President of the Chamber of Commerce," and others); see also
Cayman Hansard, Nov. 3, 2010, at 457 (discussing creation of Financial Services Legislative
Committee with public and private members); Sept. 15, 2010, at 448 (Premier assuring Leader
of Opposition that "the Government does not move on this kind of legislation . . . without
talking about those Bills, the parameters of those Bills, the need for those Bills, and have our
Legislative Committee from the Financial Services Council go through the Bills.").
426. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 359.
427. Id. at 359-60; DOGGART, 1979 Report, supra note 3, at 153-54.
428. Cayman Hansard, Mar. 14, 1996, at 253-60; Mar. 20, 1996, at 300-01.
429. Cayman Hansard, July 12, 2000, at 630-53 (discussion in Legislative Assembly).
430. Id. at 632.
431. Cayman Hansard, July 14, 2000, at 676-706.
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application to Caymanian institutions the Leader of Government Business
said would "ring the death knell" of the industry.4 32 Cayman pursued an
aggressive strategy of negotiation and threats of litigation to secure the best
terms it could with respect to the Directive.433 Despite the change in
governments in 2005 (and Hurricane Ivan in 2004), Cayman negotiated
bilateral agreements with 25 EU members that avoided the "death knell"
and quickly adopted the implementing legislation without controversy as
one of the first post-election bills.4 34 On top of the increasing demands of
outside governments, Cayman also faced some financial stress as
consolidation in the financial industry reduced the number of banking
licenses.4 35
D. Increasing Political Fractures
As Cayman's government grew in size over the 1980s, no doubt in part
because more resources were available from the financial sector's growth,
some political stress lines began to appear over control of those resources.
As just one measure of the growing level of contention, the Speaker noted
that the number of questions asked of the government by backbench
members rose from 185 in 1980 to 857 in 1992.436 In particular, one of the
most controversial events in Cayman's constitutional history to that point
developed in a dispute over control of spending after the back bench began
to reject the Executive Council leadership on the budget.43 7 In December
1989, the Finance Committee (which at that time consisted of all elected
members of the Legislative Assembly with the Financial Secretary as chair)
reallocated funds from the Executive Council's priorities. As the backbench
outnumbered the Executive Council members in the Finance Committee,
they were able to make these changes. 438 The Executive Council reacted to
432. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 7, 2002, at 625.
433. Cayman Hansard, Mar. 12, 2003, at 24-25 (describing efforts).
434. Cayman Hansard, June 22, 2005, at 35-42; June 23, 2005, at 56.
435. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 13, 2002, at 693.
436. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 18, 1992, at 1143.
437. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 2, 1992, at 850 (MLA Truman Bodden terming dispute as
"one in which we had probably more controversy than in most other areas during the time that I
have been in politics").
438. The description of the controversy is drawn from the debate in the Cayman Hansard.
See Cayman Hansard, June 11, 1990, at 373-83; June 12, 1990, at 398-414; June 13, 1990, at
434-46; June 14, 1990, at 478-81; June 15, 1990, at 488-508; June 19, 1990, at 513-31; June
20, 1990, at 533-53; June 22, 1990, at 579-99; June 25, 1990, at 601-21; June 26, 1990, at
623-45; June 27, 1990, at 649-70; June 29, 1990, at 691-715; July 3, 1990, at 717-40. Benson
Ebanks gave his account of the problems in the Finance Committee when the Government lost
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its loss of control of the budget by proposing to change the Standing Orders
governing the Legislative Assembly to add the Attorney General and the
Administrative Secretary (both official members) to the Committee and
replace the Financial Secretary as chair with the presiding officer of the
Legislative Assembly (at that time, the Governor), making the Financial
Secretary an ordinary member of the Finance Committee. The effect of
these changes would be to give the Executive Council members three
additional votes in the Finance Committee (the two new members and the
Financial Secretary, who had previously been limited to casting a vote when
there was a tie and had been required to vote to preserve the status quo).
Since ExCo members were bound by collective responsibility in both the
Legislative Assembly and the Finance Committee, they were required to
vote as a bloc to support the Government position. With a Legislative
Assembly membership of fifteen, this required the Executive Council to win
just one vote from among the six backbench members to prevail. By
comparison, under the earlier order, the five elected ExCo members needed
two backbenchers' votes (if all members of the Finance Committee were
voting). After considerable and quite heated wrangling over both substance
and procedure, the amendment passed on an eight to seven vote.4 39 The
dispute continued, prompting the Government to seek a "Constitutional
Study", the authorization of which passed on a narrow 8-7 vote after the
Governor ruled (as presiding officer) that the Official Members could
vote.440
The majority of the backbench then sought a referendum to change the
number of votes necessary to replace the Executive Council from two-thirds
control of it in a July 3rd speech. Cayman Hansard, July 3, 1990, at 728-36. MLA Haig Bodden
explained how the change allowed a minority Executive Council to override a majority of the
elected members. Cayman Hansard, July 4, 1990, at 753-55.
439. The result was essentially determined by the Governor's ruling that the three Official
Members were bound by collective responsibility and allowed to vote. See Cayman Hansard,
July 3, 1990, at 736-38 (ruling). Since the majority included the votes of the three Official
Members, the vote without their participation would have been 5 to 7 and the motion would
have failed. Id. at 738 (vote). The final vote on the actual amendment is at Cayman Hansard,
July 4, 1990, at 759 (8-5 vote with two members absent). The opposition then sought to have
the Governor not give assent to the change, as was required before it could go into effect, and
solicit public input. Cayman Hansard, July 4, 1990, at 760-65. The Legislative Assembly, not
surprisingly, rejected the call for a referendum by an 8-7 vote. Cayman Hansard, July 6, 1990, at
809. The defeated back benchers argued this led to a sharp boost in government debt. Cayman
Hansard, Sept. 2, 1992, at 852 (MLA Truman Bodden arguing "this country would not be in the
debt that it is in today [but for the change] because nearly all of the debt of the country, the
majority of it, was added after Finance Committee became in control of a minority of Elected
Members.").
440. Cayman Hansard, July 24, 1990, at 1051-73.
45: 1297] CREATING CAYAMN 1371
ARIZONA STATE LA WJOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J.
(ten) to a simple majority (eight)." Although the motion calling for the bill
passed due to the absence at the time of voting of two government
supporters, the backbench recognized that the bill itself would fail and so its
supporters appealed to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to order a
referendum rather than pressing for a vote.42 Later that year, a compromise
allowed unanimous agreement on appointment of a select committee to
examine the constitution."4 During the constitutional discussions, British
officials pressed Cayman to adopt a party system to support a ministerial
form of government."
The result of the Select Committee was a divided report with two
dissenting statements.4 45 Backbench MLA McKeeva Bush attempted to
suspend the debate on any reforms pending the general election to be held
in 1992, but the Government rejected this."6 The Government continued to
successfully persuade one of the backbench members to vote with it, giving
it a narrow majority (eight votes of fifteen) by utilizing the three official
members." A key point of dispute was over the creation of a post of Chief
Minister, with the backbench dissenters on the select committee arguing
that more checks on power were needed and that such a position should not
be created until after political parties were established." The dissenters also
441. Cayman Hansard, July 25, 1990, at 1090-97; July 26, 1990, at 1102-24.
442. Cayman Hansard, July 26, 1990, at 1124.
443. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 15, 1990, at 1314-18. The process of constitutional reform
requires brief mention. As outlined by the Governor in his 1991 Throne Speech, the UK-
appointed constitutional commission conducted consultations during 1990 in Cayman and was
formulating a proposed new constitution. The Legislative Assembly's own select committee
would then consider the input it had gathered and the draft proposed by the commission and
make its own recommendations to the UK. The final decision on the form of any constitutional
changes would be made by the UK, although it promised to make only changes that it was
satisfied were "the evident desire of the majority of the people of Cayman." Cayman Hansard,
Feb. 15, 1991, at 13.
444. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 3, 1992, at 874; Sept. 4, 1992, at 896. In addition, back bench
MLA McKeeva Bush, later the first Premier, argued that a party system would be needed for
accountability under a full ministerial system; he also cautioned that this would be "one step
closer" to independence. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 10, 1992, at 1016, 1020.
445. Cayman Hansard, Oct. 28, 1991, at 1068-84 (report and dissents).
446. Id. at 1063-68.
447. Cayman Hansard, Feb. 21, 1992, at 92 (MLA Roy Bodden noting "The First Elected
Member for Cayman Brac has ensured that [Backbench is neutralized]. His vote has effectively
neutralised [sic] seven Backbenchers so all of the mileage we can make is by saying that we
have been beating our heads against the wall and will continue to do so but in one stroke, in one
yea, Capt. Mabry neutralizes our seven positions.").
448. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 2, 1992, at 842-43. This continued to be a theme in debates
over constitutional structure. See, e.g., Cayman Hansard, Mar. 1, 2000, at 96 (MLA Linford A.
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sought to restore the previous structure of the Finance Committee as
consisting of all elected members with the Financial Secretary as chair and
to embed this in the constitution." 9
A key result of the controversy was the election of the National Team in
the 1992 elections, replacing the Government with the former backbench.45 0
The new government sought only "gradual change" in the constitution4 5 1
and achieved this with a less ambitious new constitution adopted by the
Privy Council which expanded the Executive Council to five elected
members (notably it did not include a Bill of Rights, which some had
sought).452 The National Team was reelected in 1996.453 In November 1997,
one team member (McKeeva Bush) resigned as a member of the Executive
Council and was replaced by another, Julianna O'Conner-Connolly. 45 4 Bush
returned to the Executive Council in November 2000 after the members of
the National Team were returned to office along with seven new
members. 455 A year later, Bush participated in a controversial motion (which
one MLA referred to in the heat of the moment as "a coup" 456 ) that led to
the removal of two of his fellow Executive Committee members (Kurt
Tibbetts and Edna Moyle) on the grounds that Tibbetts had been ineffective
as leader and installed Bush as Leader of Government Business at the head
Pierson arguing that cannot have a chief minister and ministerial system without "a proper party
system" to provide discipline).
449. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 2, 1992, at 849.
450. See Cayman Hansard, Mar. 17, 1993, at 146 (National Team minister McKeeva Bush
attributing victory in part to position on constitution); Mar. 19, 1993, at 196 (National Team
minister Truman Bodden same); Sept. 17, 1993, at 514 (MLA G. Haig Bodden stating "I believe
that in Cayman no Government is going to get away with any constitutional changes unless the
public agrees. Our public is very sensitive about their Constitution and anyone who tampers
with it-anyone-is likely to go. We just saw it happen, we saw a whole Government removed
and for no other reason than they tampered with the composition of our Finance Committee and
tried to put in a new Constitution before a General Election."); Sept. 23, 1993, at 602 (National
Team minister (and former Financial Secretary) Thomas Jefferson arguing election was a
rejection of prior government's efforts to change constitution).
451. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 20, 1993, at 540.
452. Cayman Hansard, Mar. 2, 1994, at 17.
453. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 27, 1996, at 3-6.
454. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 5, 1997, at 501-03. Bush later noted that he had been
"removed" from the Executive Council. Cayman Hansard, Mar. 11, 1999, at 207.
455. Cayman Hansard: Swearing in Ceremony, Nov. 15, 2000, at 7; Cayman Hansard, Apr.
9, 2001, at 404 (seven new members).
456. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 8, 2001, at 1232. The Speaker ordered the Member to
withdraw the phrase. Id.
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of a new political party, the United Democratic Party ("UDP").45 7 The two
members removed went on to form the People's Progressive Movement
("PPM"), which became the second modem Caymanian political party.4 5 8
Constitutional issues continued to be a divide in Caymanian politics. The
new government moved to reform the constitution based on the 2002 review
by the UK, ironically making changes that would prevent any future group
of members from repeating their maneuver. 459 The four members of the
PPM then walked out of the debate.460
These disputes highlighted important stresses in the political system.
Prior to the appearance of the UDP and PPM, the governing teams lacked
party discipline and instead represented ad hoc coalitions largely negotiated
after elections among the winners (although some campaigned together,
particularly within multimember constituencies). The practice of collective
responsibility ensured some cohesion among the Government members, but
as the 1989-90 crisis demonstrated, did not ensure that the Government had
support from a majority of the elected members. While the 2000 "coup"
revealed additional weakness in the political system's claim to legitimacy,
the Governor's decision to allow the ouster of Tibbetts and Moyle by the
newly formed UDP and not to seek an election demonstrated a strong
preference for stability. With the formation of the UDP and PPM,
particularly given the circumstances of the UDP's taking power, Caymanian
politics moved into uncharted waters.
V. INNOVATING IN REGULATORY STRUCTURE
CIMA's regulation of the financial industry evolved within the recent
history of changing Cayman constitutional politics. After the millennium,
Caymanian politics evolved from "team" politics into a two-party system;46 '
the combination of rising government spending and falling governmental
revenues resulting from the 2007 global financial crisis led for the first time
457. Cayman Hansard, Revocation and Re-Election of Honourable Ministers to Executive
Counsel, 2001; Cayman Hansard, Official Members and Ministers of the Legislative Assembly,
2001; Nov. 8, 2001, at 1231-64.
458. Cayman Hansard, June 20, 2002, at 321-22 (describing formation of PPM).
459. Cayman Hansard, June 19, 2002, at 307-13 (describing government's proposed
changes).
460. Cayman Hansard, June 21, 2002, at 347.
461. BODDEN, supra note 16, at 92-3. For example, the post of Leader of the Opposition
was created in 2003. Cayman Hansard, June 30, 2003, at 438.
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to serious budgetary problems that continue to plague the jurisdiction.46 2
The 2009 Cayman Constitution also introduced the previously rejected
constitutional structure: a Chief Minister (Premier) controlling ExCo
elected members (changed in 1972 to Ministers) who exercised
independence in cooperation with Assembly. However, the constitutional
change did not end. The checks-and-balances maintained through the
British Governor and the Caymanian civil service removed much of the
regulatory system from direct political pressures. Moreover, the
independent judiciary led by the Chief Justice possessed autonomy, with
final appellate review lodged, as it had been throughout colonial history, in
the Privy Council.46 3 In addition, the Cayman legal profession and powerful
law firms with international reputations promoted the rule of law. The
financial sector continued to grow into the 2000s, although ongoing bank
consolidations reduced the contribution of banking licenses to the
revenue.4' The various governments continued to seek new areas for
growth, launching an effort to create special economic zones in 2011 with
Opposition support.4 65
Checks and balances and the rule of law-reflected in ongoing embrace
of the affiliation with Britain-enabled Caymanian and British officials to
approve in 2012 a committee responsible for reinstituting the long tradition
of balanced budgets after the global financial crisis produced several years
of deficits. A public discourse suggested how this goal was consistent with
the constitutional structure shaping policies that had constructed the
Cayman financial center since the 1960 Companies Law. Finally, the late
2012 arrest of then-Premier McKeeva Bush on corruption charges led to a
no confidence vote in which members of Bush's party including his deputy,
462. See James C. Miller, III, et al., Addressing the Challenge ofFiscal Sustainability of the
Cayman Islands: Final Report of the Independent Commission (Feb. 26, 2010), available at
http://www.gov.ky/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/CIGHOME/PRESSROOM/ARCHIVE/201003/MILL
ERCOMMISSION/CI-FINAL%20REPORT%2002-26-1OF-MILLER%20REPORT.PDF
(hereinafter Miller Commission); Daniel J. Mitchell, Here's Why the Cayman Islands Is
Considering Fiscal Suicide, FORBES (July 31, 2012), available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/daniehnitchell/2012/07/3 1/heres-why-the-cayman-islands-is-
considering-fiscal-suicide/ (describing post-Miller Commission continuation of budget
problems).
463. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 326.
464. Cayman Hansard, May 4, 2007, at 39 (citing growth in company registrations); Apr.
30, 2008, at 7-8, 22-3 (same); Number of Banks by Category, CAYMAN ISLANDS MONETARY
AUTHORITY (Sep. 30, 2013), available at
http://www.cimoney.com.ky/stats-regent/stats-regent.aspx?id=200&ekmensel=e2f22c9a_14
72_200_6 (showing declining numbers of Class B banks during 2000s).
465. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 28, 2011, at 471-91.
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Julianna O'Connor-Connolly, joined the opposition to oust him.46 6 As after
the 2001 UDP "coup," the Governor opted for stability by not calling for an
immediate election as Bush requested but instead allowing a rump-UDP
government to continue with tacit support from the Opposition 467 (the May
2013 election then brought in a PPM government that also included two of
the five independent members) .468 As the Jamaican newspaper The Gleaner
editorialized admiringly, "[I]t is not a tradition of Jamaican politics for
members of the legislature to support no-confidence votes against their
governments. Indeed, it is far from current contemplation [in Jamaica] that a
deputy prime minister would cast a ballot to oust his/her own
administration." 46 9
A. Creating CIMA
A critical step amidst the evolution from team to party politics was the
further insulation of the financial regulatory system from politics. Several
factors facilitated CIMA's regulatory independence and effectiveness.
CIMA was created after the early-1990s global collapse of the
Luxembourg-chartered Bank of Commerce and Credit International
("BCCI") led to increased demands from governments, NGOs, and bankers
for more effective financial regulation, as reflected in the 1992 Basle
Committee Statement.47 0 Cayman had participated, along with France, Hong
466. Cayman Hansard, Dec. 18, 2012, at 592-97 (Motion of Lack of Confidence passes 11-
3). The corruption issue first surfaced in the Assembly in September 2011, when the Leader of
the Opposition brought a letter from the Governor to MLA Ezzard Miller to the attention of the
members, which confirmed that an ongoing investigation into Bush by the Royal Cayman
Islands Police Service existed. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 7, 2011, at 263. The Speaker ordered
some of McLaughlin's statements expunged from the record. Id.
467. Shuma Roberts, Cayman Islands governor appoints new premier, Reuters (December
19, 2012), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/19/us-cayman-premier-
idUSBRE8BIlAM20121219.
468. Brent Fuller, New government ready to roll, CAYMANIAN COMPASS, May 30, 2013,
available at http://www.compasscayman.com/caycompass/2013/05/30/New-government-ready-
to-roll/. O'Connor-Connolly also joined with the PPM and was made Speaker (a position
without a vote). Id. Former Premier Bush became the official Leader of the Opposition. Id.
469. Editorial - Lessons from the Cayman Islands, THE GLEANER, Dec. 20, 2012, available
at http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20121220/cleisure/cleisurel.html (last visited Jan. 8,
2013).
470. CRATON, FOUNDED, supra note 21, at 358-59; Johnson, supra note 22, at 191-92;
DUNCAN ROBERT WOOD, GOVERNING GLOBAL BANKING 60-62 (2005). See also Angelos
Kanas, Pure Contagion Effects in International banking: The Case of BCCIs Failure, 8 J.
APPLIED ECON. 101 (2005) (describing lack of contagion), available at
http://ideas.repec.org/a/cem/jaecon/v8y2OO5nlpl01-123.html.
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Kong, Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, in a
regulatory "college" to attempt to deal with BCCI's complex corporate
structure prior to the bank's collapse. 471 Also, Caymanian officials'
(admittedly somewhat belated) success during the 1980s handling global
policing standards, the establishment of effective banking inspectorates
meeting international standards, and the UK independent Financial Services
Authority were precedents for the 1996 Law establishing CIMA, which
passed the Legislative Assembly without controversy and with no debate,4 72
as "a further demonstration of our commitment to maintain the integrity and
stature of Cayman as a leading international financial centre."4 73 Working
with assistance from the Bank of England, the Caymanian government
created the new regulator.4 74 Thus, wrote Maples and Calder senior partner,
Timothy Ridley, "the [British Dependent Territory] Cayman Islands . . .
provide a useful example to consider in terms of confidentiality laws,
exchange of information, drugs and 'all crimes' money laundering since
they are considered by the UK and USA as a pathfinder for cooperation and
legislation." 475 For decades British officials required other Caribbean
dependencies "to follow the Cayman Islands precedent. In the case of
money laundering, Bermuda, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man are
also following the Cayman Islands' 'lead.' Most of the Independent
Caribbean countries have adopted or are in the course of adopting broadly
similar legislation."4 76 More particularly, CIMA "requires . . . internal
procedures to comply with ... the Basle Committee Statement" prescribing
global banking standards to combat money laundering.47 7 By 1998, CIMA
had begun on-site reviews of banks, trust companies, insurance companies,
and mutual funds.478
471. Richard J. Herring, BCCI & Barings: Bank Resolutions Complicated by Fraud and
Global Corporate Structure, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: RESOLVING LARGE BANK
INSOLVENCIES 321, 326 (Douglas Darrell Evanoff & George G. Kauffman, eds., 2005).
Cayman's response is described in a statement by the Financial Secretary in Cayman Hansard,
July 5, 1991, at 685-86.
472. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 20, 1996, at 696-97, 702-04. Similarly, amendments in 1997
to add Sir Vassel Johnson to the CIMA board passed without discussion. June 9, 1997, at 312,
June 11, 1997, at 332.
473. Cayman Hansard, Mar. 7, 1997, at 5 (Throne Speech by governor describing CIMA).
474. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 20, 1996, at 696.
475. Timothy Ridley, Money Laundering, Combative Legislation and Cross-Border
Disclosure and Enforcement, 2 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 225, 232 (1997).
476. Id
477. Id.
478. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 16, 1998, at 1084.
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CIMA quickly established an international reputation for effective
financial regulation. George McCarthy, Financial Secretary and Chairman
during CIMA's initial years of operation, noted that Cayman was an early
adopter of the reforms brought in by the Basle Committee and Offshore
Group of Banking Supervisors and "through the Monetary Authority" the
Islands "continued to formulate a clear response to procedural concerns."47 9
CIIIMA also adapted institutional independence to the government's
preexisting collaborative policymaking. Thus, among its "priorities" the
Authority began "intensive discussions with Cayman's private sector. In
order to remain conversant with their issues and concerns, the Authority
maintains an open door policy to all institutions operating within our
financial industry to enable dialogue and monitoring of financial issues as
they arise."4 80
When Michael Austin became Chairman in 2002, CIMA became truly
independent as it was now separated from the government, which it had not
been while the Financial Secretary remained its Chairman. This
independence was thought to "give [the Cayman Islands] the credibility that
[it] need[s]."8 Even more importantly, the new independence "significantly
enhanced its ability to meet international standards of supervision,
accountability and transparency, while giving the benefit of more clearly
defined functions, duties, powers and obligations."4 82 The addition of
foreign directors to CIMA's board, including U.S. economists Richard
Rahn and Warren Coats, soon thereafter, also enhanced the agency's
independence from local politics. Similarly, the appointment of former
Maples & Calder managing partner Timothy Ridley as Chairman in 2004
further established the agency as independent.
Consistent with global responsiveness implemented through
collaborative policymaking, Managing Director Neville Grant said: CIMA
"has undertaken projects designed to enhance international co-operation and
co-ordination" of "procedures for facilitating on-site examinations of
Cayman banks by overseas supervisors by way of Memoranda of
Understanding" with foreign governmental bodies.4 83
479. Ridley, supra note 475, at 233.
480. Hon. George McCarthy, Chairman's Statement, Apr. 22, 1998, CAYMAN ISLANDS
MONETARY ANNUAL REPORT 1997, at 8.
481. Cayman Hansard, Feb. 27, 2002, at 114 (quoting MLA Rolston Anglin).
482. Cayman Hansard, Aug. 29, 2005, at 153.
483. Neville Grant, Managing Director's Statement, Apr. 22, 1998, CAYMAN ISLAND
MONETARY AUTHORITY ANNUAL REPORT 1997, at 9.
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To this end, an on-site bank inspection programme was developed
and is now being implemented. Onsite review programmes for
insurance and investment services are expected to be implemented
in 1998. The Authority is also enhancing its off-site surveillance
capabilities in line with its on-site programme and has recruited a
number of experienced expatriate supervisors to assist in this
process. 484
So too, the international connections CIMA directors brought to the
process enhanced the agency's effectiveness in dealing with regulators in
the U.S. and the U.K. In particular, these steps helped Cayman deal with
increased pressure from the Labour government in Britain, which took steps
to reframe the relationship between Britain and her overseas territories in a
report and a White Paper published in the late 1990s. 485 Cayman also
benefited from reduced outside pressure after the 2000 election in the
United States 48 6 and with the installation of the Conservative-Liberal
Democrat Coalition government in 20 10.487
The Assembly approved CIMA's stronger independent enforcement
authority even as party politics took root. 488 Under CIMA's original
legislative mandate prescribing regulation of insurance, banking, investment
and securities and fiduciary services, the Cabinet, rather than the Authority,
issued and revoked licenses.4 89 In 2002, however, the Assembly granted
CIMA "operational independence" that authorized "enforcement" through
"more clearly defined functions, duties, powers and obligations and has
enabled the Authority to further meet international standards of
accountability and transparency." 4 90  The 2002 change in CIMA's
enforcement powers received support in the Government's 1999 planning
document that established "integrating" policy achieved by "maintaining
484. Id.
485. BODDEN, supra note 16, at 73, 77 (noting "intransigence" by UK with respect to the
financial sector beginning in the 1990s); id. at 105-08 (describing larger context). The report
and White Paper were, respectively, Contingent Liabilities in the Dependent Territories (May
1997) and Partnership for Progress and Prosperity (March 1999); Cayman Hansard, Nov. 26,
1999, at 1271-73 (discussing White Paper issues in Budget Speech).
486. Cayman Hansard, Mar. 29, 2001, at 254 (noting impact of change in US position on
OECD efforts).
487. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 18, 2011, at 675 (Premier stating that "we do have a better
relationship with this [Coalition] Government").
488. See BODDEN, supra note 25, at 301-05; Bodden, supra note 416, at 1; Remarks by Mr.
Timothy Ridley, Deputy Chairman CIMA, Claridges Hotel, London, UK, 22 June 2004 at 1;
Cayman Hansard, Oct. 6, 1999, at 1166-72 (discussing process of making CIMA autonomous).
489. Remarks by Mr. Timothy Ridley, supra note 488, at 1.
490. Id.
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balance."4 9' Regarding the economy, the planning document "balanced-
integrated" strategy included the call to: "Amend Monetary Authority Law.
Amend Banks & Trust Companies Law." 4 92 Its operational independence
and enforcement effectiveness preserved the financial industry's
international standing, despite concerns over corruption worries which a
leading local historian observed in Caymanian politics by 2009, 49 and the
budget-deficit crisis that resulted in the UK intervention in 2012.
B. Maintaining Competitive Advantage Through Stability
CIMA promoted the prosperity underpinning the social stability essential
to Cayman competitive advantage.4 94 World Bank data for 2010 ranked the
Cayman Islands eighth in "gross national income per capita," equal with the
Isle of Man, three ahead of the Channel Islands, and close to third-ranked
Bermuda. Cayman was far ahead of former British Caribbean colonies such
as Jamaica, which was ranked 111 th.495 Such prosperity reflected the
Caymans' standing as "the fifth largest banking centre in the world and the
largest funds centre as well as the world's largest private yacht registry and
a leading insurance centre." 49 6 Moreover, "Cayman's political stability and
modernization of its laws including the companies, trust, shipping,
insurance and funds legislation [much of it regulated by CIMA] and a sound
judicial system based on the U.K.'s," stimulated the "rise of a world
renowned financial centre." 497 Despite Caymanians' comparative wealth,
the political corruption and budget deficits identified elsewhere with party
politics required constructive policies rather than "problematic economic
planning."4 98
CIMA's collaborative policymaking and enforcement sustained
Cayman's reputation for diverse financial products benefiting international
clients and the government itself CIMA's full operational independence
occurred under experienced leadership. It began with the Authority's
491. Cayman Islands Government, The Key to the Future: A Guide to the Nation Strategic
Plan 1999-2008, at 17.
492. Id. at 45.
493. BODDEN, supra note 25, at 314.
494. See Mr. Timothy Ridley, Chairman, Cayman Islands Monetary Authority, Remarks at
the City-Cayman Luncheon, at 1-10 (The Mansion House, Jan. 26, 2005).
495. Bodden, supra note 416, at 1.
496. Id at 4.
497. Id. at 1.
498. Trufflenet, Independent Analysis For Public Consultation On The Overseas
Territories, 15 (Feb. 2012), http://www.provochamber.com/PDF/otsconsultationreport.pdf.
1380 Ariz. St. L.J.
experienced chair, George McCarthy, and continued with his successors,
Mike Austin (2002-2004), a former senior partner at KPMG, Timothy
Ridley (2004-2008), a British expatriate and Caymanian, and former
Maples senior law partner who also practiced in Hong Kong.4 99 It also
includes long-standing professional staff, such as CIMA Managing
Director, Cindy Scotland (2002-to date).5 00 The transition from McCarthy
to Austin to Ridley and now back to McCarthy (who returned as Chair after
retiring from the government) illustrated Cayman's traditional social
stability, despite political disputes involving resident status and work
permits. The shared local and international experience also evidenced
collaborative policymaking between CIMA and "working groups in
partnership with the private sector to recommend, where necessary,
legislative amendments to other areas that fall to its regulatory authority."50
Indeed, accompanying the legislation enabling CIMA's operational
independence in 2002, similar government-business collaboration facilitated
the Legislative Assembly's extension of the Authority's regulations in the
Securities Investment Business Law ("SIBL") and the Retail Mutual Funds
(Japan) Regulations. 502  Ridley "emphasize[d] CIMA's continued
commitment to working with the Cayman Islands Government to create the
optimal combination of business facilitation and prudent regulation to
ensure that Cayman is the ideal domicile for all types of financial
services."so3
A 2002 criminal investigation complicated Cayman's relationship with
Britain. As former Governor Russell described the incident:
Much of the evidence for the prosecution came from FRU
[Financial Reporting Unit] sources. Reportedly it emerged from
the trial that the head of the FRU had received payments from a
United Kingdom Agency which has been assumed to be M16. The
head of the FRU had an informant in the bank from whom much
of the evidence had been derived and which had been reported to
499. See Morriss & Henson, supra note 1, at 449-50.
500. Structure and Governance, CAYMAN ISLANDS MONETARY AUTHORITY,
http://www.cimoney.com.ky/aboutcima/about-ra.aspx?id=704 (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
501. Ridley, supra note 488, at 3.
502. Id.; Regulated Sectors: Securities, CAYMAN ISLANDS MONETARY AUTHORITY,
http://www.cimoney.com.ky/regulated sectors/regsec.aspx?id=102 (last visited Jan. 2, 2013)




Q&sig2=R3GyR8jdwJU28nlVg2u7Nw&bvm=bv.57155469,d.eWO (mutual funds regulations).
503. Ridley, supra note 488, at 3.
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the Agency. The relationship between the head of the FRU and the
informer was queried by defence counsel during the trial. His
relationship to an Agency in London, where further evidence was
understood to be available, then came to light. This had not been
disclosed to defence counsel. It is reported that an effort was made
to weed certain evidence of any intelligence information which the
authorities did not wish revealed to the general public. Some
evidence was also reportedly destroyed on instructions from
London by the head of the FRU. In face of these developments,
and on a statement by the Attorney-General that the prosecution
had no further evidence to present, the Chief Justice instructed the
jury to bring in verdicts of 'Not Guilty' against the accused.O"
The incident led to a vote of no confidence in the Attorney General, who
left the Islands so that he could not be questioned.' As Russell noted, this
incident raised important issues about Cayman's relationship with the U.K.,
as it revealed that the U.K. had conducted a covert operation in a British
Overseas Territory, and that this was known by senior British officials in
Cayman but not shared with the elected leadership.506 Given the U.K.'s
willingness to be creative in interpreting its powers in financial disputes, as
demonstrated by its use of anti-terrorism legislation against Icelandic banks
during the Icesave dispute with Iceland in 2008,0' this is a matter of
concern for an area where the U.K.'s reserved powers for defense intersect
with Cayman's autonomy in commercial matters.' Moreover, the lingering
controversy influenced the Terrorism Bill, 2003, with the opposition
dissenting over the bill's provision of authority to the governor to authorize
wiretaps and the Government removing the provision before final
passage.5 09 It also led to a restructuring of the Financial Reporting Unit
("FRU"), creating a new "Financial Reporting Authority," which proved
504. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 233; see also BODDEN, supra note 16, at 37-39, 165-172.
505. Cayman Hansard, Feb. 10, 2003, at 848-905. It also led to a later private member's
motion to seek to recover the government's costs of the investigation from the UK. Cayman
Hansard, Oct. 22, 2009, at 243-45.
506. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 233. Interestingly, a question was asked in the Legislative
Assembly on March 25, 1985 about whether "any electronic eaves-dropping devices have been
placed on telephones in the Cayman Islands with Government approval[]", to which the Official
Member Responsible for Internal and External Affairs answered "No." Cayman Hansard, Mar.
25, 1985, at 1.
507. See Andrew P. Morriss & Birgir Petursson, Global Economies, Regulatory Failure,
and Loose Money: Lessons for Regulating the Finance Sector from Iceland's Financial Crisis,
63 ALA. L. REv. 691, 762-64 (2012) (describing Icesave dispute).
508. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 233.
509. Cayman Hansard, July 17, 2003, at 470-7 1; July 24, 2003, at 552-54.
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controversial within the Legislative Assembly. The PPM argued that the
UDP proposal did not go far enough in ensuring the independence of the
new agencys"o and voted against the final bill,"' a significant breach in the
usual solidarity over measures to protect the financial industry. The
Government and Opposition also differed over the Government's approach
to the E.U. Savings Directive negotiations in 2003-200412 and the
Government's Tax Information Authority Bill, 2005, with the PPM arguing
that less authority to sign future agreements should be delegated to the
Government.51 3 The incident may have also given extra impetus to the
Legislative Assembly's own bid to increase its autonomy. 514 Despite these
tensions, the parties were able to cooperate to pass without incident a major
amendment to the Companies Law relating to insolvency which had been
suggested by a public-private review of the statute after a problematic U.S.
court decision.' Similarly, they worked together to amend the Monetary
Authority Act to allow CIMA to join the International Organization of
Securities Commissions ("IOSCO").1 6 And when in power both parties
pushed Tax Information Exchange Agreements needed to remove Cayman
from the OECD grey list and to "send the message that we are not a tax
haven, but on the contrary, we continue to be a responsible member of the
International Community that adheres to relevant international standards of
compliance with respect to tax co-operation.""
Despite some growing pains in the adjustment to the new party-based
political system, however, the collaborative governance model continued to
function even as politics became more explicitly partisan.118 The 2005
510. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 25, 2003, at 770-80.
511. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 29, 2003, at 802.
512. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 28, 2003, at 1078-79; Feb. 13, 2004, at 1285-94; Mar. 8,
2004, at 1311-13.
513. Cayman Hansard, Feb. 10, 2004, at 530-45.
514. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 6, 2006, at 384-91.
515. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 17, 2007, at 453-57.
516. Cayman Hansard, Dec. 10, 2007, at 654-58. CIMA ultimately joined IOSCO. Cayman
Hansard, Sept. 10, 2010, at 357.
517. Cayman Hansard, June 29, 2009, at 26; see also Cayman Hansard, Aug. 26, 2009, at
112-20 (agreeing to various TIEAs); Nov. 3, 2010, at 455-56 (discussing signing of tax
agreements, membership of Global Forum); June 15, 2010, at 19 (discussing plans for Tax
Information Authority).
518. See, e.g., Cayman Hansard, Aug. 26, 2009, at 119 (discussing Private Sector
Consultative Committee created by UDP government). Conflict grew over the UDP
government's grant of Caymanian status to a large number of individuals in the early 2000s.
Cayman Hansard, Sept. 18, 2003, at 627-59; Sept. 19, 2003, at 661-74; Sept. 22, 2003, at 675-
744. Conflict continued over whether to move to single member districts, with the PPM
favoring them and the UDP opposed (although the UDP did propose to convert only the PPM-
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elections, delayed because of the impact of Hurricane Ivan in fall 2004,
brought the PPM to power, reducing the UDP to four seats in West Bay and
one in Cayman Brac and Little Cayman. 9 The two members ousted from
the Executive Council in the 2001 "coup" became Leader of Government
Business (Kurt Tibbetts) and Speaker (Edna Moyle).5 20 The PPM
government also restarted the constitutional review with the UK FCO,
although with minimal cooperation at first from the UDP.5 2 1 Eventually the
two parties were able to agree on a set of constitutional reforms.5 22 This
removed the Financial Secretary as a member of the Legislative Assembly
and ended the voting power of the remaining official members (the
Attorney General and the Deputy Governor).5 23 However, even as internal
political stresses grew, both PPM and UDP governments were generally
able to continue the government's close working relationship with the
private sector.524
In 2007 French periodical Le Temps examined OFCs.52 5 It suggested how
these historically-rooted factors made the Cayman Islands the "world's
leading haven for the domicile of offshore hedge funds."S26 Phillippe Jabre,
CEO of investment management firms in London and Geneva, domiciled
his hedge fund Jab Cap Multi Strategy Fund in Cayman; over the course of
2007 its value reached $3.5 billion.5 27 With territorial "choices" a "standard
practice," Cayman benefitted from being a British Overseas Territory where
the common language was English among a population of 52,000, including
stronghold of George Town to single member districts for the 2005 election.) Cayman Hansard,
Oct. 3, 2003, at 853-54; Nov. 19, 2003, at 896-927; Nov. 20, 2003, at 929-58; Nov. 21, 2003,
at 959-84; Nov. 24, 2003, at 985-1008; Nov. 26, 2003, at 1010-45 (single member districts for
George Town debate).
519. CAYMAN ISLANDS GOVERNMENT, 2004-2005 ANNUAL REPORT 9-13 (2005).
520. Cayman Hansard, May 18, 2005, at 4-5, 9; Nov. 30, 2005, at 545 (delay).
521. Cayman Hansard, Mar. 23, 2005, at 722-23; Mar. 23, 2006, at 722 (UDP did not
attend meeting with FCO). The process created by the PPM is described in Cayman Hansard,
Apr. 27, 2007, at 21-22; see also Cayman Hansard, June 27, 2008, at 288 (UDP did not
participate).
522. Cayman Hansard, Feb. 11, 2009, at 807-14. The final vote to present the constitution
in a referendum was unanimous. Cayman Hansard, Feb. 23, 2008, at 902. The major issue that
was not resolved was a conflict over the reach of the Bill of Rights. See id. at 874.
523. Cayman Hansard, June 18, 2010, at 36.
524. See, e.g., Cayman Hansard, Apr. 28, 2006, at 13 (describing consultations with private
sector over revenue measures); Oct. 7, 2009, at 188 (describing "revenue enhancement group"
of public and private members).
525. Yves Genier, The Cayman Islands Establish Themselves as the Offshore Capital for
Hedge Funds, LE TEMPS, Sept. 19, 2007 (Fr.).
526. Id. at 1.
527. Id.
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"400 registered lawyers, the density . .. twice as high as the already densely
populated Geneva."5 2 8 Since the mid-1990s, investors in funds displaced
individual private banking clients through the growing expertise of CIMA
and "offshore specialist law firm[s]" like Maples & Calder.5 29 During the
same period, the Cayman-registered funds' "dynamic" growth resulted from
expertise CIMA, the law firms, and other financial professionals provided,
along with "the tax system, a very flexible legislative system, a tradition of
British law, a concentration of highly skilled, English-speaking labor and
proximity to the United States (a one and a half hour flight from Miami)." 3 o
Cayman financial services lawyer Bryan Hunter declared, "We can sort [the
registration fees] all out for less than US$6,000."53 '
Le Temps noted that Cayman regulators readily adopted international
standards.532 To address money laundering and the illicit drug trade the
U.K., United States, and Cayman signed the 1986 MLAT; shortly thereafter
the supranational Financial Action Task Force ("FATF") complimented
Cayman for its expeditious compliance with the global standards MLAT
embodied.533 In 2000 FATF blacklisted Cayman for being among "non
cooperative jurisdictions in the fight against money laundering."534 But the
next year Cayman signed a "second treaty on mutual tax assistance with the
United States, conferring to the latter the right to investigate the region on
the basis of suspicions of tax fraud by American residents." 35 The FATF
promptly removed the "Cayman Islands . . . from the black list after one
year. In the meantime they had adapted their legislation and strengthened
their surveillance systems. They understood that the survival of their
position relied on the implementation of international regulations against
money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities."536 Still, CIMA
Chairman Ridley said, Cayman officials had "responded to the market
expectations."" Admittedly, "pressure" from the U.S., U.K., and E.U.
preceded Cayman signing agreements in the "fight against money
laundering and the bilateral treaty with the United States instituting the
exchange of information re taxation." Yet since Cayman was "a British
528. Id.
529. Id. at 2.
530. Id.
531. Id. at 1-2.
532. Id.
533. Id. at 3-4.
534. Id. at 3.
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. Ridley, supra note 488, at 3.
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Overseas Territory and therefore not a sovereign state, the final decision did
emerge from London."'
Finally, Le Temps addressed the "negative attitude" held in the United
States and large European nations regarding the Cayman financial center."'
Ridley replied that the Cayman government consistently policed scandals
like the global collapse of BCCI and evils of money laundering and drug
trafficking.540 "Our mistake is not to have understood early enough the full
extent of the damage that such scandals that were unfolding far from our
shores would have on our reputation." 4 1 In addition, "Our confidential
banking system has been misunderstood. Our law is similar to that of the
U.K. Each country has its own preference in terms of transparency." 42 The
Cayman financial sector initially resisted CIMA's adoption of "individual
electronic reporting of business" by regulated entities.5 43 Although the
growth of party politics reflected increased political tensions in Cayman
society, elected officials from all parties supported CIMA, given that in
return for a budget of "around US$20 million" it "[repaid] the government
each year approximately $65 million in the form of licenses and other [fee]
rights."54 4 Financial Secretary (Minister), Kenneth Jefferson concluded:
"[W]we welcome any business operation as long as they respect our laws."
[The simple] opening of a bank account requires the client to
follow many administrative steps. Such strict conditions are never
mentioned by the foreign countries. Our financial sector is so
successful because the laws of the larger countries have developed
fiscal regimes that have allowed us to flourish. Ultimately our 'tax
neutral policy' serves the interests of investors because it
decreases the costs of their investments."545
Unfortunately, as then-Premier McKeeva Bush noted in 2010, "This is
2010. This is not 1966."S46 Cayman was no longer under the radar and now
had to engage in setting global financial standards to survive.
538. Id. at 3-4.
539. Genier, supra note 525, at 3.





545. Id. at 5-8. Even Caymanian critics of the financial industry see it as well-regulated.
See, e.g., BODDEN, supra note 18, at xxiii (industry "meticulously regulated" today).
546. Cayman Hansard, June 21, 2010, at 87.
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C. Coping with Crises
Three recent crises have tested or continue to test the robustness of the
Cayman collaborative policy making process. First, on September 11-12,
2004, Hurricane Ivan passed close by Grand Cayman (the eye was within
twenty-one miles of the island), causing considerable damage to real and
personal property including directly affecting more than eighty percent of
people on the island.5 4 7 Winds reached between 155-200 mph and the storm
surge was over eight feet.5 48 Ninety-five percent of structures in Grand
Cayman were damaged. 549 The destruction totaled 183% of the previous
year's GDP, an astounding amount. 5' And it consumed $36.5 million in
post-storm spending, approximately 8.5% of the 2005-06 budget."' This
illustrated the significant threat to a financial services-based island economy
from natural disasters.
Although the tourism industry suffered a temporary setback due to storm
damage, the financial industry did not. As a UN report noted,
Financial services and offshore activities did not suffer any
significant direct damage as such and were quickly operating, in
some cases even while the storm was still over the jurisdiction.
Through re-routing of business and by placing staff abroad in an
efficient and immediate manner this sector almost did not miss a
beat. It has not been possible, though, to assess its increased
operating costs that must have been significant. A sign of those is
the expenses incurred in travel and relocation of their staff and
families, and in operating through alternative communications and
utilities.
This quick response and immediate recovery is crucial to
maintain the country's lead in these activities and is surely
recognized by their clients, as is attested by the fact that, even
during the month of September, the number of company
547. United Nations Econ. Comm'n for Latin America, The Impact of Hurricane Ivan in
the Cayman Islands, at 13 (2004), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDISMGMT/Resources/CaymanIsL645-Partel.pdf
[hereinafter "ECLA"].
548. Id. at 18.
549. Cayman Hansard, Sept. 12, 2005, at 161.
550. Cayman marks sixth anniversary of Hurricane Ivan, CAYMAN NEWS SERVICE (Sept.
11, 2010), http://www.caymannewsservice.com/science-and-nature/2010/09/11/cayman-marks-
sixth-anniversary-hurricane-ivan.
551. Cayman Hansard, Oct. 10, 2005, at 190.
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registrations increased, in keeping with the very positive trend
observed during the first three quarters of the year.552
Since Ivan, Caymanian firms and the government have taken additional
steps to enhance the robustness of the financial infrastructure.5 3 The Islands
can thus be said to have successfully dealt with this challenge.
Second, the world financial crisis beginning in 2007 reduced Caymanian
government revenue from both financial industry fees (as the global
financial industry contracted) and tourism.554 In response, the Caymanian
Premier, with the advice of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
appointed a three member commission (which became known as the "Miller
Commission") to "assess the Government's fiscal challenges and to make
recommendations."55 ' The commission included James Miller III, former
director of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, David Shaw, a
former member of the British Parliament, and Kenneth Jefferson, the then
Financial Secretary of the Cayman Islands and an accountant who had
worked for PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young.5 6 The final
report, however, was signed by Miller and Shaw alone, although it
represented the work of multiple experts.5 '
The Miller Commission concluded that government expenditures were
outstripping government revenues, there were few alternative sources of
revenue available, and restructuring and cuts would be necessary.5 It
552. ECLA, supra note 529, at 31; see also WALKER, supra note 17, at 200 ("The
Government, Cable and Wireless, [the utility] and many private individuals worked tirelessly to
get the systems back up; Monday morning was total devastation and by Thursday we, the bank
and the country, were open for business.").
553. See, e.g., Torrin Stafford, One Year on from Hurricane Ivan: What Lessons Have Been
Learnt?, CONTINUrrY CENTRAL (Oct. 14, 2005),
http://www.continuitycentral.com/feature0253.htm; Hit Hard by Ivan, Cayman Financial
Services in Recovery, BusiNEss WIRE (Sept. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Hard+Hit+by+Ivan%2c+Cayman+Financial+Services+in+Recov
ery-a0122728734; Financial Services, CAYMAN PREPARED,
http://www.caymanprepared.gov.ky/portal/page?_pageid=3701,6816134&_dad=portal&_schem
a=PORTAL (describing collaborative response by industry and government and "how lessons
learned had since been used to strengthen Cayman's resilience").
554. This was not the beginning of financial issues for the government, however. As early
as 2001, there were public worries that the government was spending more than it took in. See,
e.g., Cayman Hansard, Apr. 4, 2001, at 350 (acknowledging public perception that "[i]t was
costing the Cayman government more to operate than it was taking in").
555. Miller Commission, supra note 462, at 3; see also Cayman Hansard, Nov. 18, 2009, at
298-99 (discussing appointment of Miller Commission).
556. Miller Commission, supra note 462, at 3.
557. Id.
558. Id. at 3-4 (summarizing major conclusions and recommendations).
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rejected imposing direct taxation as a possible means of enhancing
government revenue. 559 Since the commission's final report was issued on
February 26, 2010, the Cayman government has continued to struggle with
revenue issues5 60 and has not, as yet, adopted the level of cuts and
restructuring recommended by the commission. As Cayman fell into
deficit financing, its constitution forced it to turn to the UK for approval for
financial decisions, reducing the government's autonomy.5 62 The dispute
over these issues is one expression of what William Walker termed "a rift
between the sometimes diverging needs and wants" of the local and
expatriate populations that began to emerge as the expatriate population
grew.16 1 "Throughout the '60s and '70s, we all lived in each other's pockets,
we circulated to the same parties, we saw each other everywhere, we did
business together and so we lived well together, Caymanian and expatriate
alike. It was impossible to separate yourself. . . ."' By the late 1980s,
however, "the ability to separate oneself became easier.", 65 Similarly,
Caymanian historian Roy Bodden worried that young Caymanians lacked
access to careers in the financial sector and that this would ultimately lead
to problems.6
Public disagreements over budget cuts marked the relationship between
then-Premier McKeeva Bush and then-Governor Duncan Taylor, including
over who had the authority to reduce the size of the civil service (with the
Premier insisting only the Governor could do so).61 Controversy within
559. Id. at 4 ("Major" recommendation one was "[d]o not impose direct taxation.").
560. See Mitchell, supra note 462; CIG faces cash flow issues, CAYMAN NEWS SERVICE
(Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.caymannewsservice.com/politics/2013/01/17/cig-faces-cash-flow-
issues.
561. Richard W. Rahn, Is Cayman Committing Economic Suicide?, CAYMAN FINANCIAL
REVIEW (Oct. 12, 2012), available at http://www.compasscayman.com/cfr/2012/10/12/Is-
Cayman-committing-economic-suicide-/.
562. See, e.g., Cayman Hansard, Oct. 2, 2009, at 138 (describing correspondence with U.K.
over budget); Dec. 2, 2009, at 331 (discussing budget deficits); Mar. 25, 2010, at 566
(discussing budget deficits); June 15, 2010, at 11 (discussing need for FCO approval of budget);
June 10, 2011, at 26-27 (discussing FCO permission); June 15, 2011, at 42 (opposition
discussing government's failure to control budget leading to need for FCO approval); Nov. 5,
2012, at 267-76 (discussing FCO role in budget process); Nov. 14, 2012, at 358, 372-78
(explaining dispute with FCO over budget).
563. WALKER, supra note 17, at 186.
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. BODDEN, supra note 16, at xxv. Bodden also identified immigration as "potentially the
most divisive issue facing the Caymanian community" in the early 21st Century. Id. at 99.
567. See, e.g., Brent Fuller, Premier: 'We've gone as far as we can,' CAYMANIAN COMPASS
(July 27, 2012), http://www.compasscayman.com/story.aspx?id=103905 ("The governor of this
territory is responsible for the civil service, not the premier," the premier said. "I do not hire-
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Cayman over how to cope with the deficit grew during 2012, with a
"backbench revolt" over the terms of a "Framework for Fiscal
Responsibility" negotiated between Bush and Britain.56 8 Because the
Caymanian constitution requires U.K. approval of deficit budgets, the
Islands found themselves in a difficult negotiating position with Britain.
Unfortunately for the Islands, this weakened position coincided with a
political uproar in Britain over multinational companies' use of OFCs to
reduce their U.K. tax liabilities.7 o In the summer of 2012 the government
floated the idea of a "community enhancement fee" (effectively a payroll
tax) on expatriate workers earning above CI$20,000 per year and brought in
significant increases in work permit fees."' The financial industry opposed
the proposed payroll tax, which the government ultimately withdrew.57 2
nor fire-nor do we sign any contract for any employed civil servant. The governor himself is
better able to explain why the civil service levels are so high."); Mac Attacks Taylor, CAYMAN
NEWS SERVICE (May 4, 2012), http://caymannewsservice.com/politics/2012/05/04/mac-attacks-
taylor (describing claims by Bush that Taylor was undermining Cayman); Cayman Hansard,
June 10, 2011, at 27 ("I do not have administrative responsibility over civil servants.")
(statement of Premier McKeeva Bush); see also Cayman Hansard, Oct. 5, 2009, at 167 (MLA
Ezzard Miller complaining about "veiled threat" in Governor's statement that "Good
governance is also fundamental to the Islands' future".). Earlier, however, Bush had referred to
Taylor as "cooperative" in addressing the financial issues. Cayman Hansard, Dec. 6, 2010, at
603.
568. Back-Benchers Revolt on FFR, CAYMAN NEWS SERVICE (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://www.caymannewsservice.com/politics/2012/11/15/back-benchers-revolt-ffr ("Just a week
short of a year since McKeeva Bush actually signed the FFR and made the commitment to the
UK to pass it into local law before the end of the last financial year, via the PMFL, the
framework has at last been formalized. After missing several deadlines imposed by the FCO to
enact the necessary legislation and following a crisis between the premier and the UK minister
over the tardiness in its passage and, more importantly, additions Bush had attempted to include
in the law, the premier told the opposition that they should credit him with bringing the bill to
the House.").
569. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 231 (forecasting such issues would arise); see also BODDEN,
supra note 15, at 114 ( "[T]he financial oversight [before the financial crisis] on the part of the
administering power in relation to the Cayman Islands amounts to an intrusion into a realm in
which the Cayman Islands have an excellent record.").
570. See Louise Armistead, Autumn Statement: Britain to Drive G8 Crackdown on
Company Tax Avoidance, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/budget/9725302/Autumn-Statement-Britain-to-drive-G8-
crackdown-on-company-tax-avoidance.html ( "[Britain's] Chancellor said he was committed to
'leading the international effort' to prevent international companies transferring profits away
from major economies, including Britain, to tax havens.").
571. Brent Fuller, Payroll Tax 'Worst Option', CAYMANIAN COMPASS (July 27, 2012),
http://www.compasscayman.com/story.aspx?id=103867 (describing debate over tax).
572. See Business Associations Blast Payroll Tax, CAYMANIAN COMPASS (Aug. 3, 2012),
available at http://www.compasscayman.com/caycompass/2012/08/03/Business-associations-
blast-payroll-tax/ ("The Associations regard the Community Enhancement Fee in its current
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Some Caymanians worried the U.K. would misuse its budget authority to
undermine the financial services industry, 7' and it would not be difficult to
imagine a British Prime Minister hostile to the offshore industry, such as
former Prime Minister Gordon Brown,S74 using this as a lever to make
Cayman less competitive.
As of this writing, the Islands have not yet found a solution to the
problem of matching revenues to expenditure, although a private-public
"budget board" had been appointed to seek consensus on measures to
address the problems. 7' The U.K.'s appointment of Helen Kirkpatrick as
Governor, effective September 2013, also signaled continued metropolitan
concern over finances. Kirkpatrick had previously been the acting Home
Office Permanent Secretary and Accounting Officer in the U.K., and has
extensive experience in local government finance.17' The difficulty stems
from the relatively large size of the civil service payroll and the benefits of
government expenditure among the Caymanian electorate, making cuts
politically difficult, combined with the possible competitive disadvantage
further increases in work permit fees, filing fees, or other finance industry
or tourism-related revenue measures might create. To take but one example,
the money-losing Cayman Airways5 77 is unlikely to be privatized not only
because it is a significant employer in the Islands but because residents
perceive it to be an important resource after its role in assisting evacuation
before Hurricane Ivan. However one might describe the disagreements over
the fiscal issues among Caymanians, the British government, and the
financial industry, it certainly cannot be termed collaborative policymaking.
Further complicating matters, multiple and lengthy investigations into
Premier McKeeva Bush over corruption charges led to his arrest in
form to be discriminatory, divisive to society and inequitable." (quoting Cayman Islands
Council of Associations)).
573. Cayman Hansard, Nov. 9, 2012, at 337 (statement of MLA Ellio Solomon, arguing
that the FCO seeks to "destroy" financial services industry through budget).
574. Brown "raised the issue of tax evasion repeatedly at meetings of the G8 and the G20"
while in office. Patrick Wintour & Phillip Iman, Offshore Tax Evasion Crackdown Expected to
Raise E1Obn, THE GuARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/nov/13/offshore-tax-evasion-crackdown-billions.
575. Budget Board Appointed, CAYMAN NEWS SERVICE (Oct. 9, 2012),
http://www.caymannewsservice.com/politics/2012/10/09/budget-board-appointed (describing
the composition of the new budget board consisting of two private sector representatives and a
group of civil servants and headed by a deputy governor).
576. Cayman's New Governor Announced, CAYMAN NET NEWS (June 19, 2013),
http://caymannetnews.com/2013/06/19/caymans-new-governor-announced/.
577. Miller Commission, supra note 462, at 43 tbl.4-1 (noting losses of CI$2.6 million in
2008-09 and CI$4.5 million in 2007-08 and negative net worth of CIS42.7 million as of June
30, 2009).
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December 2012."' Although as of this writing Bush has not been charged,
he was removed from office on a no-confidence vote in which a majority of
his own party joined the opposition in voting against him.57 9 Bush charged
that his removal was the result of a "vendetta" by the Governor.so
After the no-confidence motion, the Governor then appointed Bush's
former deputy, Julianna O'Connor-Connolly, as Premier and she led a
minority government until the May 2013 elections."' The PPM won the
elections and the post-election negotiations brought O'Connor-Connolly
into the party and two of the five independents into the government. Former
Premier Bush won reelection along with two supporters and formed the
official Opposition. The outcome of the investigation into the former
Premier and the continuing budgetary issues pose serious challenges for the
continuation of the collaborative policy making process and the Caymanian
constitutional order more generally. The political turmoil also raised
questions among some observers about whether CIMA's independence
would continue.
Two quite different outcomes of these events define the range of possible
futures. (Of course, many intermediate scenarios are also possible.) The
optimistic scenario for the Islands is that the corruption investigation into
the former Premier proves to be a legitimate police matter, rather than a
personal vendetta, and a jury ultimately resolves the question of his guilt or
innocence in a manner that proves convincing to the majority of Caymanian
residents and the broader financial community one way or another. The new
government resolves the budget problems through a combination of budget
cuts, revenue enhancements, and reforms. Cayman then regains its fiscal
autonomy, strengthening its position with respect to the U.K. If this is the
outcome of the fiscal and political crises, Cayman will emerge stronger as a
jurisdiction, just as it did from Hurricane Ivan. As the Jamaica Gleaner
admiringly noted in an editorial, it is relatively unusual for a sitting
578. Matt Blake, Cayman Islands Leader McKeeva Bush is Arrested on Suspicion of
Corruption, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 11, 2012), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2246518/Cayman-Islands-leader-McKeeva-Bush-arrested-suspicion-corruption.html.
579. Cayman Islands MPs Vote against Premier McKeeva Bush, BBC NEWS (Dec. 19,
2012), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-20779961; Cayman
Hansard, Dec. 18, 2012, at 592-97 (Motion of Lack of Confidence passes 11-3).
580. Byron Buckley, Embattled Cayman Islands Premier Might Quit Party, THE GLEANER
(Dec. 16, 2012), available at http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20121216/news/newsl.html.
581. Alexander Britell, Juliana O'Connor-Connolly Named New Premier of the Cayman
Islands, CARIBBEAN JOURNAL (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://www.caribjournal.com/2012/12/19/juliana-oconnor-connolly-named-new-premier-of-
cayman-islands/.
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Caribbean government leader to be arrested over corruption charges and
then to be ousted by members of his own party.58 2 In this optimistic
scenario, the collaborative policymaking process reappears after the system
demonstrates that it works.
An alternative pessimistic scenario is that the investigation into the
former premier proves inconclusive or yields a divisive verdict (of either
guilt or innocence), Caymanian politics fracture, and the new government
proves unable to resolve the fiscal issues and conflict of financial questions
with the UK increases. These stresses make Cayman unable to rise to the
challenge posed by the U.S. FATCA and the various "son of FATCA"
initiatives by European governments.' As a result, the finance sector falls
into decline, with other OFCs gradually luring business away from Cayman
by pointing to the instability caused by the combination of fiscal problems,
increased British interference caused by a growing Caymanian dependence
on UK funding assistance, and continuing disputes among local political
factions.584 All of this leads to a long-term breakdown in the collaborative
policy-making model, with additional efforts to extract resources from the
finance sector (as with the "service fee" on expatriates) pushing firms to
other jurisdictions.
CONCLUSION
Understanding how constitutional structure shaped the history of the
Cayman financial center offers a response to critics' preoccupation with
actual or imagined abuses. OFC critics generally ignore the role of the
United States and European nations in tax avoidance policies used by
multinational corporations and wealthy individuals and those nations' own
roles as tax havens.' They also often ignore the key role of the financial
582. Editorial, supra note 469.
583. Salman Shaheen, UK to Impose Son of FATCA on Crown Dependencies, Despite
Government's Denials, INTERNATIONAL TAX REVIEw (Nov. 23, 2012), available at
http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3121964/EXCLUSIVE-UK-to-impose-son-of-
FATCA-on-Crown-Dependencies-despite-govemments-denials.html; Letter from G5 to the
European Commission, (Apr. 9, 2013), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/208068/g5letter
_to european commission 090413.pdf (advocating FATCA approach).
584. There would be some irony in this, as Cayman used similar arguments to lure business
from the Bahamas in the late 1960s and early 1970s. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying
text.
585. See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y.
TIMEs (June 30, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how-
delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-tax-haven.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0; UK Is a Tax Haven,
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sector in economic development in OFCs. Faced with a declining economy
dependent upon seamen remittances and subsistence agriculture, Cayman
enacted the 1960 Companies Law, the basis of all subsequent banking, and
financial services and related legislation. Diversification in financial
products and regulation followed basic changes in the Cayman
constitutional structure. In 1959, 1972, 1993, and 2009 constitutional
change extended Caymanians' self-government and popular faith in
maintaining a role for Britain that enforced checks-and-balances and the
rule of law. Caymanian stability rested in part on what-within the
Caribbean-were balanced proportions of black, white, and mixed-race
people. While racial animosity sometimes divided individuals on a personal
level, government, social, and economic leaders from each group managed
the transition from "Team" to party politics, disputing practical policy
outcomes rather than racial or social-class ideologies and giving the Islands
considerable political stability in a region where that was often lacking.586
Cayman's political system continues to have significant areas of instability;
the issue of single member districts, which garnered a majority of votes but
not of registered voters in a 2012 referendum,5 8 7 remains a point that is
likely to be revisited, and significant powers of the governor over the civil
service seem likely to continue to create tension with the Legislative
Assembly.
The Cayman global competitive advantage thus did not originate in
corrupt practices; it grew instead from a history of social and constitutional
stability sustaining collaborative policymaking among elected officials,
legal professionals, and U.K. and Cayman civil service authorities like
CIMA. In part, Cayman's success rested on the widespread understanding
among those who came of age as the financial services industry developed
and who remembered the days of thatch rope and turtle fishing. As
Caymanian Truman Bodden put it in 1981, "Most Caymanians are
homeowners, sir . .. and most of them have been to sea. They know how
quickly a country can be wrecked, and that if they do anything stupid they'll
Says Tax Expert Richard Murphy, THE METHODIST CHURCH IN BRITAIN (July 2, 2012),
http://www.methodist.org.uk/news-and-events/news-archive-2012/uk-is-a-tax-haven-says-tax-
expert-richard-murphy.
586. Bodden argues that "the success and future of the Cayman Islands lie in the ability to
maintain the synergistic and symbiotic relationship between established Caymanians and their
expatriate (status-holding) counterparts." BODDEN, supra note 16, at 41.
587. Brent Fuller, One Man, One Vote Referendum Failed, but Passed, CAYCOMPASS.COM
(May 9, 2013), http://www.compasscayman.com/caycompass/2013/05/09/One-man,-one-vote-
referendum-failed,-but-passed/.
1394 [Ariz. St. L.J.
lose. We mustn't kill the goose that lays the golden egg."5 " As one
Legislative Assembly member noted in 1987, "It is important that we keep
our islands financially independent so that we can determine and control our
economic development without having to abide by the dictates of others."'
The evolution of the Caymanian financial sector has three key lessons
for the rest of the world. First, financial services can provide a viable
development strategy for small jurisdictions if they get the details right. As
Roy Bodden noted, "Cayman has volunteered to regulate itself and has
established a record of meticulousness and discretion."59 0 This may not be
enough. In 2009, MLA Anthony Eden pointed out that, "we have complied
with every international requirement for transparency" but "they keep
stretching the goalpost."S91 Cayman continues to strive to cross that goal
line; in March 2013 the government announced it would attempt to sign a
Model 1 Intergovernmental Agreement with the United States under the US
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act.5 9 2 Creating a climate that attracts
financial professionals requires constitutional, political and legal stability
and adaptability. Small (and perhaps larger as well) jurisdictions cannot rest
on their laurels-they must innovate to develop new products and services
and improve existing ones. The same attributes contribute to making these
jurisdictions attractive places for their citizens. It is no wonder that these
jurisdictions "have resisted the efforts of the OECD that they concede their
sovereignty by cooperating fully with the desires of developed states' own
economic strategies." 593 Moreover, these attributes provide what one
Caymanian legislator termed Cayman's "financial and economic
independence"-what he termed "all the independence we need".5 94
Second, a successful OFC is not just a nexus of professionals,
telecommunications and air routes. It also requires a regulatory framework
that reinforces and supports the financial sector. That support includes not
only creating appropriate legislation but also establishing capable regulators
588. SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 284; see also Cayman Hansard, Mar. 11, 1976, at 18
(remarks of MLA John Jefferson) ("Now let us go back to the days before any investor came to
these shores, there was rope making, people went to the swamps to get bark from the trees, it
was sold to Jamaica along with the rope. They went to the Cays to catch turtle and sharks, they
were sold to the United States. In this country, people couldn't hardly live, because of the
mosquitos, as much as twenty and thirty cattle died during the mosquito season. Mr. President,
those conditions don't exist today, and thank God they don't exist.").
589. Cayman Hansard, Feb. 11, 1987, at 31.
590. BODDEN, supra note 16, at 138.
591. Cayman Hansard, Oct. 22, 2009, at 251.
592. Cayman Hansard, Mar. 15, 2013, at 721.
593. VLCEK, supra note 2, at 5.
594. Cayman Hansard, Mar. 1, 2000, at 97.
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who can both weed out bad apples and participate in international fora
where the future of financial markets are determined. More than a wall with
brass name plates is needed to participate in the financial industry today.
Cayman's development of a collaborative policy-making process enabled it
to strike the balance necessary to innovate and grow while screening out
problematic individuals, firms, and lines of business.'
Finally, Cayman and its neighbors illustrate the fragility of successful
legal, political, and constitutional arrangements-a fragility that larger
nations would do well to keep in mind in future financial regulation. Britain
has-some of the time-acknowledged her responsibilities to her current
overseas territories and former colonies; other European and North
American nations have been less attuned to the impact of their policies
abroad (possibly Britain's keener sense of responsibility may stem from her
fear that she will be forced to subsidize her overseas territories should their
financial sectors fail). As former Cayman Governor Russell noted in his
memoir, "The basic problem is that there has never been direct taxation in
the Cayman Islands. The outside world is the wolf without the tail trying to
persuade a very happy bushy-tailed wolf to be the same." 9 6 There is no
question that the U.K., the EU, and the United States have the power to
amputate the tiny Cayman wolf's bushy tail if they chose to do so. But if
international relations are more than the exertion of brute force, there are
important issues that need to be addressed in the development of
international financial law with respect to OFCs. This requires broadly
inclusive international consultations, not narrow efforts at defining best
practices through rich nations' clubs like the OECD or unilateral,
asymmetric measures like the United States' efforts through FATCA to
force other countries to comply with U.S. regulatory measures. While it
remains to be seen whether Cayman can avoid killing the goose that lays the
golden eggs, there remain significant outside threats to the goose.
595. Roy Bodden makes a similar point, arguing that "Over the course of the past two
decades since it emerged as a major financial centre, Cayman has had to make major
adjustments to its modus operandi to maintain credibility and standing. Each time challenges
were encountered, the jurisdiction, like a chameleon, changed operational practices to meet the
required criteria." BODDEN, supra note 16, at 129.
596. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 193.
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APPENDIX: KEY DATES IN CAYMAN'S DEVELOPMENT
Date Event
1959 - Cayman Islands legislative connection to Jamaica ends
- UK Labour Party issues Tax Dodgers
1960 - Companies Law passed by Legislative Assembly
1962 - Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago withdraw from Federation of
West Indies
- Cayman Islands elect to retain link with Britain rather than
affiliate with Jamaica
1963 - US Interest Equalization Tax imposed
1964 - William Walker moves to Cayman
1965 - US Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program begins
1966 - Exchange Control Law, Trusts Law, and Banks and Trust
Companies Law passed by Legislative Assembly
1968 - The Bahamas achieves majority rule
1970 - Legislative Assembly votes for increased self government powers
1971 - Earl of Oxford and Asquith conducts constitutional review
1971 - Collapse of Bretton Woods exchange regime
- UK government issues Competition and Credit Control White
Paper
1972 - New constitution grants increased self government
- Caymanian Protection Law passed by Legislative Assembly
- Cayman dollar created, linked to British pound
- Cayman Islands relaxes exchange controls
1973 - UK Labour Party issues Plugging a tax loophole paper
1974 - Doucet - Interbank scandal
- Cayman dollar linked to US dollar
1974 - US Interest Equalization Tax repealed
1976 - Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law passed by
Legislative Assembly
1979 - Insurance Law passed by Legislative Assembly
1979 - End of UK exchange control
1982 - Cayman opens UK office
1984 - Narco Agreement signed with United States
1986 - Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty signed by UK, U.S., and Cayman
1987 - Financial Action Task Force created
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Date Event
1989 - Legislative Assembly Finance Committee overrules government,
provoking a political crisis
1990 - Post of Speaker created in Legislative Assembly
- Mutual Fund Law passed by Legislative Assembly
1991 - BCCI collapses
- John Grisham's The Firm is published
1992 - National Team government elected
1993 - Constitution amended
1995 - Financial Services Supervisory Department created by Cayman
government to replace Banking Inspectorate
1996 - CIMA created
1998 - CIMA begins onsite inspections of financial institutions
1999 - UK government issues Partnership for Progress White Paper for
Dependent Territories
2000 - FATF lists Cayman as "non compliant" (blacklist)
2001 - Cayman removed from FATCA blacklist
2001 - UDP & PPM formed after National Team fractures
- McKeeva Bush leads no confidence maneuver that ousts Leader of
Government Business Kurt Tibbets
2002 - CIMA becomes independent
- Legislative Assembly votes no confidence in Attorney General
over use of British intelligence agencies in Cayman
- EU issues first Savings Directive aimed at OFCs
2002 - Constitution revised
2004 - Hurricane Ivan
2005 - Tax Information Authority Law passes Legislative Assembly
2009 - New constitution issued
- Miller Commission appointed
2012 - UDP government floats idea of "community enhancement fee"
(aka income tax) for high income expatriates
- Premier McKeeva Bush arrested
- Vote of no confidence carries
- UDP splits
- Deputy Premier Julianna O'Connor-Connolly becomes premier at
head of a minority government
2013 - PPM government elected
- Julianna O'Connor-Connolly switches parties
- UK appoints Helen Kirkpatrick as Governor
